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                                                             Abstract 
 
Under the common law ‘identification principle’ criminal fault can only be attributed 
to a corporation if a sufficiently senior individual, typically a director, is guilty of the 
offence in question.  This is problematic in itself given the typically complex and 
decentralised organisational structures of large companies.  However, it is 
particularly ill-suited to address instances of pervasive and systemic corporate fraud, 
such as may have been evidenced in the recent widespread mis-selling scandals. In 
response to the difficulties associated with the ‘identification principle’, various 
alternative approaches have been mooted.  Whilst the realist nature of organisations 
is now widely acknowledged, proposals for reform implicitly perceive the need to 
prove criminal mens rea as problematic and therefore construct an altogether 
different basis of fault, such as negligence or the ‘failure to prevent’ model.  
However, whereas the negligence-type model fails to express adequately the 
deceptive nature of fraud, the ‘failure to prevent’ construct is equally ill-suited in that 
fraud is peculiar, it is not an activity in itself but the way in which an activity is 
performed.  This thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge by identifying 
the legal principles and evidential mechanisms through which mens rea can be 
attributed directly to an organisation such that a corporate prosecution under the 
Fraud Act 2006 can be sustained without the need to identify individual criminality.  
Further, the proposed return to a manifest approach to fault attribution does not 
disturb the actus reus / mens rea construct of criminality and neuro-scientific 
advances made in relation to mirror neurons provide a radical new understanding of 
how fault can be ascertained in both individual and collective action.  Accordingly, 
the perception that the manifest approach to fault is incompatible with the 
subjectivist ideology of the criminal law melts away with exciting implications for a 
theory of corporate criminality generally.   
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1.    Introduction 
 
1.1   The need for a new model of corporate liability for fraud 
 
Whilst fraud is a global problem,
1
 it is estimated to have cost the UK economy alone 
£52 billion during 2013.
2
  Although frauds perpetrated by individuals have 
demonstrated how devastating this particular crime can be,
3
 such instances are 
dwarfed by widespread and systemic fraud committed in the corporate context.  For 
example, reporting in January 2015, the Financial Ombudsman observed that it will 
be years before the scandal of mis-selling personal protection insurance will be 
over.
4
  In an activity dating back to the 1990s, an estimated £50 billion worth of 
protection policies have been sold by hundreds of different financial businesses, 
resulting in millions of complainants and around £22 billion paid out in 
compensation thusfar.
5
  Whilst the mis-selling of this particular financial product 
accounts for 74% of complaints, others relate to interest rate hedging schemes, 
packaged accounts, interest only mortgages, investments and other insurance 
products.
6
   
 
Although some of the frauds perpetrated in the commercial context are readily 
identifiable as the acts of particular individuals, who would therefore attract personal 
criminal culpability, other corporate activities are so systemic and pervasive that it is 
                                                             
1 It is suggested that the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-9 cost $11.9 trillion, one-fifth of global 
output and a significant contributing factor was the USA’s sub-prime mortgage market in which 
borrowers and lenders alike were dishonest as regards the capacity to repay the loans. As 
mortgagors inevitably defaulted, the seeds of the financial crisis were sown, see Geoffrey Smith and 
others, Studying Fraud as White Collar Crime (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 2. 
2 <http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/annual-fraud-indicator--2> accessed 31 October 
2014, National Fraud Authority publication, 6 June 2013.  It was previously estimated to have cost 
the UK economy £73 billion during 2011, see 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118532/annual-
fraud-indicator-2011.pdf accessed 7 May 2015. 
3 For example, Bernard Madoff pleaded guilty to a $65 billion investment fraud in March 2009.  He 
pleaded guilty to 11 offences related to his wealth management company, including securities fraud, 
wire fraud, mail fraud, money laundering, making false statements and returns to the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission.  He operated the world’s largest ever ‘Ponzi’ scheme. 
4 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-30695720> accessed 6 January 2015. 
5 <http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/contact/PPI-your-case.html> accessed 22 January 2015.  
The matter is far from over with 2.1 million initial enquiries made in 2012-13 which represents a 92% 
increase in new cases received by the financial ombudsman, see <http:// www.financial-
ombudsman.org.uk/news/speech/2013/CW-BILA-conference.pdf>  accessed 22 January 2015. 




impossible to locate fault with the exactness that individual liability requires.  For 
example, if the mis-selling conduct described above was to be considered fraudulent 
in the criminal sense, importing the recognition that it was a dishonest practice,
7
 the 
prosecution of individual junior members of staff, involved directly in the selling, 
would not necessarily be appropriate.  It is conceivable that the honesty of such 
employees is unlikely to be in doubt in circumstances where, for example, the 
product sold was a constituent of the range of products authorised by the 
organisation and the sales conduct was a normal and encouraged part of the company 
activity, consistent with the corporate policy and part of a company-wide and  
seemingly industry-wide practice.  Similarly, whilst the behaviour might be 
pervasive throughout the organisation, the identification of criminal fault in 
individual senior members of staff, as orchestrators of the dishonest corporate 
practice, may be equally problematic and/or unlikely.  However, the lack of an 
identifiable individual perpetrator or perpetrators does not diminish the gravity of the 
conduct or make it any less blameworthy.  In such a case, it may be intuitively more 
appropriate to blame the organisation itself, as the corporate actor, rather than an 
individual employee.
8
  Indeed, the fact that the Financial Conduct Authority, in the 
performance of its regulatory remit, imposes penal sanctions on corporate bodies, as 
well as individuals, accords with this intuition and it does not, of itself, attract 
controversy.
9
        
 
However, if systemic misconduct of this nature were to be perceived as the fault of 
the corporate entity itself, in the absence of an identifiable individual wrongdoer, the 
substantive criminal law, as it now stands, is rendered ineffective.  Notwithstanding 
the potential gravity of the wrongdoing in such circumstances, the criminal law 
remains hopelessly rooted in the individualist paradigm which exclusively 
                                                             
7 Fraud Act 2006, ss 2(1)(a), 3(a) and 4(1)(b). 
8 Corporations are a succession or collection of persons having a legal existence and rights and 
duties distinct from those of the individual persons who form them; they enjoy perpetual 
succession, can sue and be sued, Co Litt 250a; 1 Bl Comm 468; Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22 
(HL).  The term ‘legal person’ is not confined to business corporations or companies and can be 
applied to any entity that is legally distinct from its owners or members, eg states, local authorities, 
universities. 
9 Replacing the Financial Services Authority, the Financial Services Act 2012 established a new 
regulatory regime for the industry comprising the Financial Conduct Authority, the Prudential 
Regulatory Authority, the Financial Policy Committee (a subsidiary of the Bank of England) and HM 
Treasury providing various powers, including the power to impose fines. 
20 
 
recognises the human actor as the natural unit of agency, capable of moral and legal 
responsibility.
10
  Thus, for criminal law doctrine, the real difficulty lies in the 
imposition of liability on a corporate form where the offence is considered ‘truly 
criminal’ in the sense that it is the moral wrongdoing that justifies the imposition of 
blame.
11
  Whilst the civil law and regulatory regimes have no problem attributing 
rights and liabilities to the corporation itself, the criminal law still lacks the 
sophistication and the general conceptual tools to do so.
12
  Whilst the current 
financial climate continues to be ripe for fraud,
13
 this crime receives little attention in 
comparison to the traditional conceptions of criminality
14





1.2   Mens rea and metaphysics: the stumbling block of the criminal law 
 
The foundation of criminal liability has long been expressed in the Latin maxim 
‘actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea’
16
 which is crudely interpreted as ‘whatever 
the deed a man may have done, it cannot make him criminally punishable unless his 
doing of it was actuated by a legally blameworthy attitude of mind’.
17
  Conforming 
to utilitarian and enlightenment thinking, it is therefore the blameworthy mental 
state, the ‘mens rea’ element as described in the offence definition, which acts as the 
modern hallmark of moral culpability.  Furthermore, the individualist ideal demands 
that the state of mind is a matter of subjective assessment in preference to an 
                                                             
10 Christopher Harding, Criminal Enterprise, Individuals, Organisations and Criminal Responsibility 
(Willan 2007); see too Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (6th edn, OUP 2009) who 
observes that continued adherence to the subjectivism associated with the individualist approach 
means that the criminal law has remained ‘trapped’ in the mindset of individual autonomy and 
moral responsibility. 
11 Elsewhere described as ‘mala in se’, some academics distinguish categories of criminal offences in 
terms of ‘mala in se’ and ‘mala prohibita’.  The distinction is elusive and many theorists seem to 
have abandoned the distinction altogether.  Husak’s account sees an instance of malum prohibitum 
when the conduct proscribed is not wrongful prior to or independent of the law, Douglas Husak, 
Overcriminalization, the Boundaries of the Criminal Law (OUP 2008). 
12 Celia Wells, ‘Corporations: Culture, Risk and Criminal Liability’ (1993) Crim LR Aug 551-566. 
13 <http://www.inhouselawyer.co.uk/index.php/fraud-and-corporate-crime/8264-fraud-forgotten-
but-not-gone> accessed 7 May 2015 and quoting Enron, WorldCom and Madoff by way of example; 
Steven Box, Recession, Crime and Punishment (Macmillan 1987). 
14 Eg violent crime, drugs offences, anti-social behaviour, burglary. 
15 Alan Doig, Fraud (Willan 2006); Christopher Harding, Criminal Enterprise: Individuals, 
Organisations and Criminal Responsibility (Willan 2007) 272. 
16
 See eg Lord Kenyon CJ in Fowler v Padget (1798) 7 TR 509; Lord Goddard CJ in Harding v Price 
[1948] 1 KB 695. 
17 JW Cecil Turner, Russell on Crime (12th edn, Stevens & Sons 1964) vol 1. 
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assessment of the defendant by reference to an objective standard of behaviour.
18
  
One particular consequence of this metaphysical approach to individual culpability is 
that the corporate body, absent of any mental state upon which liability can be 
established, has come to be viewed as a fiction.  The fiction theory views the 
corporation exclusively as a legal entity with no transcendent reality:
19
   
  The artificial legal person called the corporation has no physical existence.  It  
  exists only in contemplation of law.  It has neither body, parts, nor passions.   
  It cannot wear weapons or serve in the wars.  It can be neither loyal, nor  
  disloyal.  It cannot compass treasons.  It can be neither friend nor enemy.   
  Apart from its corporators it can have neither thoughts, wishes, nor  




This ‘individualistic anchor’ has been the real ‘stumbling block to corporate 
liability’,
21
 with the attendant perception that there is ‘no soul to damn; no body to 
kick’.
22
  Thus, in the criminal law, the fictionist view has prevailed over the realist 
theory of organisations such that they are never perceived as autonomous, 
responsibility-bearing actors in their own right.  It is nonetheless surprising that no 
overarching unified scheme or doctrine has ever developed to address the growth of 
fraud in the corporate context.
23
  Indeed, the first corporate frauds can be dated to the 
                                                             
18 A recent example of the subjectivist tendency can be found in the criminal damage case of R v G 
[2004] 1 AC 1034 (HL) in which the objective test of recklessness was replaced in favour of a 
subjective test. 
19 Hart HLA, ‘Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence’ (1954) 70 LQR 37. 
20 See Buckley LJ’s dissenting judgment in Daimler Co Ltd v Continental Tyre and Rubber Co (GB) Ltd 
(1915) 1 KB 893 (CA) 916. 
21 Law Commission, Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts (Law Com No 195, 2010) C Wells, app C, 
para C.47.  Further, Celia Wells argues that it is the shifting vocabulary that obscures the relevant 
questions about corporate liability and she goes on to suggest that attempts to define a company, eg 
by saying it is a mere fiction or that it has no mind with which to intend, confuses the issue, paras 
C.1 – C.18.  See too Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (6
th
 edn, OUP 2009).  The difficulty 
is that the corporation is neither exclusively a ‘person’ nor a ‘thing’ and there is a person/thing 
duality that explains the confusion as to the essence of a corporation.   Put another way, there are 
two forms of property relation, the shareholders own the company whilst the company owns the 
corporate assets, Katsuhito Iwai, ‘Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate Personality 
Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance’ 47 Am J Comp L (1999) 583.   
22 John Collins Coffee Jnr, ‘No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick: An Unscandalised Inquiry into the 
Problem of Corporate Punishment’ (1981) 79 Mich L Rev 386. 
23 In this respect it is suggested that the criminal law can only be understood by reference to 
historical contingencies in the political, social and economic context.  For recent proponents of this 
view see for example RA Duff and others, The Boundaries of the Criminal Law (OUP 2010); R Dagger, 
‘Republicanism and the Foundations of Criminal Law’ in RA Duff and S Green (eds), Philosophical 





 whilst fraud as a widespread problem emerged in the Victorian era, 
going hand in hand with the rise of industrial capitalism, funded by joint stock 
projects.
25
  Responding to this new challenge, it was believed that the mechanism of 
incorporation would deter financial crime, with the company registration and the   
publicity that it required.
26
  However, the shortcomings of this approach are well 
documented and indeed illustrated by the numerous subsequent piecemeal reforms 
that have followed.
27
  It is now also evident that there was a societal consciousness 
demanding a tough response to deal with real fraud, albeit misconduct of this nature 
represented uncharted waters.  Thus, in the employment of the criminal law, the 
narratives of the time show sensitivity to the tension between business, respectability 
and crime, extreme care being taken to ensure that the criminal law was only used 
against business men for whom it was wholly appropriate.
28
  Notwithstanding the 
early decision to criminalize and the growing body of company law, the use of the 
regulatory regime, through which standards of commercial behaviour are prescribed, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
of law that has developed over time, subject to the influence of historical contingency, and/or 
demonstrate a lack of prosecutorial will, see Stephen Copp and Alison Cronin, ‘The Failure of 
Criminal Law to Control the Use of Off Balance Sheet Finance During the Banking Crisis’ (2015) 36(4) 
Co Law 99. 
24 See the accounts given by John Carswell, The South Sea Bubble (Crescent Press 1960); Virginia 
Cowles, The Great Swindle (Collins 1960); GP Gilligan, ‘The Origins of UK Financial Services 
Regulation’, (1997) 18(6) Co Law 167. 
25
 George Robb, White Collar Crime in Modern England, Financial Fraud and Business Morality 1845-
1929 (Cambridge University Press 1992).  The Bubble Act 1720 was enacted after the South Sea 
Bubble and although it remained on the statute book until 1825, only one prosecution was brought 
under it, R v Caywood (1723) 1 Stra 472; 2Ld Ray 1362, see too John Carswell, The South Sea Bubble 
(Crescent Press 1960); Virginia Cowles, The Great Swindle (Collins 1960).  See too, for example, HA 
Shannon, ‘The Coming of General Limited Liability’, (1930-1) J Econ Hist 2 269; HA Shannon ‘The 
Limited Companies of 1866-1883’, (1933) J Econ Hist 4 295;  George Robb, White Collar Crime in 
Modern England, Financial Fraud and Business Morality 1845-1929 (Cambridge University Press 
1992);  RW Kostall, Law and English Railway Capitalism 1825-75 (Clarendon Press 1994): GR Searle, 
Morality and the Market in Victorian Britain (Clarendon Press 1998). 
26 Select Committee on Joint Stock Companies First Report, BPP, VII 1844 the ‘Gladstone Committee 
Report’. 
27 Select Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992), known as the 
‘Cadbury Report’ para 1.9 ‘Had a Code such as ours been in existence in the past, we believe that a 
number of the recent examples of unexpected company failures and cases of fraud would have 
received attention earlier.  It must, however, be recognised that no system of control can eliminate 
the risk of fraud without so shackling companies as to impede their ability to compete in the market 
place.’   
28 James Taylor, Boardroom Scandal: The Criminalization of Company Fraud in Nineteenth-Century 
Britain (OUP 2013) discussed further in Sarah Wilson, The Origins of Modern Financial Crime: 
Historical Foundations and current problems in Britain (Routledge SOLON Explorations in Crime and 
Criminal Justice Histories 2014). 
23 
 
has grown exponentially over the last century or so.
29
  With an ethos that views 
prosecution as a last resort, regulatory agencies prefer to obtain their objectives by 
education and persuasion.
30
  Whilst this continues to be the case, it is of note that the 
scale of non-compliance with regulations by our financial institutions has recently 
been described as truly spectacular.
31
   
 
Accordingly, the civil and regulatory approaches are supplemented by a patchwork 
of criminal laws enacted to respond specifically to the problem of corporate 
                                                             
29 ‘Very broadly, a regulatory context is one in which a Government department or agency has (by 
law) been give the task of developing and enforcing standards of conduct in a specialised area of 
activity’.  Law Commission, Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts  (Law Com No 195, 2010) para 
1.9, Regulation and Criminal Liability.  Regulations are typically backed up by the threat of criminal 
sanction for breach. 
30 Carolyn Abbot, Enforcing Pollution Control Regulation (Hart Pubs 2009) cited by N Garoupa and 
others, ‘The Investigation and Prosecution of Regulatory Offences: is there an economic case for 
integration?’ (2011) 70(1) CLJ 229-259.   A rough estimate, based on an analysis of categories of 
offences dealt with in the criminal courts in 2008, is that only 1.5% to 2% of the 89,000 defendants 
tried in the Crown Court and about 10% of the 1.64 million tried in the magistrates courts, are tried 
for an offence arising out of regulatory contexts (exc. motoring offences).  See Law Commission, 
Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts (Law Com No 195, 2010) app D, Impact Assessment, para 
D.34.  The range of sanctions available to regulators has been enhanced by the Regulatory 
Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008, following the recommendation of the Macrory Review of 
Penalties, Richard B Macrory (Better Regulation Executive), Regulatory Justice: Making Sanctions 
Effective, Final Report (Nov 2006).  Whilst many agencies have powers to prosecute, see R Baldwin, 
‘The New Punitive Regulation’ (2005) MLR 351, it is accepted that few prosecutions are brought to 
implement regulation, see James Gobert, ‘Corporate Criminality: New Crimes for the Times’ (1994) 
Crim LR 722; Keith Hawkins, Law As Last Resort (OUP 2002); Law Commission, Criminal Liability in 
Regulatory Contexts (Law Com No 195, 2010) app A, para A.12-13.  Even where successful, the 
average fine imposed is modest, see Law Commission, Criminal Liability in Regulatory Context (Law 
Com No 195, 2010) app A, para A.15.  Consequently, it is a fact that a business can make a profit 
through non-compliance with the law, see Law Commission, Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts 
(Law Com No 195, 2010) app A, para A.16; Philip Hampton, Reducing Administrative Burdens: 
Effective Inspection and Enforcement, Final Report (London, 2005) para 2.80 – 2.81 and it is even 
suggested that targeting the individual directors or senior managers in addition to the company 
itself has little deterrent effect, see Law Commission, Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts (Law 
Com No 195, 2010) app A, para A.19; R Baldwin, ‘The New Punitive Regulation’ (2005) MLR 351; 
Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and Accountability (Cambridge University 
Press 1993).  This reluctance can be dated to our earliest attempts to deal with corporate fraud, see 
the early company legislation e.g. Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 and see too Douglas Hay, 
‘Property, Authority and the Criminal Law’ in Douglas Hay and others (eds), Albion’s Fatal Tree 
(Penguin 1975);  M Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of A Prison (Penguin 1977): WR Cornish 
and G Clark, Law and Society in England 1750-1950 (Sweet and Maxwell 1989); KJM Smith, Lawyers, 
Legislators and Theorists: Developments in English Criminal Jurisprudence 1800-1957 (Clarendon 
Press 1998); Alan Norrie, Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law (2nd edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2001).    
31 See for example Re Lehman Bros International (Europe) (in admin) v CRC Credit Fund Ltd [2012] 
UKSC 6, [2012] BLR 667.  Lehman had used “Repo 105” transactions to temporarily remove $49.102 
billion and $50.383 billion from its balance sheets at the first and second 2008 quarter year ends, 
succeeding by doing so in reducing its net leverage by 1.9% and 1.8% respectively, Valukas Report 
(March 2011) 18 – 20 discussed in Stephen Copp and Alison Cronin, ‘The Failure of Criminal Law to 





  This includes the enactment of offences which are drafted in ‘strict 
liability’ mode such that they do not involve the problem of requiring proof of any 
mental elements.   
 
However, as regards offences considered ‘truly criminal’ and which, therefore, do 
contain mens rea elements, the courts have struggled to find a mechanism by which 
the necessary mental element might be attributed to the artificial person.  Of note, 
fraud is once such offence.
33
  Accordingly, as a response to the ‘metaphysical 
obstacle’ to corporate conviction, the common law developed a doctrine by which a 
corporation can only be held criminally culpable if the individual who is deemed to 
be its ‘directing mind and will’ is himself guilty of the offence in question.
34
  Where 
this is the case, the individual’s guilt can also be considered the guilt of the 
associated company.  However, the ‘identification principle’ has proved problematic 
in many cases, not least in instances where the organisation is inherently 
criminogenic.  Illustrative of the difficulties was the unsuccessful prosecution of P & 
O Ferries following the sinking of the Herald of Free Enterprise in 1987, 
notwithstanding the organisation was found to be infected with an ‘attitude of 
sloppiness’ from top to bottom.
35
  Continued adherence to the ‘identification 
principle’ means that large companies with typically complex organisational 
structures and decentralised responsibility are likely to evade prosecution.  In 
contrast, smaller companies, with directors more likely to be involved in the day to 
day activities of the company, seemingly offer ‘low-hanging fruit’ for prosecution.
36
  
It is therefore suggested that the current test of corporate responsibility ‘works best 
                                                             
32 Described by the Law Commission as being ‘resonant of a collection of cut out pieces waiting to be 
sorted and sewn together to make a coherent structure’, Law Commission, Criminal Liability in 
Regulatory Contexts (Law Com No 195, 2010) app C, para C. 99 (C Wells); Christopher Harding, 
Criminal Enterprise, Individuals, Organisations and Criminal Responsibility (Willan 2007). 
33
 Fraud Act 2006. 
34 Attributed to Viscount Haldane, Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd [1915] AC 705 
(HL). 
35 For example the industry wide safety failures illustrated by the Herald of Free Enterprise sinking 
and the following unsuccessful corporate prosecution, P & O European Ferries (Dover)  Ltd (1990) 93 
Cr App R 72.  Although the inquiry into the tragedy found that P&O was ‘from top to bottom 
infected with the disease of sloppiness’ prosecution was impossible as it could not be proved that 
any of the 5 senior managers should have known of the risks of sailing with an open bow, see James 
Gobert and Maurice Punch, Rethinking Corporate Crime (Butterworths 2003) 63. See also R v Kite & 
OLL Ltd, 8 Dec 1994, R v Jackson Transport (Ossett) Ltd, R v Roy Bowles Transport Ltd, 10 Dec 1999. 
36
 Eg see the prosecution of the small company in R v Kite & OLL Ltd, 8 Dec 1994.  Woolf T, ‘The 




in cases where it is needed least [small businesses] and works worst in cases where it 
is needed most [big businesses]’.
37
   As an approach to criminalisation, it clearly 
underestimates the complexity and subtlety of corporate action, imposing an already 
simplified biological model on an equally simplified appreciation of corporate 
management and internal behaviour.
38
  In practice, policy and decision-making is 
often decentralised or the product of other corporate policies and procedures rather 
than the result of individual decisions.
39
  Therefore, as a method of liability 
attribution, ‘it fails to reflect the reality of the modern day large multinational 
corporation ... [and] it produces what many regard as an unsatisfactory narrow scope 
for criminal liability’.
40
   Furthermore, the need to identify the criminality of an 
individual of sufficient seniority, as a precursor to corporate prosecution, incurs 
evidential problems which increase as the size of the company increases.
41
  In any 
event, it is suggested that the identification principle cannot reflect corporate 
blameworthiness since proof of fault on the part of one sufficiently senior individual 
serves merely to demonstrate his personal fault and not that of the company.
42
  
Indeed, the deficiency of this anthropomorphic model has been conclusively 
illustrated in 2 other areas of corporate wrongdoing, in the context of corruption and 
corporate manslaughter where widespread criticism of the existing law
43
 has led to 
                                                             
37 James Gobert and Maurice Punch, Rethinking Corporate Crime (Butterworths 2003) 63.  See also R 
v Kite & OLL Ltd, 8 Dec 1994; R v Jackson Transport (Ossett) Ltd, R v Roy Bowles Transport Ltd, 10 Dec 
1999. 
38
 Christopher Harding, Criminal Enterprise, Individuals, Organisations and Criminal Responsibility 
(Willan 2007) ch 9. 
39 See CMV Clarkson, ‘Kicking Corporate Bodies and Damning Their Souls’ [1996] MLR 557, 561. 
40 David Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law (12th edn, OUP 2008) 249, a view shared by Gobert, 
see James Gobert, ‘Corporate Criminality: four models of fault’ (1994) 14(3) LS 393, 395. 
41 Mark Hsaio, ‘Abandonment of the Doctrine of Attribution in favour of Gross Negligence Test in the 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007’ (2009) 30(4) Co Law 110, 111. 
42 Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite, Corporations: Crime and Accountability (Cambridge University 
Press 1993) 47. 
43 The shortcomings of the identification principle were perhaps most clearly articulated in relation 
to its application in the highly publicized corporate manslaughter cases.  For a considerable period in 
the 1980s and 1990s, it was the specific offence of corporate manslaughter that became the narrow 
focal point of discussion about corporate criminality generally.  This was ostensibly driven by public 
and media outcry in the face of a number of corporate tragedies and the significant criticism that the 
law attracted at the time in its failure to convict the companies themselves.  These tragedies 
resulted in numerous fatalities, to both employees and members of the public.  In March 1987, 187 
people were killed in the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster.  167 died on Piper Alpha in July 1988 
and, just 5 months later, 35 rail passengers lost their lives at Clapham.  Over the years, the names 
Kings Cross, Marchioness, Southall, Paddington, Hatfield and Potters Bar added to the public chorus, 
demanding that profit-driven corporate perpetrators to be brought to account for the manslaughter 
offence in preference to some nominal health and safety breach. Previously the criminal law 
employed the common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter and invoked the identification 
26 
 




Notwithstanding the general dissatisfaction with the ‘identification principle’ of 
corporate fault attribution, the criminal law’s response to the specific problem of 
fraud adds yet more complexity.
45
   In addition to the common law conspiracy to 
defraud,
46
 the statute book reveals a highly fragmented approach to conduct 
amounting to fraud.  This may be symptomatic of the early tendency to highly 
particularised drafting of offences and it is of note that, until the enactment of the 
Fraud Act 2006, there was no single codified offence or even a definition of criminal 
fraud.
47
  Indeed, whilst the Law Commission’s 2002 Report on Fraud highlighted 
government’s commitment to addressing major commercial fraud,
48
 its 
recommendation was that, ‘introducing a single crime of fraud would dramatically 
simplify the law of fraud,
49
 [and] ... a general offence of fraud would be aimed at 
encompassing fraud in all its forms’.
50
  Accordingly, when the Act came into force 
                                                                                                                                                                            
principle as against corporations. In the wake of the sinking of the Herald of Free Enterprise came P 
& O European Ferries (Dover)Ltd (1990) 93 Cr App R 72, the first case to recognise that manslaughter 
was an offence that could be committed by a company. With public emotion at a high at the 
deficiency of the law, the incoming Labour Government of 1997 pledged to consider the 
implementation of a new offence of corporate manslaughter. Even before the election victory, the 
Law Commission had already considered corporate liability for manslaughter in its consultation 
paper 135 of 1994 in its exercise to devise a statutory criminal code, Law Commission Criminal Law: 
Involuntary Manslaughter (Law Com No 135, 1994).  Ministry of Justice, A Guide to the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, Oct 2007, 3. 
44
 Eg the common law approach to corporate manslaughter was replaced by the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007.  The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development Report 2008 recognised the limitation of the identification principle in attributing 
corporate blame in its consideration of anti-bribery measures, discussed in The Law Commission, 
Reforming Bribery (Law Com No 185, 2008) app D, D5. 
45 See the Fraud Act 2006 which sets out a general offence of fraud which is supplemented by 
specialist context-specific offences, for example the forgery and counterfeiting offences set out in 
the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981, ss 1 - 5 and ss 14 - 19 and other documentary frauds eg 
false accounting in the Theft Act 1968, s 17; the tax evasion offences, eg Value Added Tax Act 1994, s 
72  and the common law offence of cheating the revenue; fraudulent trading in the Companies Act 
2006, s 993(1); misleading market practices in Financial Services Act 2012, ss 89, 90, 91. 
46 The offence is expressly preserved by the Criminal Law Act 1977, s 5(2). 
47 Coming into force on 17th January 2007 the new general fraud offence replaces the detailed and 
particularized deception offences eg Theft Act 1968, s 15 obtaining property by deception; s 15A 
obtaining a money transfer by deception; s 16 obtaining a pecuniary advantage, s 20 procuring the 
execution of a valuable security; Theft Act 1978, s 1 obtaining services, s 2 inducing a creditor to wait 
for or forego payment by deception. 
48 It sought to respond to the public recognition that ‘those responsible for major crimes of the 
commercial sphere have managed to avoid justice’, Law Commission, Report on Fraud (Law Com No 
276, July 2002) Introduction. 
49 Law Commission, Report on Fraud (Law Com No 276, July 2002) 3, para 3. 





 January 2007, it built on the early understanding of fraud expressed by 
Stephen,
51




The essence of the fraud offence is that a person is guilty
53
 if he dishonestly
54
 makes  
 
(a)  a false representation,
55
 or 
(b)   fails to disclose information that he is under a legal duty to disclose,
56
 or 
(c)   abuses a position in which he is expected to safeguard the financial interests    




he thereby intends to make a gain for himself or another or to cause loss to or expose 




However, although s. 12 explicitly recognises that the fraud offence can be 
perpetrated by the corporate actor,
59
 the corporate conviction for fraud still rests on 
the application of identification principle, with its attendant difficulties.  Similarly, 
whilst the provisions have been applauded for their simplicity, the Law Commission     
dismissed their applicability to corporate frauds, deferring instead to the regulatory 
                                                             
51 Stephen J F, A History of the Criminal Law of England (Macmillan 1883) vol 2. The classic statement 
of the nature of fraud is Stephen’s: ‘I shall not attempt to construct a definition which will meet 
every case which might be suggested, but there is little danger in saying that whenever the words 
‘fraud’ or ‘intent to defraud’ or ‘fraudulently’ occur in the definition of a crime two elements at least 
are essential to the commission of the crime: namely, first, deceit or an intention to deceive or in 
some cases mere secrecy; and, secondly, either actual injury or possible injury or an intent to expose 
some person either to actual injury or to a risk of possible injury by means of that deceit or secrecy’.   
The definition for contract law derives from the common law authority of Derry v Peek (1889) 14 
App Cas 337 (HL) 374 (L Herschell) such that ‘fraud is proved when it is shown that a false 
representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, 
careless whether it be true or false’. 
52 Since no deception needs result from the conduct, nor any loss or gain, this is a substantive crime 
drafted in inchoate mode with the ‘broad-brush’ approach favoured by the Law Commission in its 
recommendations in its Report on Fraud (Law Com No 276, 2002). 
53 S 1(1) Fraud Act 2006 
54 See ss 2(1)(a), 3(a) and 4(1)(b) 
55 S 1(2)(a) and s2 
56 S 1(2)(b) and s3 
57 S 1(2)(c) and s 4. 
58 S 2(1)(b)(i) and (ii), s3(b)(i) and (ii), s4(1)(c)(i) and (ii). 
59
 Fraud Act 2006, s 12 deals with the liability of company officers for fraud offences committed by 
the company.  Schedule 1 of the Interpretation Act 1978 also stipulates that where an act refers to a 
‘person’ this is taken to include a body of persons corporate or unincorporate. 
28 
 
regime, stating that ‘many other offences which can be described as frauds’
60
 are 
‘usually seen as specialist branches of fraud, which require separate consideration’.
61
  
It is thus somewhat of a paradox that the new generic fraud offence continues to sit 
alongside the numerous alternative legislative provisions which address different 
types of commercial fraud expressed in highly particularised form.  These include 
offences set out under the Theft Act 1968 such as false accounting,
62
 making false 
statements by officers of a company,
63
 offences under the Forgery and 
Counterfeiting Act 1981, the Trade Marks Act 1994, the Trade Descriptions Act 
1968, the Companies Acts,
64
 the Financial Services Act 2012 and the Insolvency Act 
1986.  The complexity of the structure of anti-fraud law is further exacerbated by the 
number of bodies involved in the investigation of fraud
65





1.3   Addressing corporate fraud: the carrot and the stick!  
   
The initial optimism that the Fraud Act would provide an important new weapon in 
the fight against major financial crime appears to have been misplaced, with 
evidence that corporate fraud continues to be viewed as a specialist regulatory area 
rather than mainstream crime.
67
  Although the Fraud Act has been in force for over 8 
                                                             
60 Law Commission, Report on Fraud (Law Com No 276, 2002) 11, para 2.26. 
61
 Law Commission, Report on Fraud (Law Com No 276, 2002) 12, para 2.27.  The explanation given 
was that the decision to keep ‘specialist branches of fraud’ separate followed consultation between 
regulator and regulated in the context of misleading market practices to help draw the line between 
sharp practice and criminal practice. 
62 Theft Act 1968, s 17 and subject to the provisions of s 18 regarding liability of company officers. 
63 Theft Act 1968. 
64 In accordance with Companies Act 2006, s 2, this also includes the provisions of the Companies 
Act 1985 still in force and pt 2 Companies (Audit, Investigation and Community Enterprise) Act 2004. 
65 Eg these have included, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, The Department for Work and 
Pensions, The Police, Local Authorities, National Health Service, Serious Fraud Office, Department of 
Trade and Industry, Financial Conduct Authority, Office of Fair Trading, Serious Organised Crime 
Agency. 
66 Eg these have included the Crown Prosecution Service, the Serious Fraud Office, The Revenue and 
Customs Prosecution Office, DWP Solicitors Branch, Local Authorities, Financial Conduct Authority, 
The Pensions Regulator, Office of Fair Trading. 
67 This prosecutorial reluctance may be explained in part by the historical reluctance of local justices 
of the peace to prosecute local traders, a matter remedied by the Factories Act 1833 which created 
a central government agency with the power to make rules and initiate prosecutions, WG Carson, 
‘Some Sociological Aspects of Strict Liability and the Enforcement of Factory Legislation (1970) 33 
MLR 396; WG Carson, ‘White-Collar Crime and the Enforcement of Factory Legislation’ (1970) 10 
Brit. J. Criminology; WG Carson ‘The Conventionalisation of Early Factory Crime’ (1979) 7 Int’l J Soc 
Law 37.  As this regulatory approach became the standard pattern for businesses, their criminal 
29 
 
years, it is still the case that corporate frauds are rarely brought before the criminal 
courts and continue to hover somewhere between civil sanction for regulatory breach 
and civil private action.  With regulatory agencies perceiving their role as the 
encouragement of voluntary compliance with codes,
68
 rather than the suppression of 
undesirable conduct by punishing wrongdoing,
69
 corporate fraud continues to attract 
                                                                                                                                                                            
prosecution was no longer considered mainstream.  See N Garoupa and others, ‘The Investigation 
and Prosecution of Regulatory Offences: is there an economic case for integration?’ (2011) 70(1) CLJ 
229, 233; HW Arthurs, ‘Without the law’: Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth 
Century England (Toronto 1985); Royal Commission on Practices and Proceedings of the Courts of 
Common Law, 5th Report (1833-4).  The Factories Act 1833 also provided that the central agency had 
to power to act as both prosecutor and magistrate with sanctions of fines and imprisonment 
available.  The legislation of 1844 removed the judicial authority by the agency retained the power 
to prosecute and issue remedial orders, PWJ Bartrip and PT Fenn, ‘The Administration of Safety: the 
enforcement policy of the early factory inspectorate, 1844-1804’, (1980) 58 Pub Adm 87.   
68 Criminal prosecution is just one instrument amongst many for gaining compliance, Jeremy Rowan-
Robinson and Paul Q Watchman, Crime and Regulation: A Study of the Enforcement of Regulatory 
Codes (1990).  See also Alan Norrie, Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal 
Law (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2001). 
69 Genevra Richardson, ‘Strict Liability for Regulatory Crime: The Empirical Evidence’ (1987) Crim LR 
295-306.  Carolyn Abbot, Enforcing Pollution Control Regulation (Oxford 2009) cited by Nuno 
Garoupa and others, ‘The Investigation and Prosecution of Regulatory Offences: is there an 
economic case for integration?’ (2011) 70(1) CLJ 229-259.   A rough estimate, based on an analysis of 
categories of offences dealt with in the criminal courts in 2008, is that only 1.5% to 2% of the 89,000 
defendants tried in the Crown Court and about 10% of the 1.64 million tried in the magistrates 
courts, are tried for an offence arising out of regulatory contexts (exc. motoring offences), see Law 
Commission, Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts (Law Com No 195, 2010) app D, Impact 
Assessment at para D.34.  The range of sanctions available to regulators has been enhanced by the 
Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008, following the recommendation of the Macrory 
Review of Penalties, Richard B Macrory (Better Regulation Executive), Regulatory Justice: Making 
Sanctions Effective, Final Report (Nov 2006).  Whilst many agencies have powers to prosecute, see R 
Baldwin, ‘The New Punitive Regulation’ (2005) MLR 351, it is accepted that few prosecutions are 
brought to implement regulation, see Law Commission, Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts 
(Law Com No 195, 2010) app A, Para A.12 and A.13; James Gobert, ‘Corporate Criminality: New 
Crimes for the Times’ (1994) Crim L R 722; K Hawkins, Law As Last Resort: Prosecution Decision 
Making in a Regulatory Agency (OUP 2002).  Even where successful, the average fine imposed is very 
low, see Law Commission, Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts (Law Com No 195, 2010) app A, 
para A.15.  Consequently, it is a fact that a business can make a profit through non-compliance with 
the law, see Law Commission, Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts (Law Com No 195, 2010) app 
A, para A.16; Philip Hampton, Reducing Administrative Burdens: Effective Inspection and 
Enforcement, Final Report (London, 2005) para 2.80 – 2.81 and it is even suggested that targeting 
the individual directors or senior managers in addition to the company itself has little deterrent 
effect, see Law Commission, Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts (Law Com No 195, 2010) app A, 
para A.19; R Baldwin, ‘The New Punitive Regulation’ (2005) MLR 351; Brent Fisse and John 
Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and Accountability (Cambridge University Press1993).  This 
reluctance can be dated to our earliest attempts to deal with corporate fraud, see the early 
company legislation eg Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 and see too D Hay, ‘Property, Authority and 
the Criminal Law’ in D Hay and others (eds), Albion’s Fatal Tree (Allen Lane 1975); WR Cornish and G 
Clark, Law and Society in England 1750-1950 (Sweet & Maxwell 1989);  M Foucault, Discipline and 
Punish: The Birth of A Prison (Penguin 1977);  KJM Smith, Lawyers, Legislators and Theorists: 
Developments in English Criminal Jurisprudence 1800-1957 (OUP 1998); Alan Norrie, Crime, Reason 
and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2001).    
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a different moral compass.
70
  Similarly, the tendency to draft the so-called regulatory 
offences for non-compliance in terms of strict liability
71
 perpetuates the perception 
that corporate wrongdoing is not really criminal but a matter of mere technical 
infringement.
72
  Whilst the economic case for criminalisation in preference to 
regulation has been made elsewhere, and is therefore beyond the scope of this 
research,
73
 others have raised serious doubt as to the efficacy of the regulatory 
approach
74
 with the recognition that companies are inherently criminogenic,
75
 and 
arguably more suited to the stick of prosecution than the carrot of the regulatory 
approach.  However, in this respect it must also be acknowledged that there are a 
variety of potential disincentives to criminal proceedings for corporate fraud which 
                                                             
70 Of note, when the Royal Commission provided the recommendations that formed the basis of the 
new Crown Prosecution Service in 1981, the ambit of the report was confined to mainstream crime, 
Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (The Phillips Commission) 1977, reported in 1981, The 
Investigation and Prosecution of Criminal Offences in England and Wales: the law and procedure 
(Cmnd 8092-I and II, 1980/81).  The Commission gave little attention to the non-police agencies, 
commenting that ‘prosecution is the weapon of final resort because they prefer to obtain their 
objectives by education and persuasion’. 
71 Discussed in Lim Chin Aik v The Queen [1963] AC 160 (PC), Singapore. 
72 Gerry Johnstone and Tony Ward, Key Approaches to Criminology: Law and Crime (Sage 2010).   
73 Stephen Copp and Alison Cronin, ‘The Failure of Criminal Law to Control the Use of Off Balance 
Sheet Finance During the Banking Crisis’ (2015) 36(4) Co Law 99.  See too Gary S Becker, ‘Crime and 
Punishment: An Economic Approach’ (1968) 76 J Pol Econ 169; Kenneth G Elzinga and William Breit, 
The Anti-trust Penalties: a Study in Law and Economics (Yale University Press 1976); John Collins 
Coffee Jnr, ‘Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal 
Sanctions’, (1980) 17 Am Crim L Rev 419-76; Richard A Posner, ‘An Economic Theory of the Criminal 
Law’ (1985) 85 Colum L Rev 1193-231; Kenneth G Dau-Schmidt, ‘An Economic Analysis of the 
Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy’ (1990) Duke Law Journal 1 - 38, Pat O’ Malley, ‘Risk, 
Power and Crime Prevention’ (1992) 21 Economy and Society 252; Richard A Posner, Economic 
Analysis of Law (Aspen 2007). 
74 See for example James Gobert and Maurice Punch, Rethinking Corporate Crime (Butterworths 
2003); M Levi, Regulating Fraud (Tavistock 1987); Michael Levi, The Economic Cost of Fraud Report 
for the Home Office (London, NERA 2000); Michael Levi, ‘The Roskill Fraud Commission Revisited: An 
Assessment’ (2003) JFL 11(1), 38-44; Michael Levi, The Phantom Capitalists (Ashgate 2008); Levi 
Michael and others, The Nature, Extent and Economic Impact of Fraud in the UK (London: ACPO 
2007); The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice The Investigation, Prosecution and the Trial of 
Serious Fraud: (London, HMSO 1993); JE Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility, Issues in the 
Theory of Company Law (Clarendon 2000); D Sugarman, ‘Law Economy and the State in England 
1750-1914: Some Major Issues’ in D Sugarman (ed,) Legality, Ideology and the State (Academic Press 
1983); Edward S Herman, Corporate Control, Corporate Power (Cambridge University Press 1981); 
Gary Slapper and Steve Tombs, Corporate Crime (Longman 1999); GP Gilligan, ‘The Origins of UK 
Financial Services Regulation’, (1997) 18(6) Co Law 167-176; SP Shapiro, ‘Collaring the Crime, Not the 
Criminal: Reconsidering the Concept of White Collar Crime’ (1990) 55 Am Soc Rev 346-65; Gary 
Scanlan, ‘Dishonesty in Corporate Offences, A Need for Reform?’ (2002) 23(4) Co Law 114-119; Gary 
Scanlan, ‘Offences concerning directors and officers of a company – fraud and corruption in the 
United Kingdom – the future’ (2008) 29(9) Co Law 264 – 271; JL Masters, ‘Fraud and Money 
Laundering: the evolving criminalization of corporate non-compliance’ (2008) JMLC 103. 
75 This view accords with the emerging contemporary criminal law literature which views crime as 
the norm rather than deviance, see for example Lucia Zedner, Criminal Justice (OUP 2004). 
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may operate in tandem with the doctrinal obstacle identified specifically in this 
work.
76
  For example, the evident judicial and political reluctance to prosecute may 
also be explained on the basis of lack of resources, the relative complexity of fraud 
trials, the lobbying power of large corporations or the perception that shareholders 
may be the innocent victims of any corporate sanction.  Whilst these perspectives 
merit investigation, an evaluation of their influence is not within the scope of this 
research which is concerned primarily with a narrow examination of the substantive 
law with a view to potential law reform.  In a similar vein, the question of how 
corporations might be punished is not within the remit of this work with various 
detailed propositions having already been advocated elsewhere.
77
      
 
 
1.4   The case for a general anti-fraud rule 
 
The economic case for the employment of a general anti-fraud rule is further 
supported by the recent adoption of a zero tolerance approach to financial crime in 
the context of corruption, explained on the basis of the harm it inflicts on economic 
markets.
78
  Indeed, the recently enacted Bribery Act 2010 established liability for 
corruption with offences that were designed to ‘reinforce ethical conduct in the 
commercial world and society generally’.
79
  Of note, the 2010 Act also supplemented  
                                                             
76
 Corporate crime has ceased to be considered mainstream crime and thus subject to prosecution 
by the CPS, Archibald Bodkin, ‘The Prosecution of Offenders: English Practice’ (1928) 1 Pol J 354 – 5; 
Howard Pendleton, Criminal Justice in England: A Study in Law Administration (MacMillan 1931) vol 
1; Joshua Rozenberg, The Case for the Crown: The Inside Story of the DPP (Thorsons 1987). 
77 _ _ ‘Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behaviour Through Criminal Sanctions’ (1979) 92 Harv 
L Rev, 1227; Brent Fisse, ‘Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault and 
Sanctions’ (1983) 56 S Cal L Rev 1141-246; James P Bonner and Beth N Forman B, ‘Bridging the 
Deterrence Gap: Imposing Criminal Penalties on Corporations and their Executives for Producing 
Hazardous Projects’, (1993) 20 San Diego Justice Journal 1:1; Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite, 
Corporations, Responsibility and Corporate Society (Cambridge University Press 1993); Mary Kreiner 
Ramirez, ‘The Science Fiction of Corporate Criminal Liability: Containing the Machine Through the 
Corporate Death Penalty’ (2005) 47 Ariz L Rev 933-1002.   
78 Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (Law Com No 185, 2008) app D, para D.5 and citing Peter W 
Alldridge, ‘The Law Relating to Free Lunches’ (2002) 23 Co Law 264, 267.  Another example is the 
approach taken to address money laundering in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, s 330. 
79 Ministry of Justice, Impact Assessment of the Bill on Reform of the Law of Bribery, 
<https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bills-acts/bribery-bill-ia.pdf> accessed 24 April 
2015.  See the Bribery Act 2010 which takes a zero tolerance approach to corporate corruption; The 
Secretary of State for Justice, then Jack Straw, when addressing the 5th European Forum on Anti-
corruption in June 2009, “A strong legal architecture is necessary in tackling corruption ...Ultimately 
our aim must be to bring about behavioural change within businesses themselves, creating 
corporate cultures in which no form of corruption is tolerated.” 
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the ‘identification principle’ mechanism and recognises the corporate body as a 
responsibility-bearing actor, distinct from its individual members, with the creation 
of the bespoke corporate offence of failing to prevent bribery.
80
  This shift away 
from the traditional fiction theory of the organisation, towards a realist account of 
corporate liability, is significant albeit that the ‘failure to prevent’ model of 
organisational fault is problematic in the context of fraud.  The essence of fraud 
poses unique challenges, given that fraud is not an activity in itself, unlike bribery, 
but the way in which an otherwise lawful activity is performed.
81
  Since dishonesty 
is the determinative factor, the regulatory model is also an unsuitable approach in 
that it is entirely possible that conduct constituting regulatory compliance can also 
amount to a criminal fraud.
 82
   
 
As regards the conception of criminalising fraud, other peculiarities must be 
acknowledged, not least the uncomfortable dichotomy that results from a continued 
commitment to individualism.  On the one perspective, individualism requires 
criminal responsibility to be based on the subjective fault of the autonomous 
fraudster whilst, on the alternative perspective, it demands adherence to the principle 
of caveat emptor such that the responsibility for loss must lie with the equally 
autonomous victim.  Thus, the individualist paradigm is both at the heart of the 
criminal law’s idealogy of subjective responsibility and its reluctance to criminalise 
fraud.  Further, in the context of corporate fraud, the incompatibility of the 
subjectivist model of fault attribution with the fictionist understanding of 
organisations exacerbates the difficulties.  These issues are compounded further 
when it becomes clear that the emergence of the corporate form went hand in hand 
with a meteoric rise in fraud.
83
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 Bribery Act 2010, s 7. 
81 Paul McGrath, Commercial Fraud and Civil Practice (OUP 2008) 3. 
82 Stephen Copp and Alison Cronin, ‘The Failure of Criminal Law to Control the Use of Off Balance 
Sheet Finance During the Banking Crisis’ (2015) 36(4) Co Law 99.  One consequence of R v Hinks 
[2001] 2 AC 241 (HL) is that dishonesty becomes determinative of criminality, absent of any 
otherwise unlawful behaviour, where that behaviour conforms to the offence definition.  The effect 
of this controversial decision was not lost on the Law Commission who recognised that “(a)ctivities 
which would otherwise be legitimate can therefore become fraudulent if a jury is prepared to 
characterise them as dishonest”, Law Commission Report on Fraud (Law Com No 276, 2002) para 3.8, 
14. 
83
 _ _ ‘Causes of the Increase of Crime’ (Jul – Dec 1844) 56 Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine 7-8; 
David Morier Evans, The Commercial Crisis 1847-1848 (First pub Letts Son & Steer 1848, Nabu 2010); 
Herbert Spencer, ‘Railway Morals and Railway Policy’ (1854) 100 Edin L R 426-7; David Morier Evans, 
33 
 
Having acknowledged that there is a case for the employment of the Fraud Act 
provisions to prosecute instances of corporate fraud, the substance of this work 
addresses the problematic identification principle mechanism that it is necessary to 
invoke.  Accordingly, this research identifies a suitable model by which 
organisations can be prosecuted in instances where a criminogenic and fraudulent 
culture is evident, such as in the mis-selling cases, but where the conduct cannot 
necessarily be attributed to one senior individual.  Thus, an analysis of the white 
collar ilk is also beyond the scope of this research since criminology typically seeks 
to explain the conduct of individual white collar offenders.
84
   As the law currently 
stands, an organisation characterised by pervasive and systemic fraudulent conduct 
typically stands beyond the reach of the criminal courts.  However, by stripping 
away the mask of the black letter law and revealing the various influences which 
have altered its development, the assumptions upon which the law is now based can 
be questioned.     
 
1.5   The research objectives 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to argue for corporate fraud to be more effectively 
controlled by the law by reconstructing two key criminal law doctrines, together with 
the evidential presumptions they invoke.  Such reform will be shown to provide the 
means by which dishonesty and intention can be attributed directly to an 
organization such that the corporation can be convicted of fraud without reliance 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Facts, Failures and Frauds: Revelations Mercantile Commercial Criminal (First pub Groombridge & 
Sons 1859, Augustus M Kelly 1968); Walter E Houghton, The Victorian Frame of Mind (Yale 
University Press 1957); Virginia Cowles, The Great Swindle (Collins 1960); Henry Parris H, 
Government and the Railways (University of Toronto Press 1965); Rob Sindall, ‘Middle Class Crime in 
19th Century England’ (1983) 4 Crim Just Hist 23-40; George Robb, White Collar Crime in Modern 
England, Financial Fraud and Business Morality 1845 -1929 (Cambridge University Press 1992); RW 
Kostall, Law and English Railway Capitalism 1825 – 75 (Clarendon 1994); Lobban M, ‘Nineteenth 
Century Frauds In Company Formation: Derry v Peek in Context’ (1996) 112 LQR Apr, 287-334; GR 
Searle, Morality and the Market in Victorian Britain (Clarendon 1998); Sarah J Wilson, ‘Law, Morality 
and Regulation: Victorian Experiences of Financial Crime’ (2006) Brit J Criminol 1073. 
84 Tim Newburn, Criminology (Willan 2007) ch 18; Edwin Sutherland, White Collar Crime (New York, 
Holt 1949): Carson WG, ‘White-Collar Crime and the Enforcement of Factory Legislation’ (1970) 10 
Brit. J. Criminology: Frank Pearce, Crimes of the Powerful (Pluto 1976); Gilbert Geis and Ezra Stotland 
(eds), White Collar Crime (Sage 1980); Rob S Sindall, ‘Middle Class Crime in 19th Century England’ 
(1983) Crim Just Hist 4, 23-40; Michael Levi, Regulating Fraud  (Tavistock 1987); Michael Gale and 
others, Fraud and the plc (Butterworths 1999); Alan Doig, Fraud (Willan 2006); Sarah Wilson S, 
‘Collaring the Crime and the Criminal: Jury Psychology and Some Criminology Perspectives on Fraud 
and the Criminal Law’ (2006) JCL 75; Geoffrey Smith and others, Studying Fraud as White Collar 
Crime (Palgrave Macmillan 2011).   
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upon the identification principle.  Accordingly, it will: 
 
(a)  Evaluate the traditional canons of criminal fault, the extent to which the current 
law departs from the orthodox approach and the consequent implications for the 
attribution of fault to organisations.    
 
(b)  Evaluate the role of medical science in determining how criminal fault is 
assessed. 
  
(c)  Evaluate the origins of the identification doctrine and the extent to which it has 
application where misconduct is alleged in the corporate context.  
 
(d)  Apply the model of manifest liability to corporate fraud to identify what reforms 
might be implemented and how.  
 
1.6   Methodology 
 
The foundation of the research involves the discovery of a theory of corporate 
criminality through a corrective reinterpretation of the traditional canons of fault.  
Whilst redetermining the relative boundaries of the actus reus and mens rea 
doctrines, with attendant implications for way in which fault is attributed, the overall 
framework of the criminal construct will remain undisturbed.
85
  As the primary aim 
is therefore a rational reconstruction of the law,
86
 the success of the proposal will be 
measured by reference to ‘black letter law’
87
 such that existing legal concepts and 
                                                             
85 Traditional legal scholarship comprises ‘identifying existing legal concepts and categories and 
considering their capability to accommodate for new developments... in such a way that the 
integrity and coherence of the legal system is preserved’, Pauline C Westerman, ‘Open or 
autonomous? The debate on legal methodology as a reflection of the debate on law’, in M van 
Hoecke (ed), The Methodologies of Legal Research (Hart 2011) ch 5. 
86 Rational reconstruction is not carried out for its own sake, but is a means to an end. For the legal 
researcher at the end consists of proposing a coherent, meaningful and workable new arrangement.  
Recommendations are drawn up in order to fit in these novelties in the legal system in such a way 
that the integrity and coherence of the legal system is preserved, Pauline C Westerman, ‘Open or 
Autonomous? The debate on legal methodology as a reflection of the debate on law’, in Mark van 
Hoecke (ed), The Methodologies of Legal Research (Hart 2011) 88. 
87
 According to the black letter approach, the role of legal research is to identify and give an 
exposition of the underlying principles of law, this requires researches to re-impose a supposedly 
native order and system and to rationalise a large body of case law into a manageable shape, Robert 
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categories will be considered as regards their capability to accommodate for new 
developments.
88
  Largely deductive, this method seeks to reveal the presence of a 
series of rules which are based upon a smaller number of general axioms such that 
the law can be interpreted as a broadly rational and coherent system.
89
  This 
qualitative,
90
 positivist analysis is consistent with traditional legal scholarship which 
views the law itself as an internal self-sustaining set of principles.
91
  On this analysis, 
the law is not only the object of research but it is also the theoretical perspective 
from which that object is studied.
 92
   
 
Whilst the proposal itself will be tested for compatibility with existing legal 
principle, it is widely accepted that the criminal law is the product of a piecemeal 
response to the ongoing challenge of social control in changing eras.
93
  However, the 
primary sources do not advert to any external factors which have shaped the law, or 
provide a context for its evolution, and the black letter law analysis also ignores the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Goff, ‘The Search for Principle’ (1983) 69 Procs Brit Acad 169,171; Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 
(Harvard University Press 1986).   
88 C Westerman, ‘Open or Autonomous? The debate on legal methodology as a reflection of the 
debate on law’, in M van Hoecke (ed), The Methodologies of Legal Research (Hart 2011) 88. 
89 Twining, William, Blackstone’s Tower: the English Law School (Stevens & Sons 1994);  Michael 
Salter and Julie Mason, Writing Law Dissertations (Pearson 2007); Jan M Smits, The Mind and 
Method of the Legal Academic (Edward Elgar 2012).   
90 In contrast to quantitative (numerical) research.  Doctrinal research is the process of selecting and 
weighing materials taking into account hierarchy and authority as well as understanding social 
context and interpretation, for this reason it is argued that doctrinal research is qualitative. To 
describe doctrinal legal research in this way recognises that law is reasoned and not found, Mike 
McConville and Wing Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law, (Edinburgh University Press 
2007). 
91 See for example, M McConvill and Wing Hong Chui (eds) Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh 
University Press 2007). 
92 Pauline C Westerman, ‘Open or autonomous? The debate on legal methodology as a reflection of 
the debate on law’ in M van Hoecke (ed), The Methodologies of Legal Research (Hart 2011). 
93 Alan Norrie,  Crime, Reason and History (2nd edn, Butterworths 2001).  Lindsay Farmer opines that 
Norrie’s approach, studying law in its social context, does not go far enough.  He says that in 
recognising the historical contingency, it looks neither to the contingency as the distinction between 
form and content, nor between the law and its context.  Thus while arguing that the law is 
structured to manage its own contingency, Norrie’s critique simply reproduces the structure 
whereby that contingency is contained, see L Farmer, ‘The Obsession With Definition: The Nature of 
Crime and Critical Legal Theory’ (1996) S & LS 5:57; L Farmer, ‘Bringing Cinderella to the Ball: 
Teaching Criminal Law in Context’ (1995) MLR 58(5) 756 reviewing Alan Norrie’s, Crime, Reason and 
History.    See too Duff, RA and Stuart P Green (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law (OUP 
2011); D Husak, Overcriminalization, The Limits of the Criminal Law (OUP 2008).  In his seminal text 
printed in 1978, Fletcher suggests that the criminal law is a polycentric body of principles and each 
of the major patterns of liability must be appreciated on its own terms, the temptation to reduce the 
criminal law to a single formula should be resisted, George P Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 
(Little, Brown and Co 1987); see too Lucia Zedner, Criminal Justice (OUP 2004). 
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role played by acts of subjective interpretation.
94
  Furthermore, language provides 
the framework for the law and language interprets that framework.
95
   The 
dependence of law on language presents a fundamental problem in that language has 
a fluid and contextual nature which conflicts with the objective image of legal 
decision-making.
96
  It has long been noted that an understanding of the law will not 
be improved by considering ancient authorities unless the influences under which 
they were written can be appreciated together with the real significance of the legal 
conceptions of that period and what the writings meant to the readers for whom they 
were written.
97
  Thus, to counterbalance the empirical shortcomings of the black 
letter law approach, a combination of complementary approaches has been 
employed, in particular to expose the changing use and meaning of legal terminology 
and the orthodox approach to the attribution of fault.  Accordingly, this research 
incorporates inter-disciplinary and socio-legal methods
98
 to reveal the wider context 
in which the law developed.
99
  Understanding the current law as a product of 
linguistic and doctrinal evolution invites both an historical and a theoretical analysis 
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 Sharon Hanson, Legal Method, Skills and Reasoning (3
rd
 edn, Routledge 2010).  If the plain or 
literal meaning is in doubt with respect to statutes, there can be an appeal to the 'original intentions' 
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97 JWC Turner, ‘The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law’, in L Radzinowicz and JWC Turner 
(eds), The Modern Approach to Criminal Law (Macmillan1948) 195. 
98 Socio-legal and empirical scholarship is seen as complementary to doctrinal research and can be 
used simultaneously, see J Baldwin and G Davis, ‘Empirical Research in Law’ in Peter Cane and Mark 
Tushnet (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies (OUP 2003) 881; Anthony Bradney, ‘Law as 
Parasitic Discipline’ (1998) 25 Journal of Law and Society, 71. Of note, there are many incompatible 
views as to what constitutes socio-legal research and different definitions as to the range and scope 
of relevant source materials, Roger Cotterell, ‘Subverting Orthodoxy, Making Law Central: A View of 
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99 The socio-legal approach can include perspectives such as the law’s social origins, history and 
ideological factors.  J Baldwin and G Davis, ‘Empirical Research in Law’ in Peter Cane and Mark 
Tushnet (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies (OUP 2003) 881; A Bradney, ‘Law as Parasitic 
Discipline’ (1998) 25 Journal of Law and Society, 71. 
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and this provides the basis for which the nature of the current law can be explained 
and any reform may be justified.
100
  The genealogies of particular legal concepts 
have been traced to analyse how the significance might shift over time and how the 
development of a particular offence is shaped by changes in enforcement, 
prosecution or punishment.
101
  History, with a consciousness of multiple influences 
provides an additional approach to understanding
102
 and as regards historical 
contextualisation, ‘lawyers’ legal history’ and the ‘history of law and society’
103
 will 
converge.  The former allows the significance of the current law to be considered 
internally, in the context of its development through judicial reasoning and 
legislative enactment.  It acts as a counterweight to the problem of language 
dependence associated with “black letter” analysis.  The cross-referencing of 
different clusters of authoritative cases and texts provides elucidation as to the 
problem of changing language and legal concepts
104
 by reference to temporal 
context.
105
  Further, the history of law and society encompasses external factors
106
 
which place the law as a component part of wider social and political structure
107
 and 
thus inform the reasons for and the nature of its development.  The historic approach 
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has already been employed to reveal the origins of widespread financial crime and it 
provides the context in which the law’s response can be understood.
108
  It has 
demonstrated that fraud and free market capitalism go hand in hand and that there 
was an intrinsic link between the growth of the corporate form and the growth in 
opportunities for fraud.
109
   Extrinsic detail of this nature hints heavily at the fact that 
the early ‘white collar’
110
 offenders were typically of the middle and upper class 
ranks and that there was a desire to construct anti-fraud measures that would not 
criminalise them.
111
  Thus, historical analysis has also pointed to the political 
influence of the incorporators
112
 and also provided the context in which the 
regulatory regime and the notion of social welfare offences emerged.
113
  Whilst this 
informs generally, only the historic approach can chart the evolution of the law and, 
in particular, its changing language and meaning.   
 
Close reference has been made to additional legal materials, specifically practitioner 
texts and legal commentaries which arguably have an authoratitive quality of their 
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111 WG Carson, ‘Some Sociological Aspects of Strict Liability and the Enforcement of Factory 
Legislation (1970) 33 MLR 396; WG Carson, ‘White-Collar Crime and the Enforcement of Factory 
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  In this respect the sources include Archbold’s Criminal Pleading,
115
 
Kenny’s Cases on Criminal Law
116
 and Outlines of Criminal Law,
117
 Radzinowicz 
and Turner’s Modern Approach to Criminal Law,
118
 Russell on Crime,
119
 Williams 
Criminal Law, The General Part,
120
 Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law
121
 and  
Blackstone’s Criminal Practice.
122
  In particular, the work of JW Cecil Turner 
features prominently in the analysis, providing the touchstone for the early 
understanding of the mental elements in crime.
123
  This is not only because he wrote 
extensively about the general principles of criminal law as they were developing 
over the successive decades in question, but also because of the particularly high 
respect his work commanded.
124
   
 
Similarly, in relation to the traditional theory of corporations, close reference is made 
to FW Maitland and the work he inspired.
125
  Widely acclaimed as the greatest legal 
                                                             
114 David Sugarman, ‘Introduction: Histories of Law and Society’ in David Sugarman (ed), Law in 
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2003).  
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Criminal Pleading: Evidence and Practice (30th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1938); TR Fitzwalter Butler and 
Marston Garsia, Archbold’s Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice (32nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
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122
 Peter Murphy, Blackstone’s Criminal Practice (OUP 1994). 
123 JW Cecil Turner, ‘The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law’ (1936 – 1938) 6 CLJ 31, 81. 
124 Regarding Turner’s work,  Prof. Sir John Smith QC in his Annual Lecture 2002 for the Judicial 
Studies Board, ‘Judge, Jurist and Parliament’ said, ‘When a case of fundamental importance in the 
criminal law, DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290 came before the House of Lords in 1960 it was argued for 
four days and the House reserved judgment for four weeks but the only authority other than case 
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historian ever to write in the English language, Maitland produced an unprecedented 
body of work on the history of English law.  He collected, meticulously corrected, 
translated and published from the original manuscripts he located and also wrote 
interpretative histories derived from these sources.
126
  The black letter law analysis 
of the origins of the identification doctrine has therefore been rehearsed against the 
wider theoretical environment prevailing at the time and this has provided the basis 
upon which a reconsideration of the landmark cases is justified.  
 
Although historiography is unlikely to identify all external factors that influenced the 
development of the law, a combination of historiographical methods may reduce any 
deficiency.
127
  The necessary simplifications and subjective perspectives inherent in 
any particular analysis will always leave room for more than one defensible 
interpretation of the sources but will at least illuminate different aspects and 
possibilities of past realities.
128
  One of the advantages of historical reconstruction of 
the law is the discovery that many reforms or supposedly new approaches re-enact 
aspects of long forgotten initiatives from past centuries and this is particularly 
pertinent to the overall aim of this research.
129
    
 
Whilst legal history provides an analysis of legal evidence and contextualisation, it is 
criticised for being too inward looking and self referential.  With its traditional 
reliance on formal sources of law it fails to supply the holistic and interdisciplinary 
perspective which is considered increasingly desirable in modern research.
130
  As to 
a theoretical evaluation, there were a number of perspectives that could have been 
adopted.  For example, there are the Marxist and Critical Legal Studies analyses 
                                                             
126 David M Rabban, ‘Methodology in Legal History’ in Anthony Musson and Chantal Stebbings (eds), 
Making Legal History: Approaches and Methodologies (Cambridge University Press 2012) ch 7, 88.   
127 Melanie L Williams, ‘Coercion and the Labour Contract: Revisiting Glasbrook Brothers and the 
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which are concerned with power relations.
131
  Whilst the political lobbying power of 
corporations has not gone unnoticed, its evaluation is not the aim of this research, 
although it may form the basis of future research.
132
  Similarly, comparative analysis 
of other legal jurisdictions has been rejected as it is inconsistent with the aim of a 
rational reconstruction of English law.  Systems that are not common law in nature 
are unlikely to assist and existing common law jurisdictions unlikely to have 
anything novel to offer.
133
  Further, in the specific context of fraud, cultural attitudes 
differ as to how business should be done.
134
   Comparison with Australian law, as a 
common law jurisdiction, is more useful but is not readily comparable in that 
although corporate culture as a basis for criminalization has been recognised, it is 
only applied in limited circumstances and only in relation to federal offences 
perpetrated against Commonwealth entities.
135
    
 
Given that it is the criminal element of mens rea that has been the stumbling block to 
the imposition of corporate liability, enquiry into the actus reus / mens rea construct 
of crime is of more relevance.  It is widely acknowledged that criminal fault came to 
be fashioned in this way largely due to enlightenment thinking, with its emphasis on 
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subjective individualism.  However, in that the strict division of the mental and the 
physical also accorded with the then prevailing Cartesian dualist philosophy, a 
contemporary philosophical perspective has been employed to evaluate the 
traditional canons of criminality.  The theory of mind and action is thus the 
perspective taken and this particular selection is further supported by inter-
disciplinary reference to recent discoveries in mainstream neuroscience.  The 
medical findings underpin the argument for a reconstruction of the orthodox basis of 
criminal fault attibrution and the case for a manifest approach to liability is tested 
against the neuroscientific knowledge.    
Finally, as a creature of black letter law methodology, it is fitting that the same 
methodology that is used to unmask the the ‘identification doctrine’ itself and to 
provide the means by which the principle can be distinguished in future cases of 
corporate wrongdoing. 
 
Towards that end, the following chapter commences the process of unpicking the 
evolution of criminal law doctrine, starting with an historical evaluation of the 
orthodox canons of criminal fault. 
 
1.7  Chapter outlines 
 
The remainder of this introductory chapter provides a discussion of the literature in 
the area of corporate liability and establishes that there is widespread agreement that 
organisations can and should be criminally accountable.  The bases upon which it 
has been suggested that fault might be attributed are analysed and rejected, being 
incapable of capturing the true nature of corporate fraud.  Accordingly, this research 
makes an original contribution to knowledge through the identification of a model of 
liability which facilitates the means by which criminal intention can be attributed 
directly to a corporation without employing alternative bases of fault such as 
negligence.  In the context of fraud, this means that an organisation can be convicted 
for the substantive offence in circumstances where the use of the identification 
principle is inappropriate.  
 
Chapter 2 starts the reconstruction process by revealing how the concept of mens rea 
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has altered and, given its metaphysical association, how this has frustrated the 
development of a theory of corporate liability.  It will reveal that ‘voluntariness’ was 
the traditional primary determinant of fault in all cases whereas the limited concept 
of mens rea, narrowly defined as the foresight of specified consequences, was 
confined to the common law offences.  Judicial ambivalence as to the use of the term 
will be evidenced such that mens rea will be seen to have become almost a ‘short-
hand’ to refer to voluntariness, foresight of specified circumstances and indeed any 
other blameworthy mental state.  It will be seen that the linguistic ambivalence was 
the precursor to doctrinal change, mens rea becoming upgraded as its conceptual 
boundaries gradually expanded.  This chapter discloses a further consequence of the 
changing language which has also had fundamental implications for the way in 
which fault is attributed.  It will show that where previously ‘voluntariness’ of action 
was presumed as a matter of evidence, the ‘presumption of voluntariness’ was 
replaced by reference to the ‘presumption of mens rea’.  The presumption that the 
defendant had acted voluntarily was thus replaced with the presumption that the 
prosecution needed to prove that the defendant had mens rea.  In essence, this meant 
that the evidential presumption, which had aided the prosecution, was displaced by a 
presumption of substance, which favoured the defendant.  The practical implication 
of the linguistic imprecision was that the primary enquiry as to blameworthiness 
came to focus on the defendant’s subjective mental state where previously it looked 
first to his voluntariness, by reference to the overt appearance of the act.  In 
accordance with the subjectivist ideal, this manifest assessment of conduct was then 
subject to the defendant giving evidence to the contrary if he sought to refute the 
appearance of his act.  This chapter demonstrates that the reinstatement of the full 
doctrine of voluntariness constitutes the first step to facilitating a general model of 
corporate responsibility and provides the means by which a corporation can be 
identified as a responsibility-bearing entity.    
 
Whilst chapter 2 reveals the demise of voluntariness and the accompanying 
evidential presumption, chapter 3 exposes the similar fate of the presumption of 
intention.  It makes the case for the re-acknowledgement of this presumption whose 
disappearance from the narrative of the criminal law was the coincidental result of 
the silencing effect of heightened judicial focus on the level of foresight required 
before a murderous intention could be found.  This shift away from the evidential 
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presumptive mechanism had broader implications such that the manifest assessment 
of guilt, identifying fault by primary reference to the overt act, was replaced by the 
need to prove fault by primary reference to the internal mental state of the actor.  
This has had obvious repercussions in the context of corporate fault attribution.  This 
chapter makes the case that the presumption of intention has been inadvertently 
silenced and should now return, voce forte, to the dialogue of the criminal law.  
 
The black letter law analysis of chapters 2 and 3 reveals the development of the law 
in relation to both doctrine and the evidential presumptions and how, over time, they 
suffered gradual erosion through a series of decisions culminating in an unforeseen, 
and perhaps unforeseeable, disappearance.  Where the presumption of voluntariness 
was erroneously taken to reverse the burden of proof, the presumption of intention 
was first taken to challenge the whole subjectivist edifice and then lost amidst the 
heightened attention that the issue of oblique intention attracted in the context of 
murder.  Aside from the black letter law reconstruction advocated, chapter 4 
provides further support for a return to the orthodox presumptive approach with a 
review of contemporary mind / action philosophy and knowledge emerging in the 
field of neuro-science.  It will be demonstrated that whilst they are external to the 
black letter law framework, these are complementary perspectives and provide a 
nuanced understanding of the mind / body relationship generally and, in particular, 
evidence of the legitimacy of the manifest approach to fault attribution.  Whilst 
demonstrating the ontological flaws of the bifurcated actus reus / mens rea 
understanding of criminality, a rehearsal of the advancements made in relation to the 
mirror neuron system of the brain provides credence to the proposition that the 
manifest assessment of the conduct of another provides the observer with direct 
knowledge of that conduct.  This has startling implications for the subjectivist 
account of criminal law and the way in which fault can be attributed.  These 
implications are not confined to the assessment of individual action but extend to 
explain the reality of group action and the way in which the observer also gains 
direct knowledge of that.    
 
Whilst modern neuroscience supports the recognition of distinct collective action, 
the realist theory of organisations is not new.  Indeed, what is now identified as the 
landmark legal authority for the emergence of the fiction theory, Lennard’s Carrying 
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Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd [1915] was decided in the midst of prevailing realist 
ideology.
136
   Indeed, Viscount Haldane L.C. is attributed with the first articulation 
of the fictionist ‘identification principle’ and it will be shown that this is particularly 
surprising in that he was very much attuned to realist philosophy
137
 and not bound by 
precedent.  Accordingly, chapter 5 sets out the philosophical and legal context in 
which the Lennard’s case was decided.  Revealing not only a strong realist view of 
group activity at the time, it also provides an illustrative account of the courts’ 
readiness to attribute corporate criminal liability, albeit on the basis of existing 
principles derived from the law of agency and that of master and servant. 
 
Chapter 6 deals specifically with the emergence and development of the 
identification principle, revealing that when Lennard’s
138
 was decided, it was not 
taken to decide anything remarkable or to develop any new principle of liability.  
Even if it had, the 2 evidential presumptions were fully operational in the criminal 
law at this time and the primary focus of enquiry would have been the manifest 
appearance of fault.  This chapter demonstrates that the landmark status now 
afforded to the judgment was due to its subsequent elevation in Tesco v Nattrass 
[1972],
139
 by which time both presumptions had been largely discredited and there 
was a growing judicial reluctance to convict in the absence of a blameworthy state of 
mind.
140
  With the now expanded notion of mens rea and the shift to the primacy of 
the metaphysical enquiry, the notion of the ‘directing mind and will’ provided a 
convenient solution to the practical and ideological difficulties of corporate 
prosecution whilst its attribution to the earlier authority legitimated the progeny.  
Further, the analysis reveals that the earlier cases involved instances where the 
misconduct of an individual employee was identified and, therefore, the question in 
these cases was whether this liability could be attributed to the company.  
                                                             
136 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd [1915] AC 705 (HL). 
137 In 1883, he published Essays in Philosophical Criticism, and in the same year, his translation of 
Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Idea. Other philosophical works include Pathway to 
Reality (1903), Reign of Relativity (1921), The Philosophy of Humanism (1922) and Selected 
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 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd [1915] AC 705 (HL).   
139 Tesco Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153 (HL). 
140 Something already evidenced in Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 (HL). 
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Accordingly, the black letter law analysis in this chapter indicates that cases 
involving widespread and pervasive conduct, not necessarily indicative of individual 
wrongdoing, can be distinguished. 
 
The concluding chapter draws from the findings of the combination of legal 
theoretical analysis, mind / action philosophy as it is now supported by discoveries 
in modern neuro-science, and the black letter law and historical unpicking of the 
formation of criminal law doctrine.  The case for a manifest model of corporate 
liability is premised on a number of propositions, many of which rest on the 
assertion that the course of the law never did run smooth.  Going further than 
suggesting that the development of the criminal law was largely a response to 
historical contingency, as has been mooted previously, the overall picture revealed is 
of a criminal law which has evolved randomly as the coincidental culmination of a 
series of misguided turns combined with some particularly haphazard judicial 
interventions over a considerable period.  This applies equally to the orthodox 
canons of criminal fault generally as it does to the development of the identification 
principle specifically.  Consequently, the case is made for a rational reconstruction of 
the criminal law with a renewed recognition of the orthodox doctrine of 
voluntariness, its accompanying evidential presumption, and the evidential 
presumption of intention.  Effecting a subtle shift away from the metaphysical 
prominence, inherent in the expanded mens rea doctrine, in favour of the manifest 
approach, facilitated by the evidential presumptions, the conclusion to be drawn is 
that both capacity and criminal intent can be attributed directly to a corporation.  
Accordingly, in appropriate circumstances, a corporation can be found dishonest and 
to have the necessary intention to be convicted of the generic fraud offence.  
 
1.8.   Corporate liability: the literature 
 
The literature deals with two broad areas of law in which criminal sanctions may be 
applied to organisations: first, regarding the use of ‘regulatory offences’ to enforce 
standards of conduct in specialised areas of business activity and, second, the 
theories underlying the imposition of corporate culpability for what might be 





The literature review proceeds on the basis of wide acknowledgment of the 
weaknesses of the identification theory but there is recognition that it accords with 
focus on the individual generally, an approach that became pervasive with the 
Enlightenment.  It is clear that whilst the criminal law remained committed to the 
individualist analysis, other disciplines began to identify the influence of groups on 
individual behaviour.  Beyond that, it is now widely accepted that companies can 
gain a momentum and dynamic of their own which transcends the actions of 
individuals.  This is important in that it marks the shift from liability based on the 
fiction that individual fault equates to corporate fault in certain circumstances and 
recognises the realist theory of organisations, that they can act autonomously and 
incur liability directly.  However, the basis of liability that is currently proposed is 
either of a negligence-type, comprising non-compliance with some prescribed 
standard of corporate behaviour, or the ‘failure to prevent’ approach, where the 
organisation has failed to adequately police the criminal activities of its staff 
members.  Of note, these models are largely premised on the notion that there is a 
culpable omission or failure to act and in this respect the widespread view is that the 
liability incurred by corporations differs from the liability incurred by individuals.  
However, whilst both bases avoid the mens rea requirement typical of individual 
fault attribution, they also fail to capture the real nature of corporate misconduct in 
the context of systemic fraud, appearing closer to a regulatory non-compliance than 
the mark of truly criminal conduct.  Similarly, it will be demonstrated that both of 
the approaches mooted continue to turn on the ability to reduce the misconduct to a 
level of individual criminality and neither are suited to the peculiar nature of the 
fraud offence with its defining element of dishonesty.  Ultimately, the review reveals 
that the literature in this area lacks any challenge to the actus reus / mens rea 
paradigm itself, it is this lacuna that this research fills with a reconstruction of the 
traditional canons of fault.    
 
The Allens Arthur Robinson Report of 2008 identified the fundamental issues that 
any scheme of corporate criminal liability must address.
141
   The literature deals with 
                                                             
141 Allens Arthur Robinson (for the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary – General 
on Human Rights and Business), ‘Corporate Culture as a basis for the criminal liability of 
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the considerations identified which include whether liability should be generic or 
specific,
142
 the nature of the relationship between the individual actor and the 
corporation, on whose fault the liability is based and the relationship between the 
prosecution of the corporation and any individual.  As regards the first issue, 
contemporary academic work in this area has not been confined to the consideration 
of specific, discreet offences that have been viewed as particularly problematic.  
However, whilst the literature examines models of generic liability there has been 
some tendency to focus on conduct that is dangerous in terms of health and physical 
welfare.
143
  Arguably, this tendency is a reflection of the particularly troubling 
problem of corporate manslaughter which dominated the debate for some years prior 
to the enactment of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007.  
It was in this context that the common law identification doctrine
144
 was shown to 
severely limit the potential to prosecute organisations for wrongdoing.
145
  A series of 
high-profile cases involving numerous transport fatalities were publicised
146
 and the 
overwhelming academic view continues to acknowledge the problems with the law 
that were highlighted at that time. Consequently, the literature contains reference to 
                                                                                                                                                                            
corporations’ (Feb 2008) <http://198.170.85.29/Allens-Arthur-Robinson-Corporate-Culture-paper-
for-Ruggie-Feb-2008.pdf> accessed 24 April 2015, 62. 
142 Most European jurisdictions operate a scheme of general corporate liability, see S Adam and 
others (eds), Corporate Criminal Liability in Europe (La Charte 2008) and Law Commission, Criminal 
Liability in Regulatory Contexts (Law Com No, 2010) app C at C.36.  Some are generic such that the 
chosen model is applied to every offence, whatever its nature, this model has been adopted in the 
USA, Austria, Belgium, France and South Africa; others have general liability but apply different 
models according to the fault element of the offence, for example in Australia (C’th) and Canada. 
143 Celia Wells, ‘Corporations: Culture, Risk and Criminal Liability’ (1993) Crim L R Aug 551; Celia 
Wells, ‘Corporate Liability for Crime: the Neglected Question’ [1995] 14(4) IBFL 42; Celia Wells ‘The 
Law Commission Report on Involuntary Manslaughter: the Corporate Manslaughter Proposals: 
Pragmatism, Paradox and Peninsularity’ [1996] Crim LR 545; Celia Wells, ‘Corporate Manslaughter: 
Why Does Reform Matter?’ (2006) SALJ 646. 
144 This doctrine is now employed in all instances save for manslaughter and corruption, see also the 
Bribery Act 2010. 
145 In addition to the shortcomings identified at ch 1 above, the principle is said to be both over- and 
under- inclusive. A company may be found criminally liable even where its senior officer was acting 
against the interests of the company but a company will not be criminally liable where a less senior 
employee has acted within the scope of his employment and in the interests of the company, see 
Moore v Bresler Ltd [1944] 2 All ER 515.  The Law Commission, Codification of the Criminal Law (Law 
Com No 143, 1985) ch 11 recommended a change of law such that the inequitable result said to 
have resulted in Moore v Bresler would not be repeated, here the company was culpable even 
though it was the victim of the employees’ fraud.  James Gobert, ‘Corporate Criminality: four models 
of fault’ (1994) 14(3) LS 393, 400; Christopher Harding, Criminal Enterprise, Individuals, 
Organisations and Criminal Responsibility (Willan 2007). 
146 For example, in March 1987, 187 people were killed in the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster.  167 
died on Piper Alpha in July 1988 and 5 months later 35 rail passengers lost their lives at Clapham.  
Over the years, the names Kings Cross, Marchioness, Southall, Paddington, Hatfield and Potters Bar 
have been added to the list. 
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an alternative version of corporate liability which was mooted in the Herald of Free 
Enterprise case, P & O European Ferries Ltd (1990).
147
  Described as the 
‘aggregation principle’ it is the mechanism of aggregating the acts, omissions and 
mental states of more than one person in order to determine the actus reus and mens 
rea of the organisational whole.  Suggested as a means to capture the full extent of 
company wrongdoing, it avoids the problem of locating just one ‘guilty’ individual 
at the senior level required.
148
  Specifically, the suggestion was that the negligence of 
a number of individuals could be aggregated to amount to gross negligence on the 
part of the company.  In the event, whilst acknowledging that a company could be 
guilty of manslaughter, the prosecution in P & O Ferries failed.  The finding 
accorded with Devlin J’s analysis in an earlier case in which he had said, ‘You 
cannot add an innocent state of mind to an innocent state of mind and get as a result 
a dishonest state of mind’.
149
  Put differently in ex parte Spooner (1988)
150
, a judicial 
review arising out of the same facts, it was held that a case against one defendant 
cannot be fortified by evidence against another defendant.  Thus, as far as the 
common law was concerned, the door to development by aggregation of fault was 
closed
151
 and the Law Commission also refused to acknowledge the possibility of 
aggregation as a basis of corporate liability.
152
  That being said, the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, which was subsequently enacted, 
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149 Armstrong v Strain [1952] 1 KB 232 (CA). 
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152 Law Commission, A Criminal Code for England and Wales (Law Com No 177, 1989) vol 1, para 
30(2) and the discussion in Eli Lederman, ‘Models for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability: From 








1.9   From individualism to holism: the spectrum of responsibility 
 
Whether aggregate or not, it is the individualist account of criminality that continues 
to pervade the criminal law and this brings clear implications for any regime of 
corporate liability.
154
  Focus on the individual in the analysis of socio-economic 
phenomena generally is longstanding and an approach that became prominent with 
the Enlightenment.
155
  The basic elements comprise the assumption of rationality and 
what is called ‘methodological individualism’.
156
  Elaborated and introduced as a 
precept for the social sciences, Max Weber claimed that social phenomena must be 
explained by showing how they result from individual actions.
157
  Such action must 
then be explained by reference to the intentional states that motivate the actor and 
this broadly equates to the need to examine subjective mens rea in the criminal law’s 
treatment of the individual.  However, whilst the criminal law theory appears to have 
become ever more entrenched in the individualist paradigm, as a methodology used 
primarily in economic theory, Popper and his student, Joseph Agassi, made notable 
contributions which recognised group behaviour.
158
   In accordance with this 
development, sociologists have gone on to address the issue of interdependence 
where, ‘people are not always independent actors, but are members of groups, and 
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 Karl R Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1945) 2 vols;  Joseph 
Agassi, ‘Methodological Individualism’ (1960) 11(3) British Journal of Sociology, Sept 244-70; Joseph 
Agassi ‘Institutional Individualism’ (1975) 26(2) British Journal of Sociology, June 144-55. 
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[that] such membership can sometimes affect their actions’.
159
  Agassi described this 
as 'institutional individualism', in recognition that institutional structures exist and 
affect individual choices, while only individuals have aims and responsibilities. This 
account acknowledges that the influence of group and social structures can produce 
types of collective intention
160





Whilst sociological theory was developing in this way, theorising in the criminal law 
was not completely dormant. For example, the jurist Winn made the following 
observation in the context of the law and corporate activity in the 1920s:  
  Corporations have no thoughts of their own, for they have no brains to which  
   thought images may pass; the brains of the corporators are their own brains  
  and not the corporations.  But the minds of the corporators, thinking in  
  meeting assembled, exert a mutual influence which makes the definite  
  purpose and firmness of attitude; when nine men of the like opinions unite to  
  prove to attend the infallibility of their position, each will be strengthened,  
  confirmed and rendered more obdurate by the support of others.  Mutually  
  stimulated they will go to excesses from which alone they would have  
  shrunk.  It is an inexplicable but plainly demonstrable phenomenon of the   
  human mind that men do not think their own thoughts within groups; each  
  mind contributes something to the group, and is influenced by the thought  




Winn’s contribution arrived after a period of intense legal theorising at the start of 
the 20
th
 century which was very much at pace with other disciplines.
163
  Moving to 
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160 See Karl R Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1957); JWN Watkins, 
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161 Robert Ahdieh, ‘Beyond Individualism in Law and Economics’ (2011) 91 BUL Rev 43, 57. 
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163
 There was much support for the realist theory of organisations as seen in the works of FW 
Maitland, ‘Moral Personality and Legal Personality’ and ‘Trust and Corporation’ in HAL Fisher (ed) 
The Collected Papers of Frederick William Maitland (Cambridge University Press 1911) vol 3, 210-
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more recent analysis, within the last couple of decades Sullivan has added his theory 
of organisational ‘collective intention’ in which he observed that individual intention 
flows downwards from the collective
164
 and Wells also refers the practical reality 
that people do not think as individuals but act as part of a group as a result of 
institutional and cultural constraints.
165
  Similarly, Lee’s account of corporate 
criminal liability is based upon the conceptualisation of the corporation as a team of 
individuals who play a part in the pursuance of shared goals.
166
  On this account 
moral agency rests on team participation in which team members share in both the 
achievements and failures of the team as a whole.  Thus, when a participant commits 
a crime motivated by the corporate norms, the individual wrongdoer deserves 
punishment as does the corporation itself as a matter of opprobrium upon the 
organisation’s norms and to influence the behaviour of the individuals who 
contribute to the creation of those norms.  However, the recognition of the distinct 
nature of group behaviour has not crystallised in the criminal law and the point is 
still moot.  Accordingly, the current models of corporate criminal liability continue 
to be based on the nominalist perspective which views the company as nothing more 
than a collection of individuals
167
 and the criminal law remains entrenched in the 
individualist paradigm. 
 
In this respect it is widely agreed that the criminal law will continue to lack the 
conceptual tools necessary to confront corporate liability for as long as it continues 
to be viewed as a derivative of individual liability.
168
  Indeed, this view is largely 
borne out by the fact that Parliament has seen fit to enact statutory offences in the 
areas of both corporate manslaughter and corruption, each with a bespoke model of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
319; Cecil Thomas Carr, The General Principles of the Law of Corporations (the Yorke prize essay for 
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  The literature is rich in its discussion of alternative 
constructs of liability and these extend beyond notions of group responsibility and 
move towards a ‘holistic’ analysis of the nature of the corporation as an autonomous 
actor.  There is wide recognition of a subtle inter-dynamic between the individual 
and the organisation as a whole such that a scale or spectrum of liability can be 
ascertained, ranging from fault that is wholly attributable to the individual at one end 
to wholly organisational culpability at the other.
170
  In other words, it is suggested 
that organisational responsibility starts where individual responsibility ends and as 





In accordance with this thinking, Ashworth acknowledges that whilst the law may be 
right to focus on the acts of individuals, individual actions can often only be 
explained fully by reference to the social and structural context in which they took 
place, for example, the structure and policies of a company.
172
  Furthermore, he 
accepts that companies can gain a momentum and dynamic of their own which 
temporarily transcends the actions of individual officers.  At this point the company 
itself is capable of both civil and criminal liability because, he suggests, it is the 
company which creates the structure and context for the individual’s conduct.
173
  
Concurring with Harding, the underlying issue is therefore one of ontology, rather 
than methodology, and whether it is possible to attribute responsibility to an 




There is wide academic support for the holist view that the organisation can become 
an autonomous actor, whose behaviour ‘transcends specific individual 
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174 Christopher Harding, Criminal Enterprise: Individuals, Organisations and Criminal Responsibility 





 and whose personality is unique.
176
   However, what is now 
described as the’holist’ or ‘self-identity’ model
177
 seemingly rebrands what was 
described as the ‘realist’ theory of corporations popular over a century ago.
178
  The 
seeds of this conception may be located in the early realist or natural entity theory 
associated with Gierke’s work on legal and political philosophy in which he seemed 
to suggest the phenomena of a group psyche.
179
  The thinking was widely endorsed 
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at that time, for example Maitland wrote, ‘if n men unite themselves in an organised 
body, jurisprudence, unless it wishes to pulverize the group, must see n + 1 
persons’.
180
   Dicey also stated, “it is a fact which has received far too little notice 
from English lawyers, that, whenever men act in concert for a common purpose, they 
tend to create a body which, from no fiction of law, but from the very nature of 
things, differs from the individuals from whom it is constituted’.
181
  Arguably, this 
thinking only fell out of favour as a matter of historical contingency at the start of the 
20
th
 century and, had that not been so, a fully-fledged theory of corporate liability 
may well have developed at that time.  
However, in accordance with the realist philosophy, today’s ‘holist’ model focuses 
on the primary liability of the corporation itself which it is not dependent upon 
mechanisms of fictional attribution of blame, either by vicarious liability or the 
derivative liability associated with the identification doctrine.  The renewed interest 
in collective theories looks to identify groups with their own defining features, 
obligations and rights
182
 and is accompanied by the growth of inter-disciplinary 
research and insights from extra-legal disciplines.
183
  Of note, the fact that members 
of highly structured organisations develop different norms and mores as organisation 
members than those they hold outside the organisational environment is a feature 
well-documented in sociology.
184
  Translated into the language of corporate law,
185
 
the holist or ‘self-identity’ model does not require that the corporate veil be lifted in 
order to find a suitable individual whose criminal behaviour can be attributed to that 
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of the corporation.   
 
As to the emergence of the corporate personality, whilst organisational rationality 
has its origin in human activity, Harding asserts that it is essentially the product of a 
process of human interaction that transforms the character of the rationality.
186
  
Accordingly, human interaction is to be distinguished from individual human 
contributions and the interaction itself has a transformative dynamic that produces a 
collective culture which then becomes the commanding determinant of 
organisational action.
187
  Put another way, May and Hoffman suggest that the 
process of organisations and individuals engaging in group activity may generate an 
autonomous activity which need not be identified anthropocentrically or in terms of 
the sum of its parts.
188
  Box also asserts that the essence of corporate crime is the 
behaviour of corporations, not individuals, and, therefore, the level of intervention 
has to be organisational rather than individual if it is to be effective. 
189
  According to 
Harding, the decision-making capacity of some groups moulds the individual 
intentions into a corporate intention that is often different from the intentions of any 
of the individual members.  Since act and intention are best attributed to the group 
rather than the individual members, responsibility can also be attributed to the whole 
group.
190
  Harding also points to an ‘organisation emergence’ of a collective interest 
which can replace an original individual interest.  The mystery, he says, is in the 
location of the tipping point at which the balance shifts from an individual to a 
collective centre of gravity, i.e. the point at which the collective interest takes 
control.
191
  From that point the company is autonomous, possessing an existence and 
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personality distinct from identifiable employees such that it can be held responsible 
in its own right.  There is wide agreement that the ‘decision-making personality’ is 
the hallmark of ‘organisations’ generally.
192
  So, while criminal law theorists have 
tended to consider corporate liability in the context of a company engaged in 
commercial activity,
193
 Harding observes that organisations can possess moral 
agency, irrespective of incorporation.
194
  Accordingly, whilst this research focuses 
on the specific problem of fraud committed in the corporate context, it must be 
recognised that realist theory applies equally to other forms of collectives and terms 
such as ‘corporation’, ‘organisation’ and ‘group’ are therefore used interchangeably 
throughout this work. 
 
Although there is much academic support for a model of holistic liability for 
corporations, there is no general consensus as to the specific mechanism and various 
alternatives have been mooted. While all aim to avoid trying to ‘squeeze corporate 
square pegs into the round holes of criminal law doctrines devised with individuals 
in mind’,
195
 the basis upon which fault may be attributed is a matter of debate.
196
  In 
this respect, there remains a concern as to the way in which the entity may be said to 
behave with any human characteristic or sentiment such as may attract moral 
blameworthiness.
197
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Whilst intentionality is at the heart of most philosophical justifications of individual 
liability, its applicability as a mark of corporate culpability has been questioned.
198
  
Even as a matter of linguistics, there are limitations in ascribing corporate fault 
because the language of responsibility is itself framed with individualism in mind.  
Wells in particular has recognised that notions such as rationality and autonomy, and 
the use of words such as ‘person’, are metaphysically limiting
199
 and analysis of 
crime in terms of actus reus and mens rea immediately marginalises corporate 
behaviour.
200
  Casting off the metaphysical limitations, Wells argues that 
organisations do have ‘souls to damn and bodies to kick’
201
 albeit they do not have 
the same material form as humans.
202
  However, the problems associated with the 
language of responsibility do not necessarily translate to limitations in the language 
of blame.  For example, Fisse and Braithwaite note that when people blame 
organisations they are not blaming the ‘ox that gored, or pointing the finger at 
individuals behind the corporate mantle, they condemn the fact that the organisation 
either implemented a policy of non-compliance or failed to exercise its capacity to 
avoid the offence for which blame attaches’.
203
  Similarly, Gellner’s analysis 
supports the holistic account of organisations, otherwise many descriptions would be 
lacking and, for example, ‘The team played well’ illustrates far more than any 
accurate account of each individual’s performance.
204
    
 
Whilst it is suggested that the language of responsibility might be hard to apply in 
the context of corporate liability, there is clear academic support for the proposition 
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that corporations can and do act intentionally.
205
  Pettit, for example, submits that the 
group agent not only acts intentionally but it can also form ‘evaluative beliefs’.
206
   
He argues that because the organisation can make value judgments and can then act 
in consequence, it can be held responsible for its acts in the same way that any 
individual actor can.
207
   Fisse and Braithwaite concur, suggesting that corporations 
lack intention only in the sense that they do not have the capacity to entertain a 
cerebral mental state, moreover, they certainly do exhibit their own special kind of 
intention, namely corporate policy
208
 and it is of significance that corporations have 
the capacity to change both their policy and their procedures.
209
  On this view, the 
moral responsibility of corporations relates essentially to social process rather than 
elusive attributes of personhood.
210
  This view clearly resonates with the ‘decision-
making personality’ identified by others.  Whilst corporations lack feelings and 
emotions it is widely agreed that this absence does not negate the quality of 
autonomy.
211
  On the contrary, it is argued that the lack of emotions and feelings 
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promote rather than hinder considered rational choice and in this respect the 
corporation may be a paradigm responsible actor.
212
  Continuing in this vein, 
McDonald notes that a large corporation has available and can make use of far more 
information than is possible for one individual to compute.
213
  In addition, he opines 
that the corporate form is ‘immortal’ in that it is characterised by perpetual 
succession and it is therefore better able to bear responsibility for its deeds than 
humans, whose sins die with them.
214
  Lederman’s commentary specifically 
recognises that the ‘holistic’ or ‘self-identity’ model of corporate criminal liability is 
a theoretically logical conclusion in that it is consistent with the basic principles of 
corporate theory and company law which stress the independence of the corporate 




As to the identification of a distinct corporate personality, Fisse and Braithwaite
216
 
suggest there are 2 crucial elements, namely functional autonomy and a distinct 
ethos.
217
  Functional autonomy is most clearly expressed through the idea of the 
corporation’s ability to dispense with human actors or its capacity to survive 
irrespective of human composition.  This phenomenon is described by Coleman as 
the ‘irrelevance of persons’
218
 which conveys the fact that where particular 
individuals are irrelevant to the survival or operation of an organisation, its 
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endurance through change of personnel is the mark of a separate identity.  This 
identity can also manifest itself as a controlling ethos determining the conduct of 
individuals who perform an organisational role different from their role as 
individuals.
219
  According to Fisse and Braithwaite, it is the second element, the 
ethos or distinctive culture that gives meaning to attribution of corporate 
responsibility.
220
  Bucy also moots the Aristotelian idea of ethos as a basis for 
corporate responsibility
221
 and this is also reflected in the Australian Criminal Code 
in which the concept of corporate culture is adopted as a means of reflecting the 
principle of corporate blameworthiness.
222
  Specifically, contained at part 2.5 of the 
1995 Code, s. 12.2 imposed vicarious liability on a corporation for the physical 
elements of the offence.  Section 12.3(1) states that ‘if intention, knowledge or 
recklessness is a fault element (...) [it] must be attributed to a body corporate that 
expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorised or permitted the commission of the offence. 
Further, s. 12.3(2)(c) provides that a corporation will be taken to have authorised or 
permitted the commission of a criminal offence if it is proved that a ‘corporate 
culture existed within the body corporate that directed, encouraged, tolerated or led 
to non-compliance with a relevant provision’. Section 12.3(2) (c) deals with where 
the corporation failed to ‘create and maintain a corporate culture that required 
compliance with the relevant provision’.  Corporate culture is defined in s. 12.3(6) as 
‘an attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct or practice existing within the body 
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corporate generally or in the part of the body corporate in which the relevant 
activities takes place’.  Punch describes the idea of culture in these terms, ‘specific 
companies, and parts of companies, have often a separate style of doing things 
manifested in subtle, semi-conscious ways of thinking and acting.  The corporate 
ethos is the functional equivalent of attitude that in human actors are used as bases 
for moral judgment’.
223
   
 
Harding suggests organising the criteria of agency into 2 main types, one relating to 
structure and the capacity for autonomous action, the other relating to role.
224
  The 
structure and capacity for autonomous action would link with the individual human 
members in a purposeful activity such that it would distinguish the corporation from 
the crowd or a random collectivity.  The structural conditions would comprise a 
decision making process, organisational apparatus and an identity over time, 
characterised by an irrelevance of persons, and producing a functional autonomy of 
action in addition to a representative role in the pursuit of a common purpose.
225
 
Harding argues that stressing the representational aspect of the identity and including 
it as one of the criteria of organisational agency facilitates an appreciation of both the 
‘driving force and ethos’ of the organisation and the way in which it presents itself as 
a legitimate actor. The purposive element of identity gives meaning to the behaviour 
of the organisation such that it can be distinguished from the individual members and 
it may produce a culture or ethos, with patterns of behaviour and certain expectations 
within the organisational structure.  This enables the actor to be viewed as a moral or 
legal agent in the sense that it would be appropriate and meaningful to consider it 
responsible, rather than individuals.
226
  Harding supports his thesis with reference to 
the work of Virginia Held
227
 and Earnest Gellner
228
 who similarly argue that the 
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moral responsibility of individuals is not logically derivable from the attribution of 
moral responsibility to a collectivity.  
 
The impact of a controlling corporate ethos has been recognised elsewhere as the 
basis upon which fault may be based.
229
  In this respect both French and Pettit 
supplement intentionality to expand the scope of corporate criminal liability.
230
  For 
French, the ‘Corporation’s Internal Decision Structure’
231
 provides the framework 
for the expression of corporate intention which transcends the intention of 
individuals or group of individuals when corporate decisions are taken that accord 
with the corporation’s ‘established policies’.
232
  Theories of organisation support the 
internal decision structure approach in that corporations tend to have intricate 
configurations which place responsibility for specific aspects on different 
departments.
233
  French’s work in this area identifies key features that characterise a 
corporation that is acting autonomously, namely the existence of an internal 
decision-making procedure, the enforcement of standards of conduct of individuals 
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in the group and the fact that the corporation’s identity remains unchanged despite 
changes in individual personnel.
234
  Bonner and Forman offer a more nuanced 
account recognising that criminal harm can result from the complex interplay 
between managers, standard operating procedures, corporate priorities, market 
demands and various other forces at work within corporations, rather than simply the 
influence of a particular individual.
235
  The recognition of organisations as 
possessing the capacity for autonomous action is now far from controversial. 
 
1.10   Attributing fault – what basis of corporate liability? 
 
As to a basis of liability, French suggests the employment of what he calls the 
‘extended principle of accountability’
236
  and the ‘principle of responsive 
adjustment’.
237
  The extended principle imposes liability for the unintended effects 
that the company ‘was willing to have occur as a result ...of his actions’
238
 whilst the 
responsive adjustment principle looks to measures taken to prevent the recurrence of 
an untoward event caused by it.
239
  He argues that where the internal decision 
structure has contributed to the realisation of a risk, an appropriate legal mechanism 
should be found in response.   
 
However, as regards a liability which is based on the unintended effects of actions or 
a failure to respond to harm, it would seem counter-intuitive to describe either 
principle in terms of ‘intention’, the classic hallmark of blameworthiness.  The 
language of intention does not appear suited to either of the models proposed by 
French, both of which appear more closely aligned to notions of negligence.  This 
approach accords with the pervasive tendency, evidenced throughout the literature, 
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to recommend the attribution of corporate fault by reference to conduct falling below 
some objective standard, or by some failure to comply with a particular duty.  For 
example, Fisse and Braithwaite suggest that the predominant form of corporate fault 
is more likely to be negligence than intention if an anthropomorphised notion of 
corporate intention is not at the heart of responsibility.
240
  Sullivan also proposes that 
appropriate standards of corporate behaviour should be formulated and corporate 
behaviour could then be assessed in terms of compliance or non-compliance with the 
prescribed standards.
241
  Alternatively, Lederman advocates a model which perceives 
the concept of mens rea unconventionally with objective and constructive elements 
such that liability is premised on the gap between the social expectation of the 
corporate behaviour and its actual conduct.
242
  Gobert also suggests that mens rea is 
only one way of getting at the issue of blameworthiness, an alternative may be to ask 
whether the company could have taken steps to identify and avoid the occurrence of 
harm, whether it was reasonable to do so, whether it in fact did so or whether it acted 
with due diligence.  One proposition he makes is that liability might be predicated on 
an implied duty, namely a duty incumbant upon the company to prevent crime.  This 
duty arises on the basis that the state allows companies to carry on business for profit 
under the protective umbrella of its laws and in exchange for being able to operate 
within the legal structure created and enforced by the state.  Consequently, the 
company has a duty not to conduct its business in a way that exposes innocent 
individuals to the dangers of harms proscribed by that same state’s criminal laws.
243
  
Together, Gobert and Punch argue that the most promising conceptualisation of 
corporate criminality is in terms of what they describe as ‘organisational fault’ with 
the suggestion that companies should bear the responsibility for the consequences 
that follow from the way they have organised their business operation.
244
  According 
to them:  
 
  organisational fault inheres when a company has organised its business in  
                                                             
240 Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite, Corporations: Crime and Accountability (Cambridge University 
Press 1993) 29. 
241 G R Sullivan, ‘The Attribution of Culpability to Limited Companies’ (1996) 55(3) CLJ 515. 
242 Eli Lederman, ‘Models for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability: From Adaptation and Imitation 
toward Aggregation and The Search for Self-Identity’ [2001] Buff Crim LR 642. 
243 James Gobert, ‘Corporate Criminality: New Crimes for the Times’, (1994) Crim LR 722.  Gobert 
refers to LH Leigh ‘The Criminal Liability of Corporations and Other Groups’ (1977) 9 Ottawa L Rev 
247, 287. 
244 James Gobert and Maurice Punch, Rethinking Corporate Crime (Butterworths 2003) 80, ch 5. 
66 
 
  such a way that persons and property are exposed to criminal victimisation or  
  the unreasonable risk of harm, when the company has failed to devise and put  
  in place systems for avoiding criminological risk, when its monitoring and  
  supervision of those whom it has put in a position to commit an offence or  
  cause harm is inadequate, and when the corporate ethos or culture is such as  
  to tolerate or encourage criminal offences.   
  
They argue that corporate crime is often perpetrated by an omission, where there is 
an obligation to put systems in place that would avert crime and that the failure to do 
so is a reflection of the way that the company has chosen to do its business.
245
  The 
‘failure to prevent’ model of corporate criminality they advocate is reinforced by the 
suggestion that the prosecution of an employee would not preclude the prosecution 
of the company for failing to prevent the offence of the employee.  Conversely, 
where the company is at fault, it would be liable in its own right, regardless of 
whether there is also a natural person who can be prosecuted for a separate offence.  
Accordingly, it may be that the offences for which the company and individual 
would be liable would not be the same, thus while the individual culpability would 
be for a substantive offence, the company’s would be for the blameworthy failure to 
prevent the commission of that crime.  A version of this mechanism has now been 
enacted in the context of corruption.  Sections 1, 2 and 6 of the Bribery Act 2010 
concern offences that are committed by individual persons, namely bribing another 
person, being bribed and bribing a foreign official.
246
  However, s. 7 introduces this 
innovative model of corporate culpability which is as yet peculiar to the Bribery Act.  
This section criminalises the failure of organisations to prevent bribery where a 
person associated with it bribes another person intending to obtain or retain business 
or a business advantage for the organisation.  An associated person is defined simply 
a person who performs services for or on behalf of the organisation
247
 and could be, 
for example, an employee, agent or subsidiary.
248
  The offence is far reaching in that 
the individual offender need not even have been prosecuted for, let alone convicted 
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of, any bribery for the organisational liability to arise.
249
  There is, however, a 
statutory defence available to the organisation if it can prove that it had adequate 
procedures in place designed to prevent persons associated with it from undertaking 
such conduct.
250
  As for liability, it is submitted that this model is not wholly 
committed to the notion of organisational fault since there must first be an 
underlying bribery offence committed by an individual member of staff, albeit that 
the staff member need not be prosecuted or convicted.  In this respect the model still 
relies upon individuals acting criminally within the company and there is no real 
departure from the individualist paradigm.
251
  In contrast, in the context of systemic 
corporate fraud, it may be that there is no dishonesty on the part of individual 
employees of the company. 
 
1.11   Fault attribution and the peculiar problem of fraud  
 
It is clear that there is overwhelming academic support for the ‘realist’ or ‘holist’ 
approach to organisations which recognises that the structure of the contemporary 
corporation is complex, with multiple centres of power which typically fails to 
conform to the traditional, clearly delineated, pyramid-like hierarchical echelons of 
authority.
252
  However, the literature bears out the apparent truth of Harding’s 
reasoning, namely that once over the tipping point, organisations commit different 
offences from individuals
253
 and the outcome is therefore something distinctive in 
terms of role, offending conduct and identity of the actor.
254
  The acknowledgement 
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of the distinctiveness of the corporate wrongdoing is useful.  It provides a 
justification for employing an alternative mechanism of fault attribution, neatly 
sidestepping the actus reus / mens rea construct of crime that has always proved so 
problematic in its application to the non-human actor.   
 
The ‘failure to comply with prescribed standards’ model avoids the tricky issue by 
constructing liability on a negligence-type basis.  Negligence is not a mental state but 
necessitates an objective assessment of behaviour measured by reference to 
standards of reasonableness.  As an approach to corporate misbehaviour it attracts 
little criticism.  However, as a mark of criminality, it arguably fails in its expressive 
function in that it conveys far less opprobrium than the notions traditionally 
employed, for example intentionality and subjective recklessness.  In this respect the 
breach of prescribed standards looks more like regulatory non-compliance than true 
criminality and it would arguably lack the deterrent bite of the threat of conviction 
for ‘real’ crime.  Significantly, individuals are not subject to criminal sanction on the 
basis of negligence and a more blameworthy state of mind is required before the 
criminal law is invoked.  If the criminal law regime is to acknowledge the realist 
approach to organisations, offence definitions must capture the true nature of the 
organisational criminality and do so by reference to a culpable standard comparable 
to individual liability.   
 
As a basis of criminal liability, negligence is controversial and, of note, is arguably 
more readily associated with a failure to act or to take sufficient care when acting.  In 
the context of corporate fraud, neither the ‘failure to comply’ nor the negligence-type 
model is satisfactory.  The suggestion that a company can commit fraud through 
negligence fails to express adequately the true nature of fraud which typically 
involves the making of some false or misleading statement.  Furthermore, the fact 
that a statement may be both true and at the same time misleading undermines any 
approach which does not encompass the element of dishonesty.
255
   It must be noted 
that fraud is peculiar in that it defies definition, it is not an activity in itself but the 
way in which an activity is performed.
256
  Since most fraud is perpetrated 
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intentionally and with dishonesty, any negligence based model of culpability is ill-
suited to address, or adequately express, wrongdoing of this nature. 
The ‘failure to prevent’ model attracts much of the same criticism.  In addition, this 
model cannot be said to be based on realist conceptions of organisations at all since 
it implicitly requires an underlying offence to have been committed by an 
employee.
257
  In this respect the model still relies upon individuals acting criminally 
within the company and the failure to prevent approach, formulated in this way, is 
not always suitable for attributing corporate liability.
258
  As regards fraud, it may be 
that along the spectrum of behaviour there are individuals who are perpetrating 
offences independently or subject to some group influence.  In such circumstances, a 
corporation might well be considered culpable by virtue of a failure to supervise.  
However, recent examples of corporate conduct, particularly in the financial services 
industry, have attracted legal intervention as a result of sharp practice and more 
readily point to the possibility of a corporate culture of fraud, not reducible to 
individual dishonesty.  These examples include the now highly publicised practices 
of mis-selling payment protection plans and interest rate swap agreements which 
have been endemic within the industry.  In such cases dishonesty cannot necessarily 
be located in individual directors or in the thousands of individual employees 
involved in the practice.  The dishonest culture may well have emerged, for example, 
as a result of various corporate and individual sales targets, sales policies and risk 
aversion strategies, all at some point overlapping and ultimately culminating in the 
reprehensible conduct itself.  In such a case, an individualist approach to criminality 
may serve only to inculpate carefully selected scapegoats, the criminogenic 
organisation itself remaining unscathed and undeterred.  The ‘failure to comply’ and 
‘failure to prevent’ models both avoid corporate prosecution for the substantive 
offence.  Hence, in this sort of context, the organisation would not have a conviction 
for fraud but for an altogether different nature of wrongdoing, neither approach truly 
acknowledges that companies themselves can commit fraud.    
The ‘corporate culture model’ adopted in Australia is preferable in that it adheres to 
the realist analysis of corporations.  It provides the means by which to attribute the 
necessary mens rea to the company, where there is evidence of a blameworthy 
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corporate culture, and the actus reus element of the offence is attributed by the 
simple principle of vicarious liability.  However, since the code only provides the 
mechanism to attribute intention, recklessness and knowledge to a corporation, an 
analysis of its use in the context of dishonesty offences is frustrated.
259
    
 
What remains consistent across the literature is the acceptance that the actus reus / 
mens rea construct of crime is not a suitable mechanism with which to establish 
corporate liability.  Accordingly, underlying the realist approaches suggested to date 
has been the need either to provide an alternative mechanism for the attribution of 
mens rea to the organisation or an altogether different basis of fault, such as the 
negligence-type or the ‘failure to prevent’ model.  Although Wells argues that the 
assumption that corporations cannot act intentionally or recklessly is faulty,
260
 it is 
clear that other bases for fault attribution have been suggested with a view to avoid 
the perceived mens rea problem in the context of the corporate actor.  Thus, whilst 
acknowledgement is given to the limitations of the language of metaphysical 
responsibility and anthropomorphism, there has been no challenge to the validity of 
the actus reus / mens rea construct itself, as it is now understood.  Having accepted 
this paradigm without further enquiry, the literature in this area therefore lacks 
analysis of the fundamental blocks used to determine criminality per se.  Notably 
absent is any suggestion that the conduct of organisations might be adjudged by 
reference to what could be an emotively evocative adjective, such as dishonesty, as 
this appears to be uncomfortably close to the requirement of a subjective state of 
mind.  It is that lacuna that this research fills.  It will be shown that acceptance of the 
‘realist’ nature of corporations together with a corrective re-interpretation of the 
actus reus / mens rea doctrine facilitates corporate convictions for the substantive 
offence of fraud without the need to rely on the unsatisfactory identification 
principle, where not appropriate, or to defer to alternative bases of liability such as 
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2.  Substantive law and the attribution of criminal fault.   
 
2.1   Mens rea: the hallmark of moral fault today 
 
This chapter will demonstrate not only that the concept of mens rea has altered over 
time, but also that its dominance as the signature of fault in the criminal law rests on 
an unsatisfactory foundation.  Analysis of early authoritative work and case law, 
dating back to the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, reveals that the Latin maxim, ‘actus 
non facit reum nisi mens sit rea’, which is said to articulate the basis of criminality, 
was understood in an altogether different way and that the current assumptions about 
liability are the result of a linguistic and conceptual misinterpretation of common law 
doctrine.  In particular, mens rea has evolved to assume an unprecedented meaning 
and status and, because of its metaphysical association, this has had problematic 
consequences for the development of a theory of corporate liability.  Moreover, the 
analysis reveals that it was the notion of ‘voluntariness’, not mens rea, which was the 
constituent plank of fault in all offences, whether of common law or statutory origin.  
As it was traditionally understood, voluntariness encompassed the notions of acting 
freely and doing so in knowledge of the circumstances.  Furthermore, that the   
defendant’s action was voluntary was a matter of evidential presumption, subject to 
his denial.  The common law offences were also subject to the presumption of mens 
rea by which it was presumed that proof of the defendant’s foresight of particular 
consequences was required before moral fault could be attributed.  Whilst 
voluntariness had a wide definition, which included physical and metaphorical non-
voluntariness, mens rea, in contrast, was narrowly defined.  However, judicial 
ambivalence in the use of the term mens rea, to refer also to voluntariness, and 
indeed any other mental state, has ultimately resulted in the displacement of the 
orthodox act doctrine of which voluntariness was at the heart.  The down-grading of 
voluntariness corresponded with the ever increasing scope of the mens rea doctrine.  
Furthermore, the incorrect articulation of the ‘presumption of voluntariness’ as the 
‘presumption of mens rea’, where the term had been used synonymously, has meant 
that the evidential presumption, which had aided the prosecution, has been displaced 
by a substantive presumption, which favours the defendant.  Thus, the presumption 
that the defendant had acted voluntarily was replaced with the presumption that the 
prosecution needed to prove that the defendant had mens rea, in the broad sense of 
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any mental state specified in the offence definition.  Whilst the requirement of 
voluntariness had applied in all cases,
261
 the latter only applied to common law 
crimes, statutory offences requiring altogether different consideration.  The practical 
implication of the linguistic imprecision was that the primary enquiry as to 
blameworthiness has now come to focus on the defendant’s subjective mental state 
where previously it focused first on his voluntariness, by reference to the appearance 
of the overt act.  Steering through the conceptual confusion, this chapter will show 
that a renewed recognition of the doctrine of voluntariness constitutes the first step to 
facilitating a general model of corporate responsibility.  Since it is the characteristic 
of voluntariness that asserts the capacity of the actor, it thus provides the means by 
which a corporation can be identified as a responsibility-bearing entity.  Further, 
since the orthodox doctrine operates by way of evidential presumption, it obviates 
the need to prove the specific mental states which have been so problematic in the 
prosecution of corporations.  It is, therefore, of practical application in the attribution 
of corporate fault whilst preserving the opportunity for a representative of the 




2.2   The 2 mental states: voluntariness and mens rea  
 
The classic basis of criminality is said to be contained in the Latin maxim ‘actus non 
facit reum nisi mens sit rea’,
263
 which has been crudely paraphrased as ‘whatever the 
deed a man may have done, it cannot make him criminally punishable unless his 
doing of it was actuated by a legally blameworthy attitude of mind’.
264
  Whilst the 
maxim appears simply to bifurcate the physical and mental elements, referring to 
actus reus and mens rea, the common law recognised 2 distinct mental states until 
                                                             
261 Although a couple of exceptional cases demonstrate that Parliament can even dispense with this 
requirement if it so chooses, R v Larsonneur (1934) 24 Cr App R 74 (CCA); Winzar v CC Kent (1983) 
The Times, 28 March. 
262 Should the law develop in this way, it may provide the opportunity for some novel defences to 
evolve in the corporate context by analogy with defences more suited to the conduct of individuals. 
263 Expressed in this way by Coke, 3 Inst 6, it derives from St Augustine’s words, ‘ream linguam non 
facit nisi mens rea’ which were later used as the test of guilt in the crime of perjury in Leges Henrici 
Primi 5, s 28. JW Cecil Turner provides this detail in Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law (17th edn, 
Cambridge University Press 1958) 13. 
264 JW Cecil Turner, Russell on Crime (12th edn, Stevens & Sons 1964) vol 1, 22, ‘the word reum is an 
adjective which does not qualify the noun actus but does qualify the implied noun hominem: it is 
therefore a subjective epithet and signifies legally guilty, punishable as a criminal (...) on the other 
hand the word rea does qualify the noun mens but not in the same subjective sense (hence the 
grammatical clumsiness of the whole maxim ...)’. 
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well into the 20
th
 century.  The first of these states is ‘voluntariness’, the second 
‘mens rea’, then narrowly defined to mean that the defendant must have foreseen 




In relation to the 2 mental states, it is widely acknowledged that voluntariness was 
the primary determinant of criminal fault in the criminal law.
266
  In its earliest period, 
when the law simply regulated the payment of compensation for harm caused, there 
was no need to establish any blameworthy mental state whatsoever.
267
  However, 
when the idea of punishment developed, it was agreed that liability should depend on 
moral guilt, namely that the individual knew that he was doing wrong.
268
  Initially 
decided by objective standards, the defendant’s mind, actual or presumed, became 
relevant.
269
  First, it was recognised that moral guilt could not be attributed to a man 
who acted involuntarily since there was no culpable mental state.  Thereafter, an 
advance was made when the accused was allowed to plead that his act was harmless 
in itself and that he had not foreseen that it would cause the harm that it did.  Finally, 
it was recognised that although the act was harmful, a defendant could plead that he 
had not foreseen that it would cause harm.
270
  The development of the canons of fault 




The fundamental distinction between the 2 mental states, voluntariness and foresight 
of consequences, narrowly defined as mens rea, formed the subject of Turner’s 
seminal work of 1936 which was published in the Cambridge Law Journal.
272
  Of 
                                                             
265 JWC Turner, ‘The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law’ (1936  - 1938) 6 CLJ 31, 32. 
266 See for example John Austin (1790 – 1859), John Austin, ‘The Province of Jurisprudence 
Determined’ (1832) in John Austin and Robert Campbell (eds), Lectures on Jurisprudence (orig pub 
1874, Kissinger Legacy 2010).  Austin’s early 19th century analysis of criminal responsibility had 
involved 2 mental states, the first concerning bodily action, the second the effects of such actions.  
Fragments of the Austinian thinking appeared in the analysis provided by the Criminal Law 
Commission Fourth Report of 1839 which identified that one element was the actor’s mental state in 
relation to his act, the second his mental state in relation to its consequences, Criminal Law 
Commission Fourth Report of Her Majesty’s Commissioners on Criminal Law 1839 (168) XIX. 
267 JWC Turner, ‘The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law’ (1936  - 1938) 6 CLJ 31, 34. 
268 JW Cecil Turner, Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law (17th edn, Cambridge University Press  1958) 13. 
269 JWC Turner, ‘The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law’ (1936  - 1938) 6 CLJ 31, 35.   
270 JWC Turner, ‘The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law’ (1936 - 1938) 6 CLJ 31, 35 - 36. 
271 Nicola Lacey, ‘In Search of the Responsible Subject: History, Philosophy and Criminal Law Theory’ 
(2001) 64 MLR 350-71; Nicola Lacey ‘Responsibility and Modernity in Criminal Law’ (2001) 9 Journal 
of Political Philosophy 249-77; Nicola Lacey ‘Space, Time and Function: Intersecting Principles of 
Responsibility across the Terrain of Criminal Justice’ (2007) 1 Criminal Law and Philosophy 233-50. 
272 JWC Turner, ‘The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law’ (1936  - 1938) 6 CLJ 31.   
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note, Turner’s analysis was limited to an examination of the common law offences 
since the basis of criminality articulated in the Latin maxim had no application to the 
statutory offences, which Parliament was free to draft in any way it chose.
273
  The 
distinction between common law and statutory offences was so marked at this time 
such that the interpretation of statutes was the subject of an altogether separate 
publication in the same journal.
274
  The only mental state implicit in the statutory 
offences was that of voluntariness, although, exceptionally, Parliament had 
constructed crimes without even that.
275
  As regards Turner’s exposition, 3 elemental 
rules were identified which were determinative of criminal liability at common law:  
 
1.  It must be proved that the conduct of the accused caused the actus reus.   
2.  It must be proved that the conduct was voluntary and,  
3.  It must be proved that the accused must have foreseen that certain consequences  




Whereas rule 1 dealt solely with causation, rules 2 and 3 required evidence as to the 
defendant’s state of mind.  Whilst acknowledging that it had often been overlooked, 
Turner emphasised that the distinction between the 2 mental states was an essential 
one.  While Turner’s rule 2 required voluntariness of conduct, rule 3 set out what 
was specifically referred to as mens rea.  As regards mens rea, he observed that the 
extent to which the foresight must have gone was fixed by law and that it differed in 
the case of each particular crime.  This meant that a lawyer needed to know 
specifically the consequences that were appropriate to each crime.
277
  In the 
                                                             
273 RM Jackson, ‘Absolute Prohibition in Statutory Offences’ (1936 -1938) 6 CLJ 83. 
274 Indeed, in his article Turner acknowledges the work of RM Jackson, in the same edition, dealing 
with the mental element as regards statutory offences, RM Jackson, ‘Absolute Prohibition in 
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controversially, in R v Larsonneur (1934) 24 Cr App R 74 (CCA); Winzar v CC Kent (1983) The Times, 
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276 JWC Turner, ‘The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law’ (1936 – 1938) 6 CLJ 31, 32 – 33. 
277 JWC Turner, ‘The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law’ (1936  – 1938) 6 CLJ 31, 33. 
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accompanying publication, Jackson stated that, ‘The state of a man’s mind is 
relevant to finding out, first, if the act he did is to be imputed to him, and secondly, if 
he realised the probable consequences.  It is the second enquiry which decides 
whether he had common law mens rea’.
278
  Voluntariness, denoting imputability, 
thus went to capacity and served as the hallmark of the responsibility-bearing actor. 
 
As to what then constituted mens rea, Turner’s detailed explanation centred on 
Prince (1875).
279
  It is of note that today, with the altered conception of mens rea, 
this is described as a case concerning a strict liability offence, and thus not requiring 
proof of mens rea at all.
280
  The facts of Prince were that, reasonably believing a girl 
to be over the age of 16, he had taken the girl who was in fact under that age, out of 
the possession and against the will of her father.  His conviction was affirmed by the 
Court for Crown Cases Reserved on the interpretation of s. 55 Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861.
281
  Turner observed that all the judges in the case were agreed in 
refusing to read into the section any words such as ‘with knowledge that she is under 





Turner said that there was no justification for this and that:  
  Their dicta on these points were entirely obiter and it is a pity that so much  
  prominence has been given to them in textbooks as though they were  
  authoritative expositions of general principles to be applied in all criminal  
  cases.  In reading the judgments it is necessary to avoid confusing the two  
                                                             
278 RM Jackson, ‘Absolute Prohibition in Statutory Offences’ (1936 – 1938) 6 CLJ 83, 91.   
279 R v Prince (1872 - 75) LR 2 CCR 154.  
280 Glanville Williams, Criminal Law, The General Part (Stevens & Sons 1961) 153 and David Ormerod, 
Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (13th edn, OUP 2011) 58. 
281 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s 55 ‘Whosoever shall unlawfully take or cause to be taken 
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282 Of the judgments that discussed the subject of mens rea at length, all agreed it was an essential 
element but, nonetheless, they differed as to what exact mental element this required.  Bramwell B 
thought it necessary to establish that the accused intended to do what was morally wrong whereas 
Brett J held that the accused must have 'knowingly' done ‘acts which would constitute a crime if the 
result were as he anticipated, but in which the result may not improbably end by bringing the 
offence within a more serious class of crime’.  Denman J agreed with Bramwell but added a 
definition of the word 'unlawfully' which occurred in the section in question.  He spoke of the 
prisoner having ‘wrongfully and knowingly violated the father’s rights’.  So, all agreed that words as 
to knowledge of the age of the girl could not be read into the section but Bramwell wanted to read 
in 'with knowledge that his conduct was contrary to morality', Brett the words 'with knowledge that 
his conduct amounted to a crime' and Denman the words 'with knowledge that his conduct was a 
violation of the father’s rights'.   
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  different points set out in our rules 2 and 3.  It was certainly necessary to  
  prove that Prince voluntarily incited the girl to come away (rule 2).  But his  
  foresight of the consequences of his incitement was merely that she would  
  come with him, and was not affected by his knowledge of her age, or of the  
  criminal law, or of morality.
283
   
 
Turner went on to say that even if the word ‘knowingly’ or the like could be read 
into the statute, this would not affect the mens rea of the accused, but would merely 
add another necessary fact to the actus reus, namely the offender’s knowledge of the 
girl’s age.  
 
  
2.3   Voluntariness 
 
It was recognised that the conduct of the accused must be voluntary at an early stage 
in the law, long before the recognition that he must also have foreseen the 
consequences of his conduct.
284
  Since voluntariness is presumed,
285
 in practice the 
issue is raised in the form of the defendant’s claim of involuntariness.   Expressed in 
the negative form, ‘involuntariness’ is taken to describe the state in which bodily 
movement is uncontrolled such that the very authorship of the act is negated.  Well-
rehearsed examples given in the criminal law are where the accused is unconscious, 
asleep, afflicted by St Vitus’ dance, disabled from driving a vehicle whilst under the 
attack of a swarm of bees
286
 and other instances of reflex action where the actor 
physically experiences a ‘total destruction of voluntary control’.
287
   The act cannot 
be said to be voluntary or willed if a person is unable to physically control it
288
 and 
in such circumstances, the defendant’s claim is one of automatism.
289
  Whilst claims 
of this nature are rare in practice, they do not attract controversy.  However, it is 
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285 JWC Turner, ‘The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law’ (1936 - 1938) 6 CLJ 31; Ashworth 
and Horder describe this in terms of the ‘normal presumption of free will’, Andrew Ashworth and 
Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (7th edn, OUP 2013) 24. 
286 Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 QB 277, 286. 
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clear that the orthodox act doctrine encompassed the notion of involuntariness, as the 
converse of physical voluntariness, and also ‘non-voluntariness’ in the wider sense 
which operated to deny mental volition.  It is submitted that the distinction between 
literal involuntariness and metaphorical non-voluntariness was a refinement of the 
early concept
290
 and examples of involuntary behaviour included acts performed 
whilst unconsciousness or asleep whereas instances of the latter type included 
actions performed under mistake, duress or by necessity.  Whilst such claims are 
now considered either as a separate defence or the denial of mens rea,
291
 it is 
submitted that early reliance on either state was essentially a claim that the particular 
act was not performed voluntarily.  The scope of the act doctrine was addressed by 
Turner in his historical analysis and he found evidence of the early recognition of the 
wider doctrine in case reports, dating as far back as as 1471.
292
  Further support for 
the recognition of non-voluntariness as a part of the orthodox voluntariness doctrine 
can be taken from early institutional texts and authorities which equate examples of 
involuntariness with those of non-voluntariness. 
For example, in the 1935 edition of Kenny’s this occurs in the discussion of R v 
Tolson (1889).
293
  The now infamous facts of the case were that Martha Tolson 
appealed her conviction for bigamy, a statutory offence drafted in strict liability 
terms,
294
 on the basis of her reasonable belief that her husband was dead.  It will be 
recalled that the only mental state implicitly required in statutory offences was 
voluntariness, a fact recognised by Stephen J. in the case itself.  In Cave J.’s 
judgment it was said that a reasonable belief in the existence of circumstances which, 
if true, would make the act for which a prisoner was indicted an innocent act had 
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 Indeed, in his seminal work, Turner identified a case dating to 1664 which appeared to reject the 
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 R v Tolson (1889) 23 QBD 168, cited in Courtney Stanhope Kenny, Cases on Criminal Law 
(supplement by E Garth Moore, 8th edn, Cambridge University Press 1935). 
294 The offence is set out at Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (24 & 25 Vict c 100), s57. 
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always held to be a good defence.  Furthermore, he observed that an ‘honest and 
reasonable mistake stands in fact on the same footing as absence of reasoning 
faculty, as in infancy or perversion of the faculty, as in lunacy’.
295
  That this 
reasoning related to capacity, rather than foresight, is supported by Stephen J.’s 
judgment in which he said that: 
 
  In all cases whatever, competent age, insanity, and some degree of freedom  
  from some kinds of coercion are assumed to be essential to criminality, but I  
  do not believe they are ever introduced into any statute by which any  
  particular crime is defined (...) With regard to knowledge of fact, the law,  
  perhaps, is not quite so clear, but it may, I think, be maintained that in every  
  case knowledge of fact is to some extent an element of criminality as much as  




Of significance, he continued: 
 
  To take an extreme illustration, can anyone doubt that a man who, though he  
  might be perfectly sane, committed what would otherwise be a crime in the  
  state of somnambulism, would be entitled to be acquitted?  And why is this?   




Thus, Stephen J. explicitly equated acts done in a state of somnambulism with those 
done without knowledge of fact or circumstances.  Put another way, metaphysical 
non-voluntariness was as exculpatory as literal involuntariness.  Addressing the 
seemingly problematic authority of Prince
298
 on this point, Stephen J. concurred with 
Brett J.’s submission in that case, namely that it was a general principle that a 
mistake of fact on reasonable grounds would make a prisoner guilty of no offence 
and this excuse is implied into every criminal offence.  Recognising that the majority 
had not dissented from the principle, he explained it had simply been the case that it 
had not been held to apply fully to each part of the section in question since the 
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 R v Tolson (1889) 23 QBD 168, 187 (Stephen J) and set out in Courtney Stanhope Kenny, Cases on 
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legislature had intended that some of the prohibited acts were done at the peril of the 
person.  Accordingly, mistake as to the girl’s age would not exculpate, however, a 





The 1938 edition of Archbold
300
 also stated that the capacity to commit crime 
presupposes an act of understanding and an exercise of will, quoting Stephen J. in 
Tolson.
301
  Further, as to incapacity in the context of insanity, Archbold’s stated that: 
 
  Every person at the age of discretion is, unless the contrary is proved,  
  presumed by law to be sane, and be accountable for his actions.  But if there  
  is an incapacity, or defect of the understanding, as there can be no consent of  
  the will, the act is not punishable as a crime. This species of non-volition is  
  classified by Coke (Litt. 247) and Hale (1 Hist PC 29) as either natural,  
  accidental, or affected (...) 
302
   
 
Whilst the act of a drunk or person of unsound mind was described in terms on non-
volition, Archbold’s also asserted that the same principle applied to those who act 
under compulsion or coercion, who act ‘not as a result of an uncontrolled free action 
proceeding from themselves’.
303
  The text then gave one of the classic examples of 
physical involuntariness, where ‘A by force takes the hand of B in which is the 
weapon, and therewith kills C, A is guilty of murder, but B is excused’ 
304
 and this 
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Although the earlier student and practitioner texts
306
 were notably absent of any 
discussion about actus reus or express reference to ‘voluntariness’, by 1958 Kenny’s 
Outlines, edited by J.W.C. Turner, contained a section dedicated to actus reas 
principles.  Of note, voluntariness was also mentioned and any denial of it said to 
amount to a denial of responsibility for the actus reus,
307
 although the discussion 
took place under the heading of ‘mens rea’.
308
  The text also recognised that pleas of 
no actus reus were sometimes alluded to as matters of justification and excuse, or 
‘defences’ in today’s terminology.
309
  However, in the discussion relating to the 
emergence of the subjective standard, non-voluntariness was implicitly equated to 
involuntariness.  It was said that if: 
 
  a man was honestly mistaken as to the facts upon which he took action or  
  was so insane as not to understand what he was doing, or was compelled by  
  overpowering physical force to be a helpless instrument in another person's  
  misdeed he could not reasonably be regarded as a transgressor of the moral  
  code.  In such circumstances criminal guilt was often negatived in the courts  
  by the argument that what had been done was 'not the prisoner's act'.
310
  
Further, since the lack of voluntariness in either form constituted a denial of the act 
itself, it is submitted that the reference to examples of both forms was evidence of 
the continued recognition of the wide doctrine.  Were any further support be 
required, the relationship between the 2 concepts, involuntariness and non-
voluntariness, was further supported in Turner’s footnote at this point in which he 
also referred to sleepwalking.
311
  Similarly, in relation to mistake in particular, the 
text cited Hale who had said, ‘but in some cases ignorantia facti doth excuse, for 
such an ignorance many times makes the act itself morally involuntary’.
312
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312 JW Cecil Turner, Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law (17th edn, Cambridge University Press 1958) 52, 
citing 1 Hale PC 42. 
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Furthermore, as regards compulsion: 
 
  In the old authorities statements are to be found to the effect that there may  
  be circumstances in which a man may be excused for deeds which he has  
  done not of his own free volition but under compulsion (...), in other words,  
  pleads that his conduct was not voluntary.  Compulsion can take other forms  
  than physical force (...). 
313
   
 
Whilst Turner was frank in his observation that the notions of actus reus and mens 
rea had not always been clearly distinguished, something that he sought to remedy in 
his work, there is ample evidence that the orthodox act doctrine was a wide one, 
encompassing the notions of both physical involuntariness and mental non-
voluntariness. 
 
It is also clear that the act doctrine operated on the basis of an evidential presumption 
of voluntariness.  As Turner explained, this was presumed by reference to the 
defendant’s outward behaviour since, ‘It is obvious that it is impossible really to 
know for certain what was passing in the mind of the accused person; it can only be 
surmised by a process of inference from what is known of his conduct’.
314
  The 
presumption of voluntariness thus operated to obviate any prosecutorial need to 
prove the combination of characteristics which, taken together, amounted to 
voluntariness.
315
  By leaving it to the defendant to raise any claim that his conduct 
was not voluntary, the law avoided the difficulties that would be associated with the 
development of a positive conception of voluntariness.  As to a positive notion, there 
has never been consensus as to how volition, deliberateness or intentionality of 
physical movement can be defined.
316
  Considered in the negative form, as a result of 
the operation of the presumption, the evidential burden was placed on the actor 
himself in relation to the specific claim that he was making.  As a matter of evidence, 
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and indeed procedural efficiency, this approach was plainly the preferable. 
 
 
2.4   Voluntariness – freedom of choice and the presumption of knowledge 
 
The recognition that acting under a mistake rendered the action metaphorically non-
voluntary has further implications for the scope of the first mental element.  At the 
heart of voluntariness is the idea of the free agent and his capacity to choose,
317
 
indeed, Ashworth and Horder observe that to ‘proceed to conviction without proof of 
voluntary conduct would be to fail, in the most fundamental way, to show respect for 
individuals as rational, choosing beings’.
 318
  Accordingly, it is submitted that 
voluntariness must go significantly further than just requiring that the individual is 
sane and above the age of infancy.  The very notion of rational choice imports ideas 
of choosing between options, calculating or weighing up potential courses of 
conduct.  It must surely follow that the process of weighing up implicitly assumes 
that the actor has some perception of the circumstances in which he does his mental 
calculation.  Choice simply cannot take place in the abstract.  Further, the 
individual’s perception of both external circumstances and internal factors will 
always bear on the choices made.  Whilst the subjective perception of the 
circumstances in which one acts may be impaired or flawed, it is the individual’s 
understanding of the circumstances in which he acts that determines whether or not 
moral culpability attaches.  This aspect, of course, relates directly to the doctrine of 
mistake for it is the individual’s perception or subjective ‘knowledge’ of the 
circumstances in which he acts that defines the character of the conduct itself.
319
  If 
mistake, or ignorance, can render an act metaphorically non-voluntary,
320
 then 
voluntariness must encompass that the act is done in knowledge of the circumstances 
since ‘the capacity to commit crime presupposes an act of understanding and an 
exercise of will.
321
  Support for this proposition can be found in the early cases of, 
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for example, Marsh (1824)
322
 and Sleep (1861)
323
 and these point, more specifically, 
to the recognition of a presumption of knowledge, namely that the defendant had 
knowledge of the surrounding circumstances.
324
  Indeed, Lord Diplock’s dicta in 
Sweet v Parsley (1969-70)
325
 supports this construction, in that: 
 
  the jury is entitled to presume that the accused acted with knowledge of the  
  facts, unless there is some evidence to the contrary originating from the  
  accused who alone can know on what belief he acted and on what ground the  
  belief, if mistaken, was held.
326
   
 
Arguably, this analysis accords with Duff’s seminal work on the philosophy of 
action.
327
  Whilst Duff articulated in terms of intention rather than voluntariness, he 
noted that actions and events are identified and individuated only by descriptions of 
them and that they can be described in various ways, drawing different distinctions 
between the action and its circumstances or consequences.  Depending upon the 
description, an agent may act intentionally under one description of the action, but 
not under others.  The action-description is critical to the issue of what Duff called 
intentionality, and he provided examples, ‘I intentionally pull the trigger but, not 
realising that the gun is loaded, shoot Pat unintentionally.  I intentionally drink the 
wine but, not knowing that it is poisoned, drink poison unintentionally’.
328
   It is 
submitted that what Duff terms ‘intention’, as regards the act but not its outcome, is 
expressed in the broad notion of voluntariness.  Moreover, in accordance with the 
idea of rational calculation, it is submitted that knowledge must be an integral 
component of voluntariness. That being so, it would also be a characteristic 
presumed in the defendant and the presumptive mechanism overcame problems that 
would arise if actual knowledge was a specified matter that needed to be proved by 
                                                             
322 Marsh (1824) 2 B & C 717 [722] (Bayley CJ) in relation to a carrier’s unlawful possession of game. 
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the prosecution to the usual standard.
329
   
 
2.5   Misuse of mens rea to describe both mental states 
 
Notwithstanding the distinction between the 2 mental elements, it is of note that  
both Turner and Jackson explicitly recognised that the term mens rea had been used 
generically to refer to both mental states in legal literature and case reports.
330
  
Jackson, in particular, provided particularly detailed evidence of the growing 
tendency to use the term mens rea to describe both mental states:    
 
  If, for instance, the butcher in a fit of somnambulism exposes tainted meat for  
  sale in his shop, presumably he will not be liable for the offence, because the  
  act is not considered in law to be imputed to him.  It must be established that  
  he knew he was exposing the meat for sale although it is irrelevant whether  
  he knew, or could have known, that the meat was tainted.  It has become  
  common for judges when dealing with absolute prohibitions to make  
  statements such as 'the prisoner had done the thing which was forbidden by  
  the statute and that it was not necessary to prove any further mens rea’.  That  
  is only another way of saying that the act must be one which can in law be  
  imputed to the accused, and that that imputation is properly made when the  
  accused intended to do what he did.  In this use (better described as a misuse)  
  of the expression mens rea, our hypothetical somnambulist butcher would  
  have the defence that mens rea was absent (i.e. that the act was not imputed  
  to him) although the offence does not require mens rea in the usual meaning  




Other instances of the linguistic confusion pervade the literature and case reports.  
For example, in Kenny’s 1933 edition of Outlines of Criminal Law the explanation 
given of absolute prohibitions was that ‘ordinary mens rea is still necessary.  That is 
to say, the offender must have actually known that he went through the act [of 
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330
 JWC Turner, ‘The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law’ (1936  – 1938) 6 CLJ 31, 32; RM 
Jackson, ‘Absolute Prohibition in Statutory Offences’ (1936 -1938) 6 CLJ 83, 91. 





  In this respect, Jackson observed, ‘the term mens rea is being used in a 
peculiar sense, not in its common law sense as regards foresight of consequences, 
but in the ‘voluntariness’ context of the actus reus’.  He identified better phraseology 
in Law Society v United Service Bureau Ltd (1933) in which Avery J had said: 
 
  [I]t has been laid down over and over again that where a statute absolutely  
  prohibits the doing of an act it is sufficient to show that the person accused  
  did the forbidden act intentionally, and that it is not necessary to go further  
  and show what is commonly known as mens rea or any intention other to do  
  the thing forbidden.
333
     
 
Notwithstanding the ambiguous use of the term mens rea, its relative position to the 
concept of voluntariness was restated by Turner in 1948, with the addition that ‘in 
some crimes emphasis is laid upon a specific intention on the part of the offender’.
334
  
In that respect, he stated that there was no divergence from the Latin maxim’s mens 
rea requirement since that which a man intends to bring about he obviously 
foresees.
335
  Accordingly, mens rea was deemed to include the two states of mind, 
intention and foresight, where intention equated to a desire to bring about the 
consequences.
336
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2.6   The shifting boundaries of actus reus and mens rea 
 
The analysis provided by Turner almost 2 decades later, in 1964, remained consistent 
in the respect that the mental elements at common law were (i) that the accused 
person’s conduct was voluntary and (ii) that it was actuated by mens rea.
337
  As he 
had done earlier, Turner further elucidated the meaning of mens rea in terms of an 
awareness that certain specified harmful consequences could follow and more 
precisely that, ‘What these consequences are is a matter of law.  Mostly they consist 
of the event itself which constitutes the actus reus’.
338
  However, the 1964 edition of 
Russell on Crime evidenced a fundamental change in Turner’s approach to the actus 
reus / mens rea distinction.
339
  At pains to maintain the ‘sharp’ physical / mental 
contrast made in the maxim,
340
 Turner stated that reference to actus reus would 
denote only the physical result of conduct and this would keep it distinct from any 
mental element that the law may require.  This categorisation was completely at odds 
with his own earlier analysis, set out in his discussion of Prince, in which he had said 
if the word ‘knowingly’ could be read into the offence, it would add an extra element 
to the actus reus, not the mens rea.
341
  Of note, Turner’s re-drawing of the actus reus 
/ mens rea boundaries was in contrast to the analysis provided by Glanville Williams 
who was still asserting the orthodox view, namely that the actus reus constituted ‘the 
whole definition of the crime with the exception of the mental element - and it even 
includes a mental element in so far as that is contained in the definition of an act’.
342
  
Thus, on Turner’s analysis, the very concept of mens rea had widened to encompass 
territory traditionally occupied by actus reus which now described only the elements 
                                                             
337 He went on to state that if any definition of actus reus were to be adopted which involves a 
coincidence of it with either or both of (i) or (ii), then arguments and conclusions based thereon 
“would assume a complexity likely to bewilder simple minds”, JW Cecil Turner, Russell on Crime 
(12th ed, Stevens & Sons 1964) vol 1, 25. 
338 JW Cecil Turner, Russell on Crime (12th edn, Stevens & Sons 1964) vol 1, 40, fn 10. 
339 JW Cecil Turner, Russell on Crime (12th edn, Stevens & Sons 1964) vol 1, 25. 
340 JW Cecil Turner, Russell on Crime (12th edn, Stevens & Sons 1964) vol 1, 25. 
341 In his 1936 exposition of R v Prince (1875) LR 2, CCR 154 Turner had stated that foresight of the 
consequences of his incitement was merely that the girl would come with him, and this was not 
affected by his knowledge of her age, or of the criminal law, or of morality.  Writing at that time, it 
will be recalled that he had said that knowledge was not intention and even if the word ‘knowingly’ 
or the like could be read into the statute, this change would not affect the mens rea of the accused, 
but that it would merely add another necessary fact to the actus reus, namely the offender’s 
knowledge of the girl’s age. JWC Turner, ‘The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law’ (1936 - 
1938) 6 CLJ 31, 46 – 47.   
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in the offence definition that were not mental states.
343
  Thus, although the Latin 
maxim itself, as a statement of principle, has remained unchallenged over the 
centuries,
344
 it is clear that the relative scope and meaning of the basic planks of fault 
have not been consistent.
345
   
As it is constructed in the present day, the criminal law continues to adhere to the 
maxim ‘actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea’ and, in accordance with Turner’s 
modified analysis, the elements are typically categorised by reference to either their 
physical or mental qualities.
346
  Accordingly, criminal liability is determined by the 
formulaic approach which considers whether the elements of the actus reus and mens 
rea are made out, each being considered in isolation,
347
 where mens rea is now taken 
to describe all the mental elements  expressed in the offence definition, whether of 
common law or statutory source, including ‘intention’, ‘knowledge’, ‘belief’ and 
‘recklessness’.
348
  Almost exclusive focus on the mental elements expressed in 
offence definitions has meant that the implicit mental requirements, fundamental to 
the common law doctrine, have all but disappeared from the legal narrative.  The 2 
mental states, voluntariness and mens rea, in its original narrow form, simply have 
no frame of reference.  The actus reus concept is now residual in nature and is taken 
to refer to any non-mental element.
349
  Thus, a typical exposition of actus reus in the 
educational and practitioner texts of today explains the inclusion of circumstances 
and consequences, deals with liability for omissions and then rounds up the field 
with a discussion of causation issues and the principle of novus actus interveniens.
350
  
Voluntariness tends to feature only briefly, usually in the limited context of the 
automatism ‘defence’.
351
  With its appearance confined to the associated issue of 
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automatism, involuntariness remains but the non-voluntariness aspect of the 
orthodox doctrine is no longer visible. 
 
Conversely, it is clear that the use of mens rea as a generic term for any blameworthy 
mental state has had substantive consequences such that the mens rea doctrine has 
expanded well beyond its original conception.  However, since the expanded concept 
is tacit as regards the notion of voluntariness, what remains of this distinct mental 
element has become submerged within the actus reus doctrine. Whilst this has some 
attraction in that voluntariness is inherently linked to the act, and not its 
consequences, the fact that it is a mental requirement makes it something of a misfit 
in the contemporary actus reus camp.  It is perhaps small wonder that this element is 
now generally given little more than a passing glance in the texts.  The displacement 
of voluntariness as a central plank of liability is thus consequent upon the expansion 
of the mens rea notion and the apparent inability of the bifurcated model to 
accommodate the 3 rules identified in the orthodox account of the basis of criminal 
fault.  
 
2.7   The fall of metaphorical non-voluntariness 
 
Whilst the 1960’s saw Turner redrawing the actus reus / mens rea boundaries, he 
remained committed to his analysis of the implicit mental states at common law.  
However, at odds with the orthodox exposition, Glanville Williams was now 
challenging the voluntariness doctrine altogether, suggesting that an assertion of 
ignorance or mistake of fact might as well be a denial of mens rea.  ‘At the present 
day the exemption from responsibility, such as it is, given by the “act” doctrine 
could, in respect of the requirement of will, just as well be put on the ground of 
absence of mens rea’.
352
  Further, whilst Williams recognised that there was a mental 
requirement for an act, described by him as ‘a willed movement’,
353
 he explicitly 
excluded metaphorical non-voluntariness from its ambit.
354
  However, his analysis 
was far from straight-forward, for example, he suggested that voluntariness spliced 
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part of the mental element onto the physical element and also said that to classify 
absence of will as absence of an act made the legal distinction between act and state 
of mind a jagged one
355
.  Since the modern interpretation of the Latin maxim 
requires all the components of an offence to be ‘pigeon-holed’ as either actus reus or 
mens rea, the inelegant result is evident in the modern texts, with involuntariness 
said to bear upon the actus reus whereas non-voluntariness is a denial of mens rea or 
a claim of some other excuse or justification.
356
  The resulting conceptual confusion 
is no more clearly witnessed than in the contemporary approach to insane and non-
insane automatism.  Taking the oft-cited example of the somnambulist, this claim 
may now be either a denial of actus reus or mens rea, depending on the cause of the 
somnambulism.
357
  Given that the common denominator is essentially a denial of 
voluntariness, it is not surprising that this area of law has been subjected to 
criticism.
358
  What can be said is that the orthodox concept of mens rea, the foresight 
of specified consequences, could not accommodate notions of non-voluntariness 
such as duress, there being no relationship between the principles.  Accordingly, the 
development in relation to metaphorical non-voluntariness constituted a further 
expansion of the mens rea doctrine into territory traditionally occupied by the 
voluntariness doctrine. 
 
Inconsistency in the treatment of involuntariness and non-voluntariness continues to 
be a cause of undoubted doctrinal tension.  Further, there is no universal agreement 
as to whether the voluntariness notion now constitutes a basic plank of liability or an 
excuse.
359
  It is, however, still accepted that a notion of wilfulness encompasses a 
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core expectation of criminal responsibility, shaped in the individualist paradigm, 
namely that the agent is free-acting.  If we do not enjoy freedom of choice, we 
cannot be morally responsible for our actions.
360
  In line with Turner’s exposition of 
the mental elements of crime, Lord Denning in Bratty v AG for Northern Ireland 
[1963] observed that, ‘a voluntary act is essential (…) in every criminal case.  No act 
is punishable if it is done involuntarily’.
361
  Similarly, Lord Diplock in R v Shepherd 
[1980] stated that, ‘even in absolute offences (…) the physical act relied on as 
constituting the offence must be wilful in the limited sense, for which a synonym in 





2.8   The rise of mens rea 
 
It has been established that all offences, whatever their source, contained the mental 
element Turner referred to as voluntariness.  In addition, common law offences were 
presumed to require proof of mens rea.  Mens rea simply meant that to incur criminal 
responsibility the defendant had to have been aware of the possible consequences of 
his act.
363
  Whereas consequences are now typically associated with ‘result’ crimes, 
the limited extent of the orthodox foresight requirement was illustrated by Turner’s 
exposition of Prince, set out above.
364
  What the mens rea required in relation to the 
act was simply that the defendant foresaw the possibility that the girl would go with 
him. 
 
Of note, Prince concerned a statutory offence and, as such, was a matter of statutory 
interpretation not common law doctrine.
365
  However, Turner was acutely aware of 
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the need to distinguish the sources of law and refused to attempt to formulate general 
principles of mental elements that might apply equally to both.  In the 1964 edition 
of Russell he observed:  
 
  that task is (...) futile, for it leads to a situation in which a clear picture of the  
  common law principles becomes obscured amongst the tangles statutory  
  crime.  It should not be forgotten that criminal law is the instrument of  
  criminal policy, and that statutes creating new crimes are the attempts of the  
  legislature to give effect to the criminal policy of the moment.  The   
  legislature is therefore primarily concerned to find the best method of dealing  
  with the particular mischief which it is at that moment seeking to repress, and  
  its decisions (...) are not as a rule reached by any careful regard for general  
  principles of an abstract kind.  The result is that, as things are, the statutory  
  crimes as a whole mass, cannot be brought under a simple scheme of general  
  principles of criminal liability.
366
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favouring (subject to the observance of the accepted standards of morality) the liberty of the 
individual, the freedom of contract, and the sacredness of property, and which was highly suspicious 
of taxation, P Devlin, Judge (OUP 1981) 15.  Then, acknowledging that statutes could override any 
rule of common law, Jackson noted a sense in which statutes were still ‘controlled’ by it, and he 
referred to the ‘well-established rule’ that statutory provisions should, if possible, be construed so 
as not to abrogate the common law’s settled rules.  Quoting Byles J in R v Morris (1867) LR 1 CCR 90, 
95, he said, ‘It is a sound rule to construe a statute in conformity with the common law rather than 
against it, except where and so far as the statute is plainly intended to alter the course of the 
common law’. 
366 JW Cecil Turner, Russell on Crime (12th edn, Stevens & Sons 1964) vol 1, 64 - 65. 
92 
 
Although earlier statutes had been interpreted to conform to common law principles, 
during the late 19
th
 century Parliament began the more detailed regulation of social 
life with the creation of numerous summary offences which imposed relatively light 
punishment.  With this development the courts interpreted the failure to specify a 
mental element in an offence as a decision to impose strict liability
367
 and a 
proliferation of ‘public welfare’ offences emerged in areas such as health and safety, 
building, pollution, the sale and preparation of drugs and food, alcohol and 
tobacco.
368
  Of note, Prince
369
 was identified as the point at which the judiciary 
tended away from the presumption of mens rea and towards having sole regard to the 
words of the statute.
370
   
 
However, the displacement of voluntariness in favour of the language of mens rea 
also occurred in the context of statutory construction.
371
  Consequently, the mental 
requirement for criminal fault in statutory offences has been mis-stated and, as a 
result, substantively misconceived.  Thus, where both mental elements have been 
described generically as ‘mens rea’, there are cases in which discussion about the 
presumption of mens rea appears more likely to have been reference to the 
presumption of voluntariness.  This is no small matter in that it confuses the 
                                                             
367 JW Cecil Turner, Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law (19th edn, Cambridge University Press 1966) 46 
citing, inter alia, Fowler v Padget (1798) 101 ER 1103, 7 TR 509, 514; R v Prince (1875) LR 2 CCR 154, 
163 (Brett J). 
368 Leigh LH, Strict and Vicarious Liability (Sweet & Maxwell 1982).   See for example, the Factory Act 
1878, Licquor Licensing Act 1872, Food and Drugs Act 1875, Public Health Act 1875, Rivers (Pollution 
Prevention) Act 1876 and 1893, the Regulation of Railways Act 1868, the Adulteration of Food and 
Drugs Act 1872.  A raft of statutes were enacted in the spirit of public health and safety, others in 
relation to prohibited behaviour on licensed premises, others to uphold standards of morality. 
Different policy considerations applied in different contexts.  Similarly, the territory covered by strict 
liability offences spanned across conduct typically performed in a personal capacity and conduct 
performed in the course of business.  The consideration of wrongdoing in the commercial environs 
necessarily encroached on established principles that have already emerged in that legal 
environment.  Therefore, the criminal law can be seen to have steered a path which often touched 
on existing principles of master and servant law and that of principal and agent.  Accordingly, 
different influences have shaped the legal response and any search for principles of general 
application is futile. 
369 R v Prince (1872 - 75) LR 2 CCR 154.  According to Turner it is not easy to say what the proper 
interpretation of Prince was but the commonly accepted defence was wrong, namely bona fide 
mistake of fact was denied as the accused knew he was doing an immoral act, JW Cecil Turner & A LL 
Armitage, Cases on Criminal Law (Cambridge University Press 1953). 
370 JW Cecil Turner, Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law (19th edn, Cambridge University Press 1966) 46. 
371 JW Cecil Turner, Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law (19th edn, Cambridge University Press 1966) 50, 
here he also cites in support R v Maughan (1934) 24 Cr App R 130 (CCA) 132; Cotterill v Penn [1936] 
1 KB 53; Nichols v Hall (1873) LR 8 CP 322; Harding v Price [1948] 1 KB 695.  R v Wheat and Stocks 
(1921) 15 Cr App R 134 (CCA) 135 (Shearman J) is just one example identified by Turner as a modern 
instance in which the words mens rea were used to indicate voluntariness. 
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presumption of legal substance, favouring the defendant, with a presumption of 
evidential nature, which favours the crown.  The result is an unprincipled muddle 
which has served to undermine the orthodox basis of fault attribution. 
In the present day, the modern restatement that there is a presumption of mens rea in 
statutory offences is largely associated with the 1969 case of Sweet v Parsley
372
 
which concerned the meaning of the provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1965.  
In this respect, it is submitted that, contrary to its subsequent interpretation, the 
judgments in Sweet v Parsley
373
 did not mark a sea-change in thinking.  Rather, they 
simply restated, albeit in imprecise language, that in every case the defendant’s 
conduct must be voluntary, in the wide orthodox sense.  Accordingly, Ms Sweet’s 
defence of no knowledge was not a denial of mens rea, as is now suggested, but 
simply the claim that there was no actus reus.
374
  It will be demonstrated that the 
presumption in question was that of voluntariness and that, taken as a landmark case, 
this misinterpretation has had significant implications for the criminal law.  
However, the violence done to the voluntariness doctrine in Sweet v Parsley
375
 does 
not end there and it will be shown that, through a misinterpretation of the 
Woolmington judgment,
376
 the presumption of voluntariness was deemed to shift not 
just the evidential burden but the burden of proof itself to the defendant.  On such a 
view, the continued existence of the presumption went beyond contemplation and it 
could not be tolerated in a regime committed to the principle that the prosecution 
must prove its case.  Not only was the term ‘voluntariness’ displaced by ‘mens rea’ 
but the presumption upon which the orthodox doctrine had operated was also 
discarded. 
 




The state of the law at the time when the House of Lords were called upon to decide   
                                                             
372 See for example, Dennis J Baker, Glanville Williams’ Textbook of Criminal Law (3rd edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2012) in relation to Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 (HL). 
373 Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 (HL). 
374 ACE Lynch, ‘The Mental Element in the Actus Reus’ (1982) 98 LQR. 
375
 Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 (HL). 
376 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 (HL). 
377 David Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (13th edn, OUP 2011) 162. 
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Sweet v Parsley [1969]
378
 was set out by Turner in the 1966 edition of Kenny.
379
  
Still firmly distinguishing the concept of voluntariness from the notion of mens rea, 
he opined it was not possible to form any general principle by which to decide the 
extent that mens rea was a constituent in statutory offences.  There was still a strong 
presumption that there was no liability for the consequences of involuntary conduct, 
voluntariness continuing to be the essential element in every offence.  Accordingly, 
statutory crimes, and even those described as strict liability, still required that the act 
could be imputed to the defendant through voluntariness, the primary determinant of 
fault.
380
  In addition to the strong presumption of voluntariness, Turner 
acknowledged that there was a much weaker presumption that the mens rea 
requirement in common law offences also applied to statutory offences.  However, 
the presumption that mens rea, the foresight of specified consequences, had to be 
proved was so much weaker that it was, he observed, often held to be rebutted by 
straightforward words of prohibition.
381
  Notwithstanding the clarity of Turner’s 
exposition, the judgments in Sweet and Parsley
382
 make no express mention of 
voluntariness, exclusively employing the terminology of mens rea as regards the 
mental element.  Taken on its face, the case has consequently become the modern 
touchstone and leading authority for the presumption of mens rea in statutory 




The facts were that Stephanie Sweet, the non-resident ‘landlady’, did not know that 
her ‘beatnik’ lodgers were smoking cannabis resin at the house she let to them; 
nonetheless she was convicted at trial under s. 5(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 
1965.
384
  Section 5(b) created an offence of ‘being concerned in the management of 
premises used for the purpose of smoking cannabis’.  The questions for the House of 
Lords were:  
                                                             
378 Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 (HL). 
379 JW Cecil Turner, Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law (19th edn, Cambridge University Press 1966) 55. 
380 Exceptionally this element had been excluded by parliament, as it was in the controversial cases 
of R v Larsonneur (1933) 24 Cr App R 74 (CCA) and Winzar v CC Kent (1983) The Times, 28 March. 
381 JWC Turner, Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law (19th edn, Cambridge University Press 1966) 55. 
382 Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 (HL). 
383 Eg Dennis J Baker, Glanville Williams’ Textbook of Criminal Law (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012). 
384 Dangerous Drugs Act 1965, s 5, ‘If a person - (a) being the occupier of any premises, permits 
those premises to be used for the purpose of smoking ... cannabis resin ... or (b) is concerned in the 
management of any premises used for any such purpose as aforesaid; he shall be guilty of an offence 




  (1) Whether section 5(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1965, creates an  
  absolute offence.   
  (2) What, if any, mental element is involved in the offence; and ... 
  (3) Whether on the facts found a reasonable bench of magistrates, properly  
  directing their minds to the law, could have convicted the appellant.   
 
In reaching its decision, it is of note that the House approved just one case, R v 
Tolson (1889),
385
 although it did consider Warner [1969]
386
 which had come to the 
House 7 months earlier.
387
  Whilst the older case of Tolson concerned an altogether 






 had been a case requiring the 
interpretation of the statutory drugs offences.
391
   Whilst different in the offences 
they dealt with, it is of note that both authorities concerned the voluntariness doctrine 
and not mens rea.
392
    
                                                             
385 R v Tolson (1889) 23 QBD 168. 
386 Warner v MPC [1969] 2 AC 256 (HL). 
387 Common to the judicial panels in both cases were Lords Reid, Morris, Pearce and Wilberforce. 
388 Contrary to the Offences Against the Persons Act 1861, s 57; R v Tolson (1889) 23 QBD 168. 
389 Warner v MPC [1969] 2 AC 256 (HL). 
390 Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 (HL). 
391 Drugs (Prevention of Misuse) Act 1964. 
392 It was from Warner that the following proposition was taken, ‘The absence of mens rea consists 
in “an honest and reasonable belief entertained by the accused of the existence of facts which, if 
true, would make the act charged against him innocent”’, Warner v MPC [1969] 2 AC 256 (HL) 276 (L 
Reid), quoting from Bank of New South Wales v Piper [1897] AC 383, 389 - 390 (PC) Aus.  However, 
where Warner quoted this statement from Bank of New South Wales [1897], a case concerning 
malicious prosecution, it failed to advert to the preceding sentences in that case and the context in 
which that assertion was made.  In its full expression, Sir Richard Couch in the Bank of New South 
Wales had said, ‘but the questions whether a particular intent is made an element of the statutory 
crime, and when that is not the case, whether there was an absence of mens rea in the accused, are 
questions entirely different, and depend upon different considerations.  In cases when the statute 
requires a motive to be proved as an essential element of the crime, the prosecution must fail if it is 
not proved.  On the other hand, the absence of mens rea really consists in an honest and reasonable 
belief entertained by the accused of the existence of facts which, if true, would make the act 
charged against him innocent’, 388.  Evidently, Sir Richard Couch was alive to both mental states and 
the difference in the evidential burden.  However, by quoting the shortened passage, the result of 
Warner is seemingly to equate mens rea, foresight of specified consequences, with what is clearly 
the orthodox voluntariness doctrine rather than recognise the distinction between those mental 
states.  That the mental state being identified in Warner was voluntariness is supported by the 
substance of Lord Guest’s reasoning which is much along the lines of Jackson’s somnambulist 
butcher example of imputability.  He said that there must, ‘in relation to possession, be some 
conscious mental element present.  The sleeper who has a packet put into his hand during sleep has 
not got possession of it during sleep, but if when he wakes up he grasps the article, it is then in his 
possession.  If someone surreptitiously puts something into my pocket, I am not in possession of it 
until I know it is there’, 299.  Similarly, the other examples provided by Lord Pearce, 303, and Lord 






 had given rise to much academic and judicial discussion, indeed Turner 
examined it in depth in his 1964 edition of Russell on Crime.
394
  It is submitted that 
his explanation of the case is significant, given that an altogether different 
interpretation has subsequently been attributed to both it and Sweet v Parsley.
395
   
Turner’s analysis started with a statement of general principle, explaining that the 
language of a statute may be such as to reject the defence of mistake of fact.  He said 
that, ‘where the statute excludes a mental element then the presence or absence of 
that element is irrelevant and the guilt of the accused person is not affected by any 
mistake of fact which may have led him to suppose that he was not doing the 
forbidden thing.’
396
  However, he went on to say that even in these cases a mistake of 
fact may be admitted to establish that the act in question is not to be imputed to the 
accused.  Tolson,
397
 he observed, could have been dealt with under this principle 
without further discussion as to the mental element required by the particular section 
of the statute.  Mrs Tolson had believed, with good reason, that her husband had died 
and she had married again during his lifetime.  On appeal, the Court for Crown 
Cases Reserved had interpreted the provision as not being one of absolute 
prohibition in the situation where the facts fell within the second proviso of the 
section and, Turner said, this must be taken to mean that belief in the spouse’s death, 
whether arising from 7 years’ silent absence or from other facts, rendered a second 
marriage non-felonious.  Further, with this belief found as fact, she had been entitled 
to have her case decided on this fiction and had her husband been dead then the 
second marriage would not have constituted the actus reus of bigamy.  Therefore, the 
trial had to regard the husband as dead and, therefore, it was immaterial that in 
addition she was not conscious of doing anything that was wrong.
398
  On Turner’s 
analysis, Tolson’s mistake had thus denied the voluntariness of the act and mens rea 
was simply not an issue.
399
   
                                                             
393 R v Tolson (1889) 23 QBD 168. 
394 JW Cecil Turner, Russell on Crime (12th edn, Stevens & Sons 1964) 78. 
395 Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 (HL). 
396 JW Cecil Turner, Russell on Crime (12th edn, Stevens & Sons 1964) 78 and citing the following 
cases in support: R v Bishop (1880) 5 QBD 259; R v Wheat & Stocks (1921) 15 Cr App R 134 (CCA); R v 
Maughan (1934) 24 Cr App R 130 (CC); Cotterill v Penn (1935) 1 KB 53, 153 LT 377. 
397 R v Tolson (1889) 23 QBD 168. 
398
 JW Cecil Turner, Russell on Crime (12
th
 edn, Stevens & Sons 1964) 78, 79. 
399 However, Turner did go on to acknowledge that the court had discussed the issue of mens rea 
and had concluded that Mrs Tolson did not have it. This discussion, although technically superfluous, 
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Turner’s explanation of Tolson is borne out by a close reading of the judgments in 
the case.  Cave J, for example, stated that an, ‘Honest and reasonable mistake stands 
in fact on the same footing as absence of the reasoning faculty, as in infancy ... or 
lunacy’.
400
  Similarly, according to Stephen J,  
 
  The full definition of every crime contains expressly or by implication a  
  proposition as to a state of mind (...) In all cases whatever, competent age,  
  sanity and some degree of freedom from some kinds of coercion are assumed  
  to be essential to criminality, but I do not believe they are ever introduced  
  into any statute by which any particular crime is defined. (...) in every case  
  knowledge of fact is to some extent an element of criminality as much as  
  competent age and sanity.  To take an extreme illustration, can anyone doubt  
  that a man who, though he might be perfectly sane, committed what would  
  otherwise be a crime in a state of somnambulism, would be entitled to be  
  acquitted?  And why is this?  Simply because he would not know was he was  
  doing. (...) it may be laid down as a general rule that an alleged offender is  
  deemed to have acted under that state of facts which he in good faith and on  
  reasonable grounds believed to exist when he did the act alleged to be an  




Stephen J. went on to say that mental elements such as age, sanity and freedom from 
compulsion are presupposed in every case and that there was no statute which 
specified these elements of criminality in the definition of any crime.  Using the 
words ‘wilfully’ or ‘maliciously’ makes knowledge of fact implicit in the statutory 
definition but in some cases it cannot be said.
402
   
 
Accordingly, the aspects to which the dicta refer, such as freedom from coercion, 
competent age, sanity and sleepwalking, are the classic stuff of voluntariness, going 
                                                                                                                                                                            
would have been expected in 1889 when there was still a judicial leaning to read common law mens 
rea into statutes, a tendency which was not now present.  Turner also pointed to the later case of R 
v Wheat and Stocks [1921] 2 KB 119 in which, 30 years later, the Court of Appeal had interpreted the 
third proviso of that section in another way, and as an instance of absolute prohibition, refusing the 
admit the ‘defence’ of mistake. 
400
 R v Tolson (1889) 23 QBD 168, 181 (Cave J). 
401 R v Tolson (1889) 23 QBD 168, 187 - 188 (Stephen J). 
402 R v Tolson (1889) 23 QBD 168, 189 (Stephen J). 
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to the denial of capacity.  As the only authority approved in Sweet v Parsley
403
  and, 
in substance, a case turning on a denial of metaphorical voluntariness, it follows that 
Sweet simply provided a restatement that voluntariness, in the full sense, was 
necessary in all cases.  That the term mens rea was being used to describe 
voluntariness was not unusual, its use as a catch-all term having already been well-
documented.
404
  Indeed, Lord Diplock implicitly recognised as much in his 
judgment, he observed:  
 
  mens rea itself also lacks precision and calls for closer analysis than is  
  involved in its mere translation into English by Wright J. in Sherras (...)  as  
  ‘evil intention or a knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act’ - a definition  
  which suggests a single mental element common to all criminal offences.
405
   
 
The judgment clearly alluded to the othodox doctrine of voluntariness with reference 
to insanity, somnambulism, duress and inevitable accident.
406
  Lord Diplock also 
nodded at Tolson
407
 and the general principle that a necessary element of every 
criminal enactment was the absence of a belief, held honestly and upon reasonable 




However, what was hitherto an innocuous confusion of language, escalated in 
gravity in Sweet v Parsley
409
 to the point of undermining the very substance of 
criminal liability.  This violation to the orthodox principles was the result of 
                                                             
403 Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 (HL). 
404 Jackson RM, ‘Absolute Prohibition in Statutory Offences’ (1936 - 1938) 6 CLJ 83; JWC Turner, ‘The 
Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law’ (1936  - 1938) 6 CLJ 31. 
405 Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 (HL) 162. 
406 ‘The mere fact that Parliament has made the conduct a criminal offence gives rise to some 
implication about the mental element of the conduct proscribed.  It has, for instance, never been 
doubted since M'Naghten's Case (1843) 10 Cl. & F. 200, that one implication as to the mental 
element in any statutory offence is that the doer of the prohibited act should be sane within the 
M'Naghten rules; yet this part of the full definition of the offence is invariably left unexpressed by 
Parliament.  Stephen J. in Reg v Tolson (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 168 suggested other circumstances never 
expressly dealt with in the statute where a mental element to be implied from the mere fact that 
the doing of an act was made a criminal offence would be absent, such as where it was done in a 
state of somnambulism or under duress, to which one might add inevitable accident.’ Sweet v 
Parsley [1970] AC 132 (HL) 162 - 63. 
407 R v Tolson (1889) 23 QBD 168. 
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 Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 (HL) 163 (L Diplock) referring to the Privy Council in Bank of New 
South Wales v Piper [1897] AC 383 (PC) Aus, 389 - 90. 
409 Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 (HL). 
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reference to another 19
th
 century case, Sherras v De Rutzen [1895],
410
 and its 
analysis in the light of Woolmington [1935].
411
   In Sherras
412
 the conviction of a 
publican for selling drink to a constable on duty was set aside because the accused 
had reasonably believed that the officer was not on duty.
413
  Whilst a claim of 
absence of knowledge was simply one way to refute voluntariness, as demonstrated 
in Tolson,
414
 Day J. in Sherras had reasoned that where a different subsection of the 
same act
415
 had included reference to the word ‘knowingly’, its omission in the 
following subsection had the ‘only’ effect of shifting the “burden of proof” to the 
accused.
416
  Whilst this construction had been approved in a number of cases,
417
 
Devlin J. had argued against it half a century later in Roper v Taylor’s Central 
Garages [1951]
418
 as had the Privy Council in Lim Chin Aik v The Queen [1963].
419
  
The disapproval arguably lay in the terminology employed by Day J. since the 
notion of a shift of this nature, was not an unfamiliar one.  It will be remembered that 
where rebuttable presumptions operated in the criminal law, such as with the 
presumption of voluntariness, the various characteristics encompassed by that 
notion, such as free will and absence of mistake, were not required to be proved by 
the prosecution.  If the accused denied culpability on the basis of a lack of 
voluntariness, the evidential burden shifted to him.  However, by framing his 
analysis in terms of shifting the ‘burden of proof’, rather than the ‘burden of 
evidence’, Day J. had provided what was to become a fatal objection to the doctrine 
of voluntariness.  Such a consequence was unlikely to have been foreseen at the time 
of his judgment since was not until a couple of years later, in 1898, that an accused 
could give sworn evidence on his own behalf
420
 and it is therefore likely that the 
presumptions operating before that watershed would have had a force more akin to 
legal presumption.
421
  This may well account for Day J. referring to a burden of 
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411 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 (HL). 
412 Sherras v De Rutzen [1895] 1 QB 918. 
413 Licensing Act 1872, s 16. 
414 R v Tolson (1889) 23 QBD 168. 
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421 JWC Turner, Russell on Crime (12th edn, Stevens & Sons 1964) 33. 
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‘proof’ in place of ‘evidence’.   
 
However, it was not until much later, in Woolmington v DPP [1935],
422
 that the 
crucial distinction between the ‘burden of proof’ and the ‘burden of evidence’ was to 
become a live issue.  With that in mind, Sweet and Parsley
423
 may have had an 
altogether different outcome had Day J. articulated in terms of the ‘burden of 
evidence’.  What did happen in Sweet v Parsley
424
 was that the Law Lords used the 
term mens rea loosely to describe voluntariness.  For example, Lord Diplock stated: 
 
  It is a general principle of construction of any enactment which creates a  
  criminal offence that, even where the words used to describe the prohibited  
  conduct would not in any other context connote the necessity for any  
  particular mental element, they are nevertheless to be read as subject to the  
  implication that a necessary element in the offence is the absence of a belief,  
  held honestly and on reasonable grounds, in the existence of facts which, if  




Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest added that: 
  it has frequently been affirmed and should unhesitatingly be recognised that  
  it is a cardinal principle of our law that mens rea, an evil intention or a 
  knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act, is in all ordinary cases an essential  
  ingredient of guilt of a criminal offence.  It follows from this that there will  
  not be guilt of an offence created by statute unless there is mens rea or unless  
  Parliament has by the statute enacted that guilt may be established in cases  
  where there is no mens rea.
426
   
 
Furthermore, Lord Reid alluded to 2 mental states, ‘Sometimes the words of the 
section which creates a particular offence make it clear that mens rea is required in 
one form or another’.
427
  He also observed, now infamously, that:  
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 Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 (HL) 163.  
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  there has for centuries been a presumption that Parliament did not intend to  
  make criminals of persons who were in no way blameworthy in what they  
  did.  This means that, whenever a section is silent as to mens rea there is a  
  presumption that, in order to give effect to the will of Parliament, we must  
  read in words appropriate to require mens rea.
428
   
 
Read in the light of Turner’s seminal exposition, their Lordships’ judgments accord 
with his analysis of the 2 mental states whilst equally according with his observation 
that the term mens rea was employed ubiquitously to denote voluntariness.  Having 
established the inter-changeability of the terms, it is submitted that the ‘presumption 




2.10   The inter-relationship of the 3 presumptions 
 
At the time of the Sherras judgment
429
, there were 3 relevant presumptions in play: 1 
seemingly in favour of the accused whilst the other 2 favoured the prosecution.  
First, in all cases it was presumed that the accused had acted voluntarily.  Second, in 
the common law offences, the ‘presumption of mens rea’ meant that guilt turned on 
the defendant having foreseen the specified consequences of his act.  In this respect 
the Crown was assisted by the third presumption, that the accused was presumed to 
have intended the natural consequence of his act.  In practice, the determination of 
‘natural consequences’ was taken be an objective assessment of them and also, 
therefore, the defendant’s mental state.  Furthermore, the direction given to juries 
had the effect of elevating the status of the presumption, from a matter of evidence to 
a rule of law.  So, whilst individualism insisted upon the subjective assessment of 
both mental states, voluntariness and foresight of consequences, in practice they 
were presumed to inhere in the defendant, subject to his refuting such an appearance.  
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Having confused the terminology of fault, the appellate court in Sweet v Parsley
430
  
then turned its attention to the dicta of Viscount Sankey, in Woolmington.
431
  He had 
said that, ‘Throughout the web of the English criminal law one golden thread is 
always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt, 
subject to matters as to the defence of insanity and subject also to any statutory 
exception.’
432
  Accordingly, on the facts of the Sweet prosecution,
433
 knowledge of 
circumstances, an integral element of the orthodox doctrine voluntariness, was left in 
a precarious position.  Day J. had earlier confused the burden of proof with the 
burden of evidence and,
434
 further to Woolmington,
435
 it was said that a defendant 
could not be required to prove his innocence.
436
  On this interpretation of 
Woolmington
437
 and Day J’s expression in Sherras,
438
 the presumption of 
voluntariness could no longer be explicitly recognised, it now seemed to require the 
abhorrent, namely that a defendant had to prove his innocence.
439
  Indeed, some of 
the dicta in Sweet v Parsley went as far as to distinguish the earlier authorities that 
had turned on the absence of voluntariness on the basis that they were cases 
preceding the Woolmington statement.
440
   Whilst the explicit reference to 
voluntariness had been in decline, the presumption of voluntariness, understood in 
this light, would have been incompatible with a basic tenet of the criminal law and it 
would need to be discarded with haste.  As to the resulting lacuna, the advancing 
language and notion of mens rea was the obvious ‘filler’ to replace the now 
discredited primary basis of fault.  Accordingly, the mental element identified in the 
Dangerous Drugs statute had to be described as mens rea.  The presumption of mens 
rea was thus re-introduced as a weighty presumption in statutory construction where 
the requisite mental element, voluntariness, no longer bore scrutiny.  
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2.11   The problem – erroneous reasoning and the revitalised presumption  





 was itself questionable.  Counsel for Sweet had 
argued that whilst it fell to the defendant to raise the ‘defence’ of lack of guilty 
knowledge, the burden of proof lay firmly on the prosecution.
443
  He cited in 
authority the cases of Tolson
444
 and Dixon J.’s decision in the Australian High Court 
case of Proudman v Dayman (1941),
445
 both of which appeared to be entirely 







  Dixon J. had said: 
 
  The burden of establishing honest and reasonable mistake is in the first place  
  upon the defendant and he must make it appear that he had reasonable   
  grounds for believing in the existence of the state of facts, which, if true,  
  would take his act outside the operation of the enactment and that on those  
  grounds he did so believe.  The burden possibly may not finally rest upon  
  him of satisfying the tribunal in case of doubt.
449
 
Bearing in mind the force of this submission, it is curious that the judgments in 
Sweet
450
 made reference to Woolmington
451
 but were overwhelmingly silent as to the 
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subsequent re-interpretation of it.  Of note, none of their Lordships specifically 
referred to Mancini v DPP [1942] which had corrected the point about the shift in 
the burden of proof.
452
  In this respect, Woolmington
453
 had also been discussed at 
length by Turner in the 1964 Russell on Crime and he had also clarified the manner 
in which the presumptions operated.
454
  Although Woolmington
455
 had originally 
been expressed to hold that, ‘where intent is an ingredient of a crime there is no onus 
on the defendant to prove that the act alleged was accidental’, Turner explained that: 
 
  as soon as mens rea had become subjective the burden of proof on the  
  prosecution was a heavy one.  It was discharged by relying upon the old  
  assumption of intention, which then became the well-known legal  
  presumption that a man is deemed to have intended the natural consequences  
  of his acts (...) . The result of judges putting the presumption in simple  
  terms to juries was that it gradually moved from a rule of evidence into a rule  
  of law as an objective test of mens rea.
456
   
 
In this respect, Woolmington
457
 had operated as a corrective
458
 but it had been 
modified subsequently in Mancini v DPP [1942]
459
 which provided a rule of general 
application to all criminal charges.  In it Viscount Simon L.C. observed, 
‘Woolmington's case is concerned with explaining and reinforcing the rule that the 
prosecution must prove the charge it makes beyond reasonable doubt, and, 
consequently, that if, on the material before the jury, there is reasonable doubt, the 
prisoner should have the benefit of it’.
460
  Consequently, the presumption placed no 
heavier burden on the defence than to put, or to point to, evidence before the court, 
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Williams’ seminal work of 1961 concurred with this analysis and that the ‘defence’ 
of automatism placed the ‘evidential burden’ on the defendant.
462
  Furthermore, as 
regards the operation of the presumption of voluntariness, he stated that: 
 
  the object of placing this on the defendant is twofold: first to save the  
  prosecution the trouble of meeting the defence unless it is first raised by the  
  defendant and, second, where the matter relates to the defendant’s state of  
  mind to force the defendant to go into the witness box and give evidence if he  
  wishes to deny a state of mind where the fact that would normally be inferred  





Additionally, ‘The fact of killing does not raise a persuasive presumption that the 
killing was intentional and unprovoked, [but] it does raise an evidential presumption 





Although Lord Diplock alluded to the voluntariness doctrine and was clear as to the 
true effect of Woolmington,
465
 Sweet v Parsley
466
 was to be incorrectly identified as 
the modern revitalisation of the presumption of mens rea
467
 and not as a statement of 
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the orthodox presumption of voluntariness.  The disappearance of voluntariness as a 
distinct doctrine at around this time is evident from the extra-judicial writing of Sir 
Patrick Devlin.  Writing about the statutory offences in 1958, Devlin considered the 
issue of silence as to mens rea and he suggested that, rather than accepting absolute 
liability, the courts could choose to presume that Parliament required the act to be 
done deliberately, and that an involuntary act should not be punishable.  He 
suggested that this would work as an easy method of construction because you 
would simply read into the act ‘wilfully’ or ‘knowingly’ as the case may be.
468
  
Arguably, this was precisely how the law was stated until the Woolmington 
confusion.
469
  Where voluntariness once formed the central plank of criminal liability 
in all cases, it was now displaced in favour of the modern notion of mens rea which 




2.12   Voluntariness, capacity and the corporate actor 
 
The examination of the orthodox doctrine of voluntariness has provided a fruitful 
line of enquiry as to a central plank of criminal fault that might be applied to the 
corporate actor.  A return to the explicit recognition of voluntariness as the hallmark 
of criminal fault in all cases would not only restate the law as traditionally 
conceived, it would also provide a step towards the facilitation of a general model of 
corporate liability.  Voluntariness as a concept continues to constitute an appropriate 
determinant of fault and the return to a fully acknowledged presumption of 
voluntariness is of practical application as regards evidential matters in the corporate 
context.  Without the need for the prosecution to prove specific mental states, it 
would be open for a representative of the organisation to raise evidence of any denial 
that the corporate conduct was voluntary.  Since voluntariness, conceived in its wider 
sense, is indicative of the capacity of the actor, it would provide the means by which 
the corporation could be recognised as a responsibility-bearing entity in its own 
right.  Of significance, a return to this analysis would not cause any change or 
detriment in cases alleging the criminal conduct of individuals.   
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Whilst voluntariness underpins recognition of capacity to act, the attribution of other 
mental states to the corporate actor remains to be considered.  If the Fraud Act 2006 
is to be employed in instances of systemic fraud, both dishonesty and an intention 
need to be proved.  The following chapter will demonstrate how these other mental 
































3.  Evidence and the attribution of criminal fault 
  
3.1   Mens rea and manifest assessment 
 
The way in which the law has developed in relation to fault-attribution has had a 
profound effect in relation to the development of theories of corporate criminality. 
The combined effect of the demise of the presumption of voluntariness and the 
expanded concept of mens rea has led to the primary enquiry focusing on the 
defendant’s state of mind, a metaphysical mind that the fictional corporate entity 
simply cannot possess.  However, given that the need to prove mens rea has been the 
real hurdle to corporate prosecution, typical academic accounts of the development 
of corporate criminality fail to acknowledge that ‘mens rea’ has not been constant in 
terms of either its substantive meaning or the way in which it is proved.  Whilst 
chapter 2 addressed the former dynamic and the presumption of voluntariness, this 
chapter addresses that lacuna in the context of other mental states. 
   
It will be recalled that proof of the orthodox canons of liability turned upon the 
operation of 2 evidential presumptions.  Chapter 2 identified the combination of 
factors which led to the demise of the presumption of voluntariness and this chapter 
will reveal how the presumption of intention suffered a similar fate.  According to 
this presumption, a defendant was presumed to have intended the natural 
consequences of his act.  This conclusion was based on the assumption that an act 
foreseen was an act intended and, further, that the defendant had the mental capacity 
of a reasonable man such that he would have foreseen what were deemed its natural 
consequences.  The presumption of intention of natural consequences, like that of 
voluntariness, presupposed that an initial consideration of the appearance of the 
conduct had taken place.  The act and its consequences were inferential of the 
defendant’s state of mind, namely that the conduct was both voluntary and that the 
resulting harm was intended.  In this respect it might be said that if the appearance is 
outwardly or ‘manifestly’ criminal, the presumptive mechanism then affords the 
defendant an opportunity to refute the inference by giving evidence of his own 
mental state.   
 
However, when this evidential presumption came to be mistaken for a presumption 
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of law, this mode of fault assessment became uncomfortably objective in nature.  
Thus, whilst the presumption of voluntariness seemed to offend one basic tenet of 
criminal law, reversing the burden of proof, the presumption of intention seemingly 
offended the whole principle of subjective individualism.   
 
Although s. 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 was enacted to remedy any remaining 
misperception,
470
 and placed the factual presumption on a statutory footing,
471
 the 
language it perpetuated was subsequently subjected to a fierce judicial onslaught in 
the context of murder and the requisite intention for this particular offence.
472
  That a 
jury could infer a murderous intent if the defendant had foreseen serious bodily harm 
or death as a natural consequence of his action was considered ‘unsafe and 
misleading’.
473
  Although the legal territory attracting such heightened interest was 
narrow, it will be shown that the silencing of the language of natural consequences, 
and its associated presumption, was more general in effect.  Further, as explicit 
references to the 2 presumptions of fault progressively diminished in the narrative of 
the criminal law, the term ‘mens rea’ assumed greater prominence in the discourse.  
Used in its enlarged catch-all sense, the notion of mens rea began to encompass the 
idea that the blameworthy mental state needed to be positively proved.  Whilst the 
presumption of innocence and the burden of proof had not been in doubt,
474
 the 
practical effect was a gradual move from a position in which fault was presumed by 
reference to the appearance of the act, subject to the defendant’s rebuttal, to a 
position in which it was presumed that the culpable mental state needed to be 
examined and specifically proved.  Thus, the diminution in the use of the 
presumptions resulted in a further conceptual shift in the nature of the enquiry, from 
the manifest and the directly observable to the internal and the unobservable.  It was 
arguably this conceptual re-ordering and the disappearance of the evidential 
presumptions that necessitated a mechanism by which the corporate mind could be 
identified. 
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This chapter will expose the way in which this evidential mechanism shrank from 
the discourse and the various influences on its disappearance.  Accordingly, it charts 
the shift away from the objective and manifest approaches to fault attribution to the 
subjective model and the evidential problems this incurred.  Having demonstrated 
how the presumptions bridged the evidential gap, it will reveal the fatal confusion 
between the evidential issue of the presumption of intention and the nature of 
intention itself.  The case for the full acknowledgment of presumption of intention 
will be made. 
 
3.2  The shift to subjective individualism  
 
There are two narratives relevant to this conceptual shift, the first being the transition 
from the manifest assessment of blameworthiness by reference to the defendant’s 
overt conduct and his known character.  The second is the move from the objective 
consideration of foreseeability of consequences, by reference to an external standard, 
to the subjective enquiry of the defendant’s own mental state.  Both strands are 
inevitably interwoven, influenced by the fact that an accused could not give evidence 
on his own behalf at trial until the enactment of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898.  
Consequently, until this time, the actual intention with which a suspect had done the 
act in question could only be established as a matter of inference arising from the 
evidence of other witnesses as to what the accused had said or done.  Further, in 
drawing any inference, it was necessary to presume that the accused had the mental  
capacity of a ‘reasonable man’ such that he could be said to have intended 
everything that was the probable consequence of his act.  Thus, whilst the modern 
criminal law institution was concerned with the mental attitude of the accused 
himself, and whether he attracted moral opprobrium by virtue of his capacity and 
foresight of potential harm, in practice this enquiry necessitated the employment of 
both the manifest assessment of the conduct and the objective test of foreseeability.  
 
This approach to the determination of fault was a longstanding feature of the 
criminal law institution.  The Prisoners’ Counsel Act 1836 had entitled a defendant 





fault was determined through what has been described as ‘manifest assessment’.
475
  
Manifest liability, in this sense, looked first to the overt conduct of the suspect and 
then considered the outward appearance of the act by reference to his known 
character and standing in the community.
476
  This process was called ‘character-
vouching’ and was thus indicative of a criminal regime that was largely arbitrary in 
nature.
477
  There was little professional policing prior to 1830 and, even until the late 
1800’s, criminal prosecution was generally a private matter with little involvement 
of lawyers.
478
  Accordingly, most crimes were dealt with locally by informal 
processes which were dependent upon hierarchical social relations and the authority 
of the local landowners to maintain order and settle disputes.
479
  This informal 
arrangement facilitated discretion and encouraged settlements between victim and 
offender in less serious cases.
480
  However, whereas informal penal sanctions 
included dismissal or chastisement by employer, pressure from priest or land-owner, 
arbitration or ostracism,
481
 the formal criminal justice institution was maintained 
through the threat of violence tempered by the discretionary use of mercy.
482
  In 
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these circumstances character-vouching was important, involving reliance on 
character evidence provided by those higher in the social scale.  This might be 
followed by the use of pardon
483
 or, if mercy was not to be shown, the infliction of 
public degradation, violence or the public killing of the offender in a carnival-type 
atmosphere.
484
  This pre-modern institution, infamous for its ‘bloody, penal code’, 




   
 
Condemnation of this barbarity is said to be linked to the enlightenment philosophy 
that was starting to emerge in the 18
th
 century.  This began to focus on principles of 
liability and also the notion of the autonomous individual capable of rational 
calculation.
486
  At the same time new problems of crime were emerging, consequent 
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on the then novel conditions created by urbanisation and industrialisation.  For the 
first time a mobile and anonymous society had come into existence and as a result of 
this, and the associated poor living conditions,
487
 there was an increase in crime in an 
environment where crime was easier to commit.
488
  The growth of industry and the 
market economy had undermined the traditional informal controls.
489
  Significantly, 
local knowledge of individual character was lost within this new community and, 
consequently, the hitherto central role of character-vouching was largely 
extinguished.
490
  The criminal justice system became the primary tool for 
maintaining social order.
491
  Indeed, Parliament’s first Report on criminal law in 
1834 expressed the new-felt chaos of the common law and recognised that a new 
methodology was required for identifying criminal conduct.
492
  It also became 
apparent that deterrence through terror would not work where there was little chance 
of being detected.  Accordingly, it was recognised that an effective institution 
demanded professional policing
493
 with a higher detection rate and a system that was 
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transparent, systematic and humane.
494
  This brought changes to the trial procedure 




At the same time, cognitive and volitional capacity theories were emerging with the 
growth of the psychological and social science disciplines, and this was conducive to 
the development of a subjective theory of mens rea.
496
  The utilitarian system was 
thus conceived on the basis of certainty of law and punishment and the underlying 
ideology that individuals, as rational calculators, would determine that the cost of 
punishment would outweigh the benefit of crime.
497
  Furthermore, the ascription of 
criminal responsibility to mental states was consistent with both the dualistic 
philosophy of Descartes and also the idea that the interior world of the human 
individual could be proved as a matter of fact at trial, on the basis of the evidence of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
too David Philips ‘Good Men to Associate and Bad Men to Conspire: Associations for the Prosecution 
of Felons in England 1760 – 1860’ in Douglas Hay and Francis G Snyder (eds), Policing and 
Prosecution in Britain 1750-1850 (Clarendon Press 1989); Barry Godfrey and Paul Lawrence, Crime 
and Justice 1750-1950 (Willan 2005). 
494 Robert Reiner, The Politics of the Police (3rd edn, OUP 2000). However, it was only when the 
formal police forces were established in the mid-19th Century that the state assumed responsibility 
as the primary provider of crime control. There is evidence of organised and uniformed private 
policing from the 16th Century when wealthy Londoners paid retainers to watch over their property, 
see Hilary Draper, Private Police (Harvester 1978) and a number of voluntary and subscription 
forces, see Robert Storch, ‘Policing Rural Southern England Before the Police: Opinion and Practice 
1830- 56’ in Dougals Hay and Francis G Snyder (eds), Policing and Prosecution in Britain 1750 – 1850 
(Clarendon Press 1989) 
495 David J A Cairns, Advocacy and the Making of the Adversarial Criminal Trial (Clarendon 1998); 
John H Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (OUP 2003).  
496
 At the same time came the idea that if the function of the criminal law institution was to protect 
social interests, was futile to wait until harm or damage had occurred. Thus, the 18th Century 
theorists also emphasised prevention of harm and the first cases recognising a doctrine of attempts 
emerged later that century.  This development was in itself influential in the gradual move from 
manifest criminality to a pattern of subjective liability. See for example, W Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England 1765 – 69 (University of Chicago Press 1979) 4, 251; Douglas 
Hay, ‘Property, Authority and the Criminal Law’ in Douglas Hay and others (eds), Albion’s Fatal Tree, 
Crime and Society in 18th Century England (Penguin 1975); George P Fletcher, ‘The Metamorphosis of 
Larceny’ (1976) 89 Jan, Harv L Rev 3; JKN Smith, Lawyers, Legislators and Theorists (OUP 1998);  Alan 
Norrie, Crime, Reason and History (2
nd
 edn, Butterworths 2001). 
497 See Jeremy Bentham, ‘An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation’ in John 
Bowring (eds), Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham (Russell 1962) vol 1; Cesare Becarria, On Crimes 
and Punishment (Bobs Merrill 1966); Charles de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Forgotten 
Books 2010) 108 – 10.  In addition, the Victorians used the law to educate the lower orders in 
standards of behaviour and provide guidance, for example contract law was also developed in this 
period as a means of imposing important rules of behaviour, eg that one must keep one’s promise. 
The utilitarian theories were populised by for example by Bentham and Beccaria:  Jeremy Bentham, 
‘An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation’ in John Bowring (eds), Collected Works 
of Jeremy Bentham (Russell 1962) vol 1; Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishment (Bobs Merrill 
1996).  Expressed in Bentham’s words, “men calculate some with less exactness, indeed some with 
more: but all men calculate”, Jeremy Bentham, Economic Writings (For the Royal Economic Society, 





  Culpability therefore came to be based on this different form 
of knowledge which could be found within the mind of the individual.
499
    
Accordingly, the doctrine of mens rea in the wide sense, and with it the recognition 
of associated defences,
500
 met both the contemporary practical challenges and the 
need to legitimise the basis of criminal culpability.
501
   
 
3.3   Individual responsibility, subjectivity and the problem of proof    
 
As the notion of individual responsibility became established, the doctrine of mens 
rea necessitated enquiry of the defendant’s mind and the problem of proof arose.  
The criminal law responded with the use of the evidential presumption which held 
that a man must have intended the necessary consequence of his acts.  The linking of 
the observable outcome with the internal mental state is well-established and 
longstanding, for example, reference to this approach can be found in the 
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institutional texts as early as the 1700’s,
502
 although it was not until the enactment of 
the 1898 Act that a defendant was permitted to give sworn evidence on his own 
behalf to refute the appearance of blameworthiness.
503
  Previously, a defendant had 
been neither a competent nor a compellable witness at any stage in the proceedings 
because of the maxim, nemo tenetur seipsum prodere, which protected both him and 
all witnesses from having to answer incriminating questions.
504
   Presumably, this 
would also have prevented him from refuting the presumptions of voluntariness and 
intention.  However, even after the enactment of the Criminal Evidence Act, the 
inescapable truth remained, in that although the defendant might give evidence, his 
mental state was still not directly observable.  Turner articulated the problem in this 
way:  
   
  A great difficulty arises (...).  We cannot enter a prisoner’s mind, and  
  therefore we can only surmise the state of it by inference from his acts, i.e.  
  through his declarations, or other conduct of his own.  That is to say, the test  
  of whether a man’s state of mind be one of intention, or recklessness (...)  
  must necessarily be objective.
505
   
 
Thus, whilst the separation of the physical and mental enquiry was philosophically 
appealing to both individualism and Cartesian dualism, which sharply distinguished 
mind and body, it was still the case that the defendant’s state of mind was a matter of 
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  The result of the enactment of Criminal Evidence Act was 
therefore to add the defendant’s demeanour and behaviour at trial to the other 
available evidence as regards his capacity to commit crime.  In this respect, 
publications such as Gross’s Manual on Criminal Psychology tutored legal 
professionals on topics such as how to interpret mental states from the outward 
appearances of witnesses and suspects.
507
  Thus, notwithstanding the irrevocable 
changes made to the trial itself, the presumption that the accused must have intended 
the natural consequences of his act remained central to the process.   
 
3.4   The presumption of intention   
 
The presumption was therefore of fundamental importance in that it provided the 
crucial bridge between the new subjective conception of mens rea and the old 
manifest approach which had been premised on the assumption that one would 
recognise crime when one saw it.
508
  The presumption of intention was itself 
premised on another presumption, namely that the individual was endowed with the 
mental capacity of a reasonable man.  Accordingly, he was taken to have foreseen as 
a possible consequence anything which, in the ordinary course of events, might 
result from his act.  Thus, the inference provided the infrastructure for the operation 
of the presumption of intention and, of itself, clearly resonated with the assumptions 
of individualism – namely that the actor was possessed of the capacity for rational 
calculation.  However, whilst being seen to provide the necessary gateway to the 
subjective mental state, the use of the presumptions brought implications that were 
inconsistent with the prevailing theory.  Given that the defendant was disqualified 
from giving sworn evidence at his own criminal trial until the end of the 19th 
century, the reality of the presumption in practice may well have been that it was 
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closer to an irrebuttable, fixed rule of law.
509
  Accordingly, the presumption would 
have blurred the conceptual distinction between subjective and objective principles 
of mens rea
510
 although, in most cases, the individual’s foresight would correspond 
with what was objectively foreseeable such that it could be described as the natural 
or probable consequence.  That being so, it was then presumed that a natural 
consequence was an intended one and this thought-process effectively upgraded 
instances in which a defendant was objectively reckless to instances of intentionality.  
Whilst the distinctions between objective and subjective fault, intention and 
recklessness, are crucial to the modern construction of criminal liability, earlier 
notions of responsibility were not so finely delineated.
511
  With its status tantamount 
to a rule of law, it was almost inevitable that continued reliance upon the 
presumption in this form would pose conceptual problems as the modern distinctions 
became ever more refined.  Indeed, even after the confusion between the substantive 
and evidential issues had been tackled by the House of Lords in Woolmington 
[1935],
512
 a decade later Turner was still observing that:  
 
  once the actus reus is proved (...) the accused can only escape if the evidence  
  shows (...) that he did not foresee the possibility of harm [which] he will be  
  unable to do (...) if the facts show either that he clearly did foresee it or that  
  an ordinary person in the circumstances could not (...) fail to foresee it.
513
   
 
Since the main purpose of the criminal law was to protect innocent persons from 
harm caused by others, their protection was seen to be equally necessary against 
those who were reckless or indifferent as to the harm they may cause, as against 
those who intended that harm.   Accordingly, the law at this time was not overly 
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concerned to distinguish between subjective and objective mental states.
514
  That 
being said, the fact that defences gradually developed to rebut the presumption of 
intention are indicative of the fact that, in most cases, it came to be regarded as a 
rebuttable evidential inference.  Similarly, the 1938 edition of Archbold’s, having  
given due consideration to the basic tenets upon which the modern criminal law 
rests, expressed the position on presumptions generally in the following way,   
 
  Presumptive or (as it is usually termed) circumstantial evidence is receivable  
  in criminal as well as in civil cases; and, indeed, the necessity of admitting  
  such evidence is more obvious in the former than the latter; for, in criminal  
  cases, the possibility of proving the matter charged in the pleading by the  
  direct and positive testimony of eye-witnesses or by conclusive documents is  
  much more rare than in civil cases; and where such testimony is not available  
  the jury are permitted to infer from the facts proved other facts necessary to  
  complete the elements of guilt or establish innocence.  It has been said that  
  although presumptive evidence must, from necessity, be admitted, yet it  
  should be admitted cautiously.
515
   
 
More specifically, presumptions of law were categorised as either disputable or 
conclusive and the most important of the disputable presumptions was the 
presumption that the accused was innocent, expressed in the maxim, ‘semper 
praesumitur pro negate’.  However, the presumption was said to be easily rebutted 
by proof of acts tending to show guilt, and, ‘when these acts are wrongful and not 
accidental a presumption of malice or criminal intent arises (...) the evidence of guilt 
must not be a mere balance of probabilities, but must satisfy the jury beyond 




However, the formulation of the presumption of intention varied between different 
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 and it was not until the 1960’s that the last vestige of the objective 
assessment of mens rea can be found.  Indeed, in DPP v Smith [1961]
518
 its status 
was recognised as an irrebuttable presumption of law, encompassing an objective 
test of mens rea.  To quote Viscount Kilmuir L.C.:   
 
  It is immaterial what the accused in fact contemplated as the probable result  
  of his actions, provided he is in law responsible for them in that he is capable  
  of forming an intent, is not insane within the M'Naghten Rules and cannot  
  establish diminished responsibility. On that assumption, the sole question is  
  whether the unlawful and voluntary act was of such a kind that grievous  
  bodily harm was the natural and probable result, and the only test of this is  
  what the ordinary responsible man would, in all the circumstances of the  
  case, have contemplated as the natural and probable result.
519
   
 
However, given the gravity of the offence under consideration, namely murder, the 
Smith
520
 judgment attracted considerable criticism which sparked a renewed interest 
in the nature of the presumption.  Glanville Williams, for example, described it as 
the expression of a psychological theory.  He said that since it is impossible to delve 
into a man’s mind, he must be judged on his outward acts although, in addition to the 
supposed uniformity of human nature, there were also confessions, denials, 
demeanour in the witness box and also circumstantial evidence
 
 that could be taken 
into account.
521
  The 1966 edition of Kenny’s Outlines also continued to recognise it 
as an evidential presumption, ‘rebuttable’ by the accused through the raising of 
reasonable doubt, ‘on the balance of probabilities’.
522
  Similarly, Kenny’s approved 
Denning L.J.’s dicta in Hosegood v Hosegood (1950)
523
 in which he had stated that:  
 
  The presumption of intention is not a proposition of law but a proposition of  
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  ordinary good sense.  It means this: that a man is usually able to foresee what  
  are the natural consequences of his acts, so it is, as a rule, reasonable to infer  
  that he did foresee them and intend them.  But, while that is an inference  
  which may be drawn, it is not one that must be drawn.  If on all of the facts of  





3.5   Section 8, virtual certainty and the silencing of the presumption  
 
In the event, DPP v Smith
525
 had raised sufficient uncertainty that Parliament felt 
obliged to enact s. 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 to provide clarification.  The 
provision finally put the status of the presumption beyond doubt and placed the 
common law factual presumption on a statutory basis, such that,   
   A court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offence,  
  (a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of  
  his actions by reason only of its being a natural and probable consequence of  
  those actions; but (b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result  
  by reference to all the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence  
  as appear proper in the circumstances. 
 
Whilst confirming that the presumption did not constitute a legal rule or import an 
objective standard of fault, s. 8 acknowledges that a person may be presumed to have 
intended or foreseen the natural and probable consequence of his act, but that the 
presumption may be refuted by other evidence raising contrary inferences.  
However, although the provision remains unchanged today, a string of high-profile 
appeals against murder convictions
526
 went on to provide the test bed for a refined 
understanding of how evidence of intention may be found.
527
  After successive 
definitions emanating from successive cases over successive decades, the position 
                                                             
524 JWC Turner, Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law (19th edn, Cambridge University Press 1966). 
525 DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290 (HL) and see Richard Buxton, ‘The Retreat from Smith’ (1966) Crim LR 
196. 
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was finally settled in Woollin [1999] and expressed in this way: 
 
  In the rare cases where the direction that it is for the jury simply to decide  
  whether the defendant intended to kill or to do serious bodily harm is not  
  enough, the jury should be directed that they are not entitled to find the  
  necessary intention, unless they feel sure that death or serious bodily harm  
  was a virtual certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of  
  the defendant's actions and that the defendant appreciated that such was the  
  case.
528
   
 
Thus, whilst s. 8 puts on a statutory basis the common law presumption of fact and 
continues to refer to inferences of intention and foresight that may be drawn by 
reference to the terminology of ‘natural and probable consequences’,
529
 the now 
infamous jury direction on intention emphasizes subjective foresight amounting to 
the infinitely higher standard of ‘virtual certainty’.
530
  The relevant authorities, as are 
typically rehearsed in academic texts dealing with intention, now tend to omit the 
statutory articulation contained in s. 8 and the language of natural and probable 
results appears long since rejected.  Thus, in Hyam v DPP [1975], Lord Diplock 
endorsed the view that an actor intended a result if, whilst it was not his purpose, he 
knew that it was a highly probable, or perhaps a merely probable, result.
531
  Whereas 
this was sufficient mens rea for murder at that time, in the following decade the link 
between probability, foresight and intention was refined and given a more nuanced 
explanation.
532





 articulates the finding of intention by reference to virtual certainty 
exclusively and is wholly absent of the language of natural and probable 
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Similarly, contemporary academic texts explain intention by reference to an actor’s 
purpose or desire and, where this is denied, by reference to indirect or ‘oblique’ 
intention in which a discussion of the test of ‘virtual certainty’ typically takes centre 
stage.
536
  As far as the legal landscape is concerned, the evidential presumption that a 
man intends the natural consequences of his act has been effectively silenced by the 
academic thrall surrounding the notion of virtual certainty as the level of foresight 
required to find intention.   
 
It is disconcerting that s. 8 Criminal Justice Act and case law are apparently at odds. 
Of note, Lord Steyn in Woollin explicitly referred to s. 8 in his judgment and he dealt 
with it in this way.  In his opinion, s. 8(a), the subsection which includes the 
phraseology of natural and probable consequences, is simply an instruction to the 
trial judge.  In contrast, it is subsection 8(b) that sets out the legislative instruction to 
the jury, namely that they must take account of all relevant evidence.  That being so, 
the case law, and in particular Nedrick, did ‘not prevent a jury from considering all 
the evidence: it merely stated what state of mind (in the absence of a purpose to kill 
or to cause serious harm) is sufficient for murder.’
537
  It is submitted that Lord 
Steyn’s interpretation of the applicability of the relevant subsections is to be 
doubted.  Read in its entirety, ‘a court or jury’ is to have regard of both subsections, 
(a) and (b), and the intention of the Law Commission, who drafted s. 8, was simply 
to require that intention and foresight were subjectively proved.
538
   However, the 
message emanating from Lord Steyn’s dicta is that a jury is not to be directed in 
terms of foresight of natural and probable consequences and, as far the jury are 
concerned, the finding of intention rests on foresight that the result was a virtually 
certain one.  However, the silencing of the language of natural and probable 
consequences is not confined to the judicial discourse.  It is clear that the 
presumption of intention of natural and probable consequences has disappeared from 
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the criminal law narrative generally.  It is of note that academic texts, which also 
inevitably focus on intention in the context of the murder offence, also tend to omit 
this articulation in favour of a detailed exposition of the test of virtual certainty 




As was the case with the demise of the voluntariness doctrine, the linguistic and 
seemingly conceptual shift away from ‘natural and probable consequences’ to the 
‘virtual certainty’ paradigm has had far-reaching implications. At one level, the 
extent of subjective foresight required has been elevated such that the outcome has 
gone from a probable one to a point of near certainty, at least in the context of 
murder.  In this respect, given the gravity of the offence, the ‘higher’ test of fault is 
salutary.  However, by rejecting the language of natural consequences, together with 
the objective stance it was erroneously taken to import, it is submitted that the 
metaphorical baby was, yet again, thrown out with the bathwater.  Whereas the 
presumption of voluntariness became subsumed within the general doctrine of mens 
rea, effectively displacing the first fault presumption, the notion of virtual certainty 
effectively swamped its sister, the presumption of intention.  Where a man was once 
presumed to have intended the natural and probable result of his act, subject to his 
evidence in denial, the onus is now on the prosecution to positively prove the 
defendant’s state of mind.  Again, the practical and theoretical implication is to shift 
the primary focus from the appearance of the act to the internal mental state.  As has 
been observed in the context of voluntariness, it is this reconception that has proved 
particularly problematic in the case of corporate wrongdoing.   
 
3.6   Turning the volume back up 
 
Whilst reference to the presumption that a person intends the natural and probable 
consequences of his act has slipped from the legal narrative, of case law and 
academic texts, its demise is not yet complete.  Indeed, in contrast to the academic 
and judicial preoccupation with the subjective test of ‘virtual certainty’ of foresight, 
it is of note that passing reference was made to it in the Criminal Justice and Courts 
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 and Blackstone’s Criminal Practice continues to recognise the 
presumption of intention in its original form.
541
  As may be expected of a practitioner 
text, it provides a detailed exposition as regards all of the potential evidential 
inferences that may be drawn in the trial process.   
 
Unsurprisingly, the offence of murder provides the context of the rehearsal, with 
reference to the controversial decision in Smith [1961]
542
 and the corrective  
provisions of s. 8 Criminal Justice Act 1967.
543
  Although on its face, s. 8 does not 







 on the statutory provision.  It 
proceeds on the basis that where death or grievous bodily harm is the natural and 
probable result of an act, the logical processes available to the jury appear to be 
threefold.
547
  First, the jury may infer that death or grievous bodily harm was 
intended.  Second, they may infer that such an outcome was foreseen and, from this, 
they may then infer that the death or grievous bodily harm was intended.  Finally, a 
jury might decide not to draw either of the above inferences.  However, whilst s. 8 
addresses the concepts of intention and foresight together and their relationship with 
natural consequences, the practitioner text separates the concepts.  Accordingly, it 
provides an explanation of the difference between the first two propositions such 
that, in the first instance, the inference of intention is made directly and, whilst 
looking at all the evidence, this can be by reference to the natural and probable 
consequences of the act.  It is only in the second case that the inference of intention 
is made indirectly via foresight of a virtually certain outcome.  The first process 
applies where the jury conclude from all the evidence that the accused intended the 
result in the sense that he desired it, the second process where they may conclude 
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that the accused intended the result, even though he did not desire it.   
It is conceded that the higher standard of foresight required for a finding of 
murderous intent is a laudable common law development.  However, that it has also 
put a seemingly complex spin on a plainly-drafted statutory provision of general 
application
548
 is a matter of regret.  What a jury may take as evidence of desire is a 
matter of conjecture, the difference between direct and oblique intention not 
necessarily that great, and the choice of evidential principle applied might well turn 
on the finest of distinctions.   
 
However, since the ‘virtual certainty’ direction as regards foresight is only given in 
the rarest case, what can be said with confidence is that in the vast majority of trials 
the orthodox presumption of intention, as expressed at s. 8, is applicable.
549
  That 
almost the entirety of the academic discourse on intention goes to foresight of 
virtually certain consequences is, therefore, inversely proportionate to its actual 
application in practice.  Furthermore, although the evidential presumption is 
applicable in almost all cases, it fails to attract explicit judicial reference since the 
question of intention is usually left to the jury without any further elaboration.
550
  
Accordingly, the presumption of intention, and that an inference can be drawn from 
the natural and probable consequences of an act, is unlikely ever to be articulated in 
plain terms.
551
  The absence of any judicial acknowledgment of the presumption is a 
fact supported by reference to the current judicial ‘bench book’ on jury directions.  
Whilst mentioning s. 8 and the relationship between intention and natural and 
probable consequences, the specimen directions confirm that elaboration of the 
meaning of intention will almost never be required.
552
  Thus, whilst the academic 
narrative excludes mention of the evidential presumption, it is clear that explicit 
                                                             
548According to Lord Steyn in R v Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82 (HL), 96 'it does not follow that “intent” 
necessarily has precisely the same meaning in every context in the criminal law', it remains possible 
that lower levels of foresight could still be a sufficient basis for a legitimate inference in relation to 
other offences requiring intention. 
549 Ie those not turning on the finding of an oblique intent.  The Crown Court Benchbook 2010 states 
that judicial elaboration in the form of the Woollin direction as to virtual certainty will ‘almost never’ 
be given.  See <http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Training/benchbook_criminal_2010.pdf.> accessed 4 March 2015. 
See also David Ormerod and Anthony Hooper, Blackstone’s Criminal Practice (OUP 2014) B.13; 
Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (7th edn, OUP 2013) 172. 
550 David Ormerod and Anthony Hooper, Blackstone’s Criminal Practice (OUP 2014) A.2. 
551
 David Ormerod and Anthony Hooper, Blackstone’s Criminal Practice (OUP 2014) A.2. 
552 <http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Training/benchbook_criminal_2010.pdf> accessed 4 March 2015. 
127 
 
reference to it is also rare in practice.  It is submitted that this status quo has an 
apparently self-perpetuating quality.  However, whatever the collective academic 
and judicial voices imply,
553
 the judicial and practitioner materials at least 
demonstrate that the presumption of intention is alive and is still a fundamental 
evidential factor, albeit existing somewhat tacitly.
554
   
 
The fact that the observable consequences of an act may be taken as indicative of 
intention has important application for a theory of corporate criminality.  In the 
context of fraud particularly, the offence requires that the conduct is accompanied by 
a specific intention to make a gain or to cause a loss to another or expose another to a 
risk of loss.
555
  Accordingly, it is submitted that in cases where, having considered 
all the evidence, the requisite intention can be presumed by reference to the 
consequences of the corporate conduct, the need to attribute fault via the fictional 
‘identification’ mechanism is obviated.  The presumption effectively averts the 
primary enquiry to the visible consequences of the act and away from metaphysical 
mental states, leaving the defendant organisation the opportunity to challenge the 
inference.  Arguably this ‘common sense’ approach, considered so obvious that it 
requires no elaboration, has always formed a staple part of jury deliberations.  
Accordingly, practice and theory appear out of step, whilst practice has quietly 
tended to a manifest assessment of fault, the highly-vocalised doctrine of mens rea 
has been the predominant ideology and focus of attention. 
 
3.7   The objective assessment of the subjective state 
 
Having concluded that the manifest assessment of conduct more closely reflects the 
reality of fault assessment at trial, the extent to which the doctrine of mens rea truly 
                                                             
553 Lacey, for example, refers to the presumption in the past tense opining that it is surprising that 
the presumption operated well into the 20th century, notwithstanding it remained founded on an 
objective approach to culpabilty.  She asserts that it is a modified version of Fletcher’s manifest 
liability model, Nicola Lacey ‘In Search of the Responsible Subject: History, Philosophy and Social 
Sciences in Criminal Law Theory’ (2001) 64 MLR 350-71 referring to George P Fletcher, ‘The 
Metamorphosis of Larceny’ (Jan 1976) 89, 3 Harv L Rev; George P Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 
(Little Brown and Co 1978). 
554 For example, David Ormerod and Anthony Hooper, Blackstone’s Criminal Practice (OUP 2014) 
F3.63; <http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp- 
content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Training/benchbook_criminal_2010.pdf> accessed 4 March 2015. 
555 Fraud Act 2006, ss 2(1)(b)(i) and (ii); 3(b)(i) and (ii) and 4(1)(c)(i) and (ii). 
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departs from this approach will be considered.  Arguably, this question is at the heart 
of this research and raises the perennial problem, how to determine the defendant’s 
internal mental state.  Whilst Smith erroneously upgraded the evidential presumption 
to a rule of law
556
, effectively importing an objective test of intention, s. 8 affirmed 
the subjective nature of intention as a determinant of criminal fault.
557
  That being 
said, if a defendant does not give evidence in his own trial, the objective test 
facilitated by the presumption is the only one available.
558
  Otherwise, in cases where 
the accused does testify, the assessment of his subjective state must be effected 
objectively or manifestly since external evidence is the only available evidence.
559
  
Accordingly, whilst foresight and intention have, as legal concepts, attracted 
considerable debate and increasingly refined definitions in cases where the defendant 
denies desire, the requisite mental state must still be determined as a matter of 
fact.
560
   
 
Considered in this light, it would appear that the shift from the objective assessment 
of fault to the subjective approach amounted to little more in substance than the 
procedural change, brought about by Criminal Evidence Act 1898, and the 
opportunity it provided for a defendant to give evidence in his own trial.  Before its 
enactment, the presumption of intention of natural consequences was needed to 
operate as an objective assessment of fault but, with the passing of the act, the 
defendant could now testify as regards his subjective state of mind.  However, the 
distinction between the objective test of fault and the objective or manifest 
assessment of conduct is paramount.  As a matter of practice, it is clear that juries 
                                                             
556 DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290 (HL). 
557 Criminal Justice Act 1967. 
558 Richard Buxton, ‘The Retreat From Smith’ (1966) Crim LR 196. Blackstone’s confirms that in the 
absence of an explanation, a jury will doubtless infer that a defendant intended the natural and 
probable result of his action and that, as a purely factual inference, this is unexceptional.  Apart from 
admissions made, this is the most obvious way to ascertain his state of mind.  David Ormerod and 
Anthony Hooper, Blackstone’s Criminal Practice (OUP 2014) A2.34. 
559 As regards this indirect knowledge of the internal state, Bentham, for example, said that the 
factors which should be considered are the act itself; the accompanying circumstances; the intention 
of the perpetrator; his degree of understanding or perceptive faculties which are to be inferred from 
the nature of the act or from circumstances peculiar to it; the particular motive or motives at its root 
and the general disposition of which it is indicative, JW Cecil Turner, Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal 
Law (19th edn, Cambridge University Press 1966) 32 citing Jeremy Bentham’s, Principles of Morals 
and Legislation. 
560 In this respect a man's thoughts are said to be ‘as much facts as are his bodily movements’, JW 
Cecil Turner, Russell On Crime (12th edn, Stevens & Sons 1964) 23. 
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still infer intention, in the sense of desire, on the common sense basis that the 
outcome was the natural and probable consequence of the act in question.  The 
presumption of intention, considered with all of the other evidence, means that a jury 
may make the inference on the basis of everything relevant that they have observed.  
Since the totality of the evidence includes that of the defendant himself, the 
presumption is naturally rebuttable.  Accordingly, it is submitted that the theoretical 
weight placed on the mens rea doctrine is a somewhat artificial construct, the 
inescapable fact being that whatever the subjective mental state, its determination 
can only be made objectively.  It is thus submitted that the shift from the 
examination of the overt and physical to the consideration of the internal and 
metaphysical amounts to an ideological sleight of hand, altering nothing more than 
mere perception.  The prominence given to the expanded doctrine of mens rea in the 
criminal narrative therefore effectively masks the continued existence of the 
presumptions of fault which continue, albeit tacitly, to provide the structural basis for 
the determination of liability. 
 
3.8   The presumption of intention and the corporate actor 
 
A corrective refocusing of the orthodox presumptions of fault would realign theory 
with evidential practicalities of both prosecution and defence.  Further, it is 
submitted that an acknowledged return to such an approach would accommodate the 
prosecution of the corporate entity without detriment to the position of human 
defendants.  As far as corporate culpability is concerned, the absence of a 
metaphysical ‘mind’ would not be fatal to the finding of criminal fault, nor would it 
involve the necessary inculpation of an associated individual.  Further, the explicit 
employment of the evidential presumptions would simply acknowledge the 
continuing need to infer fault through the observance of the manifest.   
 
The practicability of this approach to the specific problem of corporate fraud is 
readily demonstrable.  The generic fraud offence can be perpetrated through the 
dishonest making of a false representation,
561
 failure to disclose information
562
 or 
                                                             
561 Fraud Act 2006, s 2(1)(a). 
562 S 3(a). 
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abuse of a position
563
 intending, by so doing, to make a gain for himself or another, 
or to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss.
564
  Taking by way of 
example the widespread practice of mis-selling of personal protection insurance 
alongside other financial products, assuming that this conduct might be considered 
dishonest, the current approach turns on the successful application of the 
identification principle.  This means that a corporation could only be convicted of 
fraud if a sufficiently senior director was personally guilty of the same offence such 
that his culpable state of mind could be considered that of the company.  In this 
context, given the distance between the personnel at top level management and those 
who carry out the day to day corporate functions, and for various other reasons, a 
corporate conviction on this basis could be difficult to sustain.  However, leaving 
aside the issue of establishing dishonesty for the moment, by applying the evidential 
presumption of intention, a corporate intention might be readily ascertained by the 
inference that the organisation intended to make a gain, through such sales activity, 
since this is the natural and probable result of such activity.   
 
It is clear that both the presumption of voluntariness and the presumption of 
intention can serve equally in the context of corporate action as in that of individual 
action.  Furthermore, the defendant organisation is as capable as the accused 
individual of calling witnesses to refute either or both presumptions in its defence.  
Whilst it is acknowledged that some ‘defences’ available to human individuals, such 
as duress, may be inapplicable to corporate defendants, the recognition of corporate 
autonomy could also afford the exciting opportunity to recognise, perhaps by 
analogy, some context specific defences.   
 
3.9   Dishonesty and the corporate actor 
 
Whilst it is clear that organisational capacity and intention might be attributed by 
application of the orthodox evidential presumptions, the generic fraud offence also 
requires proof of dishonesty.  As regards fraudulent intent, in the context of 
obtaining by false pretences
565
, the 1938 edition of Archbold stated that where 
                                                             
563
 S 4(1)(a). 
564 Ss 2(1)(b)(i) and (ii); s. 3(b)(i) and (ii); s. 4(1)(c)(i) and (ii). 
565 Eg at Larceny Act 1916, s 32(1). 
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money was obtained by pretences that were false, prima facie there was an intent to 
defraud.
566
  Similarly, the use of false statements or documents to obtain money was 
evidence from which an intent to defraud may have been inferred, even where the 
money might have been obtained without them.
567
  At this time there was also, of 
course, explicit recognition that ‘prima facie everyone must be taken to intend the 
consequences of his acts’.
568
   
 
Of note, contemporary analysis evidences a continued reliance on the inferential 
approach to fraudulent intents.  For example, as regards the fraudulent trading 
offence, ‘Whether there has been intent to defraud is a question of fact to be 
determined in every case and a person’s intent usually has to be inferred from what 
the person did.  The courts have said that there is some behaviour will usually give 
rise to an inference that there has been an intent to defraud’.
569
  The Fraud Act 2006 
is somewhat different in that it does not articulate liability in terms of fraudulent 
intent, preferring instead to employ the concept of ‘dishonesty’ that was introduced 
in the deception offences contained in the 1968 Theft Act.  These provisions 
replaced the obtaining by false pretences offence which was set out in the Larceny 
Act 1916 and, of note, the Court of Appeal, in R v Wright [1960],
570
 affirmed that an 
intent to defraud was really synonymous with dishonesty.  Final clarification to that 
effect was later provided in the Court of Appeal case of Ghosh [1982]
571
 which set 
                                                             
566 RE Ross and MJH Turner, Archbold’s Criminal Pleading: Evidence and Practice (30th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 1938) 724 citing R v Hammerson (1914) 10 Cr App R 121 (CCA).  This comment was made as 
regards Larceny Act 1916, s 32(1) which was the statutory forerunner of the 1968 and 1978 Theft Act 
deception offences.  These were then replaced by the generic offence contained in the Fraud Act 
2006. 
567 R v Hopley (1916) 11 Cr App R 248 (CCA). 
568 Robert Ernest Ross and Maxwell Turner, Archbold’s Criminal Pleading: Evidence and Practice (30th 
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1938) 725 citing R v Williams (1836) 7 C & P 354. 
569
 Stephen Mayson and others, Company Law (27
th
 edn, OUP 2010-11) 693. 
570 R v Wright [1960] Crim LR 366 and see JWC Turner, Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law (Cambridge 
University Press 1966) 365. 
571 R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053 (CCA), 2 All ER 689, 692.  Lord Lane observed that In Scott v Comr of 
Police for the Metropolis [1975] AC 819 (HL) Viscount Dilhorne traced the meaning of the words 
'fraud', 'fraudulently' and 'defraud' in relation to simple larceny, as well as the common law offence 
of conspiracy to defraud. After referring to Stephen's History of the Criminal Law of 
England (Macmillan 1883) vol 2, 121 – 22 and East's Pleas of the Crown (1803) vol 2, 553 he 
continued as follows [1975] AC 819, 836 – 837: 'The Criminal Law Revision Committee in their eighth 
report on “Theft and Related Offences” (Cmnd 2977 (1966)) in para 33 expressed the view that the 
important element of larceny, embezzlement and fraudulent conversion was “undoubtedly the 
dishonest appropriation of another person's property”; in para 35 that the words “dishonestly 
appropriates” meant the same as “fraudulently converts to his own use or benefit, or the use or 
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out both objective and subjective elements that are required to establish dishonesty.  
In cases where a jury direction is necessary, Lord Lane held that the first question is: 
 
  whether according to the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people  
  what was done was dishonest.  If it was not dishonest by those standards, that  
  is the end of the matter and the prosecution fails.  If (but only if) D's conduct  
  was dishonest by those standards, the jury must consider the second question,  
  namely: . . . whether the defendant himself must have realised that what he  
  was doing was [by the standards of reasonable and honest people]  
  dishonest.
572
   
 
However, whilst the second question constitutes the subjective element, the Court of 
Appeal provided further elucidation when it said, ‘In most cases, where the actions 
are obviously dishonest by ordinary standards, there will be no doubt about it. It will 
be obvious that the defendant himself knew that he was acting dishonestly’.
573
  
Accordingly, it is acknowledged that in many cases dishonesty is so obvious (or 
manifest) that the Ghosh direction is not required.
574
  Furthermore, if dishonesty is 
synonymous with intent to defraud and the latter notion was subject to the evidential 
presumption of intention, it is submitted that proof of dishonesty is also subject to 
such an approach.  Of note, this accords with the construction of the 2 limb Ghosh 
test,
575
 the overt appearance of the conduct being considered primarily, by reference 
to an objective standard of conduct, the subjective enquiry being conducted 
thereafter.   
 
3.10   Making out the mens rea of corporate fraud  
 
It is submitted that findings of organisational voluntariness and intention can be 
facilitated via the mechanism of the evidential presumptions and the manifest 
assessment of conduct.  Further, it appears that a finding of corporate dishonesty can 
                                                                                                                                                                            
benefit of any other person”, and in para 39 that “dishonestly” seemed to them a better word than 
“fraudulently“. Parliament endorsed these views in the Theft Act 1968’. 
572 R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053 (CCA), 2 All ER 689, 692 
573
 R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053 (CCA), 2 All ER 689, 692 (L Lane). 
574 David Ormerod and Anthony Hooper, Blackstone’s Criminal Practice (OUP 2014) B4.55. 
575 R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053 (CCA), 2 All ER 689. 
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be inferred in the same way.  As with the earlier examples of voluntariness and 
intention, where the conduct in question appears blatantly dishonest and the 
inference can be made, it would be open to a defendant organisation to bring 
evidence to refute that appearance.  It can be concluded that as between the external 
act and the requisite mental state, albeit framed in subjectivist terms, the essential 
bridge continues to be evidential, behavioural presumptions based on the objective 
perception of manifest appearance.
576
  All things considered, it is submitted that a 
renewed commitment to the presumptive approach to evidence would facilitate 
corporate convictions for fraud where there is an appearance of misconduct of this 
nature. 
 
In summary, the black letter law analysis has identified various points in the 
evolution of the criminal law that have been determinative of the demise of the 
orthodox canons of fault and the associated evidential presumptions.  However, 
whilst the concept of mens rea has grown and changed exponentially and the way in 
which mental fault is attributed has theoretically altered, ‘actus non facit reum nisi 
mens sit rea’ is still said to express the basis of criminal fault.  This articulation has 
survived the shifting boundaries of the actus reus and mens rea concepts themselves 
and perpetuates an approach to criminal liability that distinguishes sharply between 
physical elements of an offence and its requisite blameworthy states of mind.  This 
dualism accords with the philosophy of Descartes but the construct is not without 
tension, particularly as regards notions of intention, voluntariness and what has been 
described as ‘the mental element in an act’.
577
  Accordingly, the following chapter 
considers the actus reus / mens rea construct in the light of developments in mind / 






                                                             
576 Indeed, a revival of interest in the idea that criminal responsibility is and should be founded on an 
evaluative assessment of moral character, displayed in putatively criminal conduct, has been 
identified by Nicola Lacey, 'Character, Capacity, Outcome' in Marcus Dubber and Lindsay farmer 
(eds), Modern Histories of Crime and Punishment (Stanford University Press 2007). 
577 Glanville Williams, Criminal Law, The General Part (2nd edn, Stevens & Sons, 1961) 11. 
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4.   Philosophical and scientific advancements   
 
4.1    Mens rea - modern mind / action philosophy and mirror neurons.      
 
Whilst the respective scope of the notions of actus reus and mens rea have not 
remained static, the modern understanding of the Latin maxim has generally 
involved the idea that the physical and the mental elements of an offence should be 
distinguished.  Although this construct of criminal liability accorded with Cartesian 
dualism, it is widely agreed that act and intent are not ontologically distinct.  
Accordingly, this chapter provides a basic examination of contemporary philosophy, 
in particular ‘mind / action’ theory, with some important contibutions in this area 
having already been made in the context of the criminal law.
578
  The philosophical 
case for the dismantling of the rigid actus reus / mens rea construct reveals a much 
more nuanced understanding of action such that contemporary philosophy and 
criminal law doctrine are demonstrably out of step.  Departing from the dualist 
assumptions, it will be shown that the physical and mental are neither separate nor 
severable and, accordingly, a more holistic and contextual approach to fault 
attribution is desirable.  This recognition removes the perceived need to distinguish 
finely delineated mental states which are currently considered in isolation from the 
physical act.   
 
Further, this chapter goes on to consider the advancements made in scientific 
understanding of the workings of mirror neurons in the brain which disclose that the 
observer can acquire direct knowledge of the conduct of the observed.  This finding 
provides additional support for the manifest assessment of conduct, reinstating the 
notion that criminal behaviour is readily recognisable as such.  That being so, it is 
proposed that, in our individual capacity as actors within the organised groups 
typical of modern life, direct knowledge of organisational action is also possible 
through the observation of it.  It will be shown that these discoveries afford a retreat 
from the predominance of the inflated mens rea doctrine in its current form such that 
corporate fault might now be attributed directly, without the need to identify an 
associated individual’s metaphysical mind.  This knowledge provides further support 
                                                             




for the re-establishment the orthodox evidential presumptions and the manifest 
model of fault attribution.  
 
Whilst this research argues the case for capacity-based liability, founded primarily 
on the orthodox voluntariness doctrine, it is also of note that the contemporary 
philosophy recognises that an autonomous actor can emerge from an organisation.  
Broadly stated, properties can combine to amount to something that is more than the 
sum of the parts.  Expressed in various ideas and terms such as holism, realism and 
emergentism, the common proposition is that individual parts can join together to 
form something different, something sui generis.  The clear implication for a theory 
of corporate culpability is that organisations can and do become personalities which 
are distinct from their members and thus can be recognised as responsibility-bearing 
actors.  Accordingly, where corporate misconduct is the result of systemic and 
pervasive behaviour, not attributable to identifiable individuals, there is a case for 
inculpating the organisation directly, obviating the need to employ the artificial 
‘identification theory’ in all cases. 
 
Accordingly, this chapter briefly charts the developing theories of mind and action, 
which, taken together with neuro-scientific advances, underpin the case for a return 
to a presumptive approach to the attribution of fault and a realist account of 
organisations. 
 
4.2   Cartesian dualism – the root of the actus reus / mens rea divide 
  
The basis of criminal fault, expressed in the maxim, ‘actus non facit reum nisi mens 
sit rea’ with its characteristic demarcation of physical and mental elements, is still 
constructed in accordance with what is called philosophy’s ‘official doctrine’.
579
  
The force behind the distinction was driven by the doctrine of dualism which 
separates the non-physical mind from the tangible body, 
580
 hailing chiefly from the 
thinking of Descartes nearly 4 centuries ago.
581
  The dualist assumption holds that 
                                                             
579 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Penguin 2000). 
580 See for example, RA Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability: Philosophy of Action and 
Criminal Law (Basil Blackwell 1990). 
581 Scholastic and reformation theology was also influential. Platonic and Aristotelian theories of the 
intellect shaped the orthodox doctrines of the soul’s immortality.  
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human beings have both a mind and a body which, although mutually exclusive 
ontological categories, are somehow harnessed together.
582
  Accordingly, this 
thinking assumes 2 different kinds of existence, the physical which is composed of 
matter and the mental comprising consciousness.  The physical body exists spacially, 
subject to mechanical laws, and is observable whereas the workings of the mind are 
private and can only be observed, internally by the individual himself.  Although 
comprising distinct substances, there is causal interaction such that by a mental act of 
will, the individual can cause his physical body to move and, conversely, the 
physical phenomena can cause a mental sensation of pain.  However, the laws of 
physics fail to explain the causal relationship between the mechanical animate and 
the inanimate.
583
   
 
Whilst the respective disciplines of philosophy and science have struggled to provide 
an explanation for this mind-body relationship, the criminal law has continued to 
labour under the influence of 17
th
 century Cartesian dualist philosophy.  This has 
ultimately led to an approach whereby the making out of a criminal offence typically 
involves a ‘step by step’ accumulation of the requisite physical and mental elements, 
each apparently considered in isolation.
584
  In addition, the Cartesian view of the 
mental process is that it is staged in the ‘private theatre’ of the mind of the individual 
and this view has endured such that it has been generally accepted that the state of a 
man’s mind cannot be observed by anyone but the individual himself.  Hence, whilst 
the moral attribution of fault has demanded a subjective approach to criminality, the 
evidential implication of the philosophy rejects the objective or manifest assessment 
of the defendant’s state of mind.  The necessary bridges between the subjective and 
objective, direct and indirect knowledge, have, therefore, been the evidential 
presumptions of voluntariness and that the accused must have intended the natural 
                                                             
582 Plato opined that we each have a soul which is divine and immutable and before birth we pre-
existed in a pure and disembodied state.  The body is the vehicle for existence in the earthly world 
which is a transitory stage in the soul’s eternal journey.  It would seem that Descarte’s interest in 
maintaining the dualist approach to the mind was partly motivated by his religous desire to allow for 
the survival of the soul after physical death.  After the death of the body, the mind may continue to 
exist and function. 
583 Various theories have been put forward, for example Descartes himself thought that a fluid of 
‘animal spirits’ flowing in the pineal gland provided the solution as to the interface between the 
mental and physical; others have suggested that God is the medium, for example Berkeley, 
Malebranche and Geulinext, that there is a pre-established harmony, Leibniz, or that there is only 
one underlying substance which is neither material or mental, Spinoza. 
584 R v Hinks [2001] 2 AC 241 (HL). 
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consequences of his actions.  Whilst the presumptions are no longer openly 
acknowledged, this philosophy, with its dualist assumptions, has never been 
displaced as the ideological underpinning of the criminal law. 
 
Although substance dualism is not widely accepted in philosophy today,
585
 the 
problem of explaining consciousness and the mind-body relationship remains.  
However, faith that science will ultimately provide the link may well be borne out in 
that there has been interest in recent neuroscientific research.
586
  For example, 
sophisticated brain imaging techniques have demonstrated correlations between 
mental phenomena and neural brain states and that there is a physical brain state 
accompanying every mental event, the physical brain identified as the determinant of 
mental activity.
587
  Even so, the problem of explaining how a mental phenomenon 
can correlate with a physical one remains.
588
  Various theories have emerged, for 
example that of psychoneural identity
589
 and, thereafter, functionalism which became 
                                                             
585 See for example, Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind (3rd edn, Westview Press 2011); Ryle 
infamously referred to it as the dogma of the ‘ghost in the machine’, Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of 
Mind (Penguin 2000) 17; Vadim V Vasilyev, ‘Philosophy of Mind, Past and Present’ (2013) 44, 1-2 
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for example Thomas Hobbes, Richard Rorty, Daniel Dennett. 
586 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Penguin 2000). 
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and only if, B occurs to O at T, Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind (3rd edn, Westview Press 2011) ch 4. 
588 If C-fibre stimulation correlates to the feeling of pain this still leaves the problem of explaining 
how a mental phenomenon can correlate with a physical one, Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind (3rd 
edn, Westview Press 2011) ch 4. 
589 Explained in this way, replacing the ‘pain occurs if there is C-fibre stimulation’ theory with the 
notion that ‘pain equals C-fibre stimulation’, pain and C-fibre stimulation is but 1 phenomenon, not 
2 phenomena whose correlation needs to be explained.  According to this phsychoneural identity 
theory first advanced in the late 1950s, the mental state is identified with the physical processes of 
the brain.  Although ‘C-fibre activation’ and ‘pain’ do not have the same dictionary meaning, they 
are one and the same, see Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind (3rd edn, Westview Press 2011).  In the 
same way that bolts of lightning can be also described as atmospheric electrical charges; they are 
not synonymous but the 2 expressions, ‘lightning’ and ‘atmospheric electric discharge’, refer to the 
same phenomenon.  The claim that the mind is produced by the brain and the naturalistic approach 
to the interaction of the mind and body has become mainstream opinion during the past few 
decades, see Vadim V Vasilyev, ‘Philosophy of Mind, Past and Present’ (2013) 44, 1- 2 
Metaphilosophy 15.  Identifying the mental with the physical brought the hypothesis within the 
ambit of physical theory which could then provide a complete framework to explain all aspects of 
the natural world.  However, it is argued that psychoneural identities are no more reducible to basic 
physical–biological laws than the psychoneural correlations are, so they must also be viewed as 
fundamental and ineliminable postulates about how things are in the world.  For the non-
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the orthodox philosophy of cognitive science.
590
  However, whilst functionalism 
provides a holistic conception of mentality,
591
 it de-substantialises the mind and, 
therefore, encompasses the view that mental processes depend on, and are realised 
in, the physical make-up of the organism, although they are not reducible to it.
592
  
That being so, the mind must be a 'non-physical' thing and this still leaves the need 
to explain how the mind can cause something physical, such as a bodily 
movement.
593
  In an attempt to avoid a return to the dualist dilemma, Vicari argues 
that both monist and dualist theories are implicitly based on the same rationally 
unjustified assumptions.
594
  The main assumption is the exclusion principle which 
perceives the mental and physical as independent and exclusive ontological realms.  
However, scientific theories can explain the existence of the mind without reducing 
it or eliminating it such that it is compatible with the physical.  Searle refers to this 
                                                                                                                                                                            
reductivist, mental properties, along with other higher level properties of the special sciences, like 
biology, geology and the social sciences, resist reduction to the basic physical domain. 
590 Hilary Putnam, ‘Psychological Predicates’ in WH Capitan and DD Merrill (eds), Art, Mind and 
Religion (University of Pittsburgh Press 1967) reprinted as ‘The Nature of Mental States’ in Hilary 
Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers (Cambridge University Press 1975) vol ii. 
The core of the functionalist conception of the mind is that organisms which are different, 
biologically and physically, can have the same psychology and, conversely, organisms with the same 
physical structure can have different psychological capacities and functions, depending on the way it 
is causally embedded in a larger system. Most neurons are alike and are largely interchangeable.  
According to functionalism, a mental kind is a functional kind or a causal–functional kind and, 
therefore, the feeling of pain accords with the concept of the tissue damage detector, a functional 
concept, specified by the job description. Thus, what makes something a mousetrap, for example, is 
its ability to perform that function rather than being composed of a specific psycho-chemical 
structure. Accordingly, pain is defined by reference to its function, that being to serve as a causal 
intermediary between pain inputs and pain outputs.  Moreover, the causal conditions that activate 
the pain mechanism can include other mental states and the outputs of the pain mechanism can 
include mental states as well, for example the sense of distress or desire to be pain-free.  The 
functionalist holds that mental states are real internal states with causal powers; pain is thus an 
internal neurobiological state typically caused by tissue damage that might, in turn, cause groans 
and avoidance behaviour.  Mental states form a complex causal network which is anchored to the 
external world at various contact points.  Here interaction takes place with the outside world, 
receiving sensory inputs and admitting behaviour outputs.  The identity of a given mental kind 
depends solely on the place it occupies in the causal network.  That is, what makes a mental event 
the kind of mental event that it is, is the way it is causally linked to other mental event kinds and 
input–output conditions.  The identity of each mental kind therefore depends ultimately on the 
whole system – its internal structure and the way it causally links to the external world via sensory 
inputs and behaviour outputs. 
591 The mind is seen as a set of powers, abilities and processes which perform a causal role in the 
management of organism–environment transactions. 
592 What makes them irreducible is the fact that they are multiply realisable in different physical 
systems. Giuseppe Vicari, ‘Beyond Conceptual Dualism: Ontology of Consciousness, Mental 
Causation, and Holism’ in John R Searle (ed), Philosophy of Mind (Value Enquiry Book Series 2008). 
593
 Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind (3
rd
 edn, Westview Press 2011). 
594 Giuseppe Vicari, ‘Beyond Conceptual Dualism: Ontology of Consciousness, Mental Causation, and 
Holism’ in John R Searle (ed), Philosophy of Mind (Value Enquiry 2008) 60. 
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as biological naturalism, the theory being that consciousness is a state or a process 
realised in the brain whose causal base is at the lower, microstructural level of 
organisation of the brain itself.
595
  Conscious states are therefore created in the 
physical structure of the brain and consciousness is causally explained by the 
interactions between the elements composing the brain as an organic system.  It is 
realised at a level of the same system which is higher than that of the basic elements.  
Consciousness is therefore a causally emergent property of the brain.  An emergent 
property is a feature of the entire system but not of its basic elements and it is 
causally explained not as the simple addition of the parts, but from the causal 
interactions at the level of the basic components of the system itself.  For example, 
liquidity is an emergent property of water although no individual water molecule is 
in a liquid state, unlike the system as a whole.  In the same way Searle argues that 
consciousness is the emergent of certain systems of neurons and that although no 
individual neuron can think or speak or feel, the system as a whole has this capacity. 
Thus, consciousness cannot be deduced or calculated from the sheer physical 
structure of the neurons without some additional account of the causal relations 
between them.  The failure of ontological reduction can be explained by reference to 
other phenomena, for example, money and musical performances are, in principle, 
reducible to molecular structures or soundwaves, but if a bank or a musician were to 
redefine the concepts in these terms, they would lose the sense of the concepts 
themselves.
596
   
 
By abandoning the disconnected Cartesian categories of the mental and the physical, 
the problem of mental causation disappears.  Furthermore, scientific research 
provides an explanatory structure which accounts for the emergence of ontologically 
'new' levels, with properties that are non-existent at the lower levels, but which 
emerge from the lower-level interactions as system macrofeatures.  The reverse 
approach is reductionism with which science has been successful in reducing into 
atomic states various organic matter.
597
  However, reductionist analysis moves from 
wholes down into parts and, by so doing, moves in the opposite direction from the 
                                                             
595 John R Searle (ed), Philosophy of Mind (Value Enquiry 2008). 
596 Giuseppe Vicari, ‘Beyond Conceptual Dualism: Ontology of Consciousness, Mental Causation, and 
Holism’ in John R Searle (ed), Philosophy of Mind (Value Enquiry 2008) 60. 
597 Ursula Goodenough and Terrence W Deacon, ‘The Sacred Emergence of Nature’  in Philip Clayton 
(ed), The Oxford Handbook of Religions and Science (OUP 2006) ch 50. 
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way that matters arise.  To understand how matters arise, the process must be run in 
reverse, for example from the sub atom to the atom to the amino acids to the protein 
to the polymer to the cell to the muscle to the contraction.
598
  As scientists have 
undertaken such upwards projects, they have discovered that the whole is greater 
than the sum of its parts.  They have not found something greater or something more, 
but something altogether different.  Indeed, this something else can, in turn, 
participate in generating a new something else at a different level of organisation. 
These dynamics are termed emergence.
599
  Turning again to the illustrative water 
molecule, whilst it comprises hydrogen and oxygen atoms, the molecule possesses 
unprecedented attributes because the joining of the atoms has distorted the shapes of 
each, producing a composite shape with its own intrinsic properties.  Further, when 
water molecules interact together different outcomes are possible.  Ice forms when 
the kinetic energy of the average molecule is low and the molecules’ stickiness 
overcomes their movement;  liquid water forms when their movement is just 
sufficient to overcome that stickiness and steam forms when their relative velocities 
are high enough that collisions seldom allow stickiness.
600
  Thus, emergentists 
suggest that human characteristics are constructed bottom-up and are then deeply 
influenced by environmental contexts.  Accordingly, human evolution has entailed 
the co-evolution of three emergent modalities – brain, symbolic language and culture 
– each feeding into and responding to the other two, thereby generating particular 
complex patterns and outcomes.  This identification of a naturalistic and non-
reductive ontology of mind is exciting in that it can now dialogue with scientific 




4.3   The criminal law and the holistic analysis of action  
 
Whilst this thinking provides one of any number of possible answers that might 
respond to the dualist dilemma, at the very least the scientific research demonstrates 
                                                             
598 Ursula Goodenough and Terrence W Deacon, ‘The Sacred Emergence of Nature’  in Philip Clayton 
(ed), The Oxford Handbook of Religions and Science (OUP 2006) ch 50. 
599 Ursula Goodenough and Terrence W Deacon, ‘The Sacred Emergence of Nature’  in Philip Clayton 
(ed), The Oxford Handbook of Religions and Science (OUP 2006) ch 50.   
600 Ursula Goodenough and Terrence W Deacon, ‘The Sacred Emergence of Nature’  in Philip Clayton 
(ed), The Oxford Handbook of Religions and Science (OUP 2006) ch 50. 
601 Giuseppe Vicari, ‘Beyond Conceptual Dualism: Ontology of Consciousness, Mental Causation, and 
Holism’ in John R Searle (ed), Philosophy of Mind (Value Enquiry 2008). 
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that the notions of mind and body, mental and physical, are inextricably interwoven 
and, in contrast to the traditional model of criminality, simply defy separation.  
Whilst this does not profess to be a philosophical or scientific thesis, it is submitted 
that there is evidently no bright line distinction to be made between an act and its 
accompanyting mental state and that the modern bifurcation of actus reus and mens 
rea concepts labours under a fundamental misconception.  Thus, any attempt to 
demarcate the territory of the mental from the physical must be fraught with 
difficulties from the outset.  Arguably, a more satisfactory basis for criminal liability 
would be established if the Latin maxim, on which it was based, was analysed 
holistically, avoiding the faux distinctions between the physical and mental elements.  
Indeed, the early understanding of the terms actus reus and mens rea more readily 
accords with today’s scientific findings, the actus reus performing a much larger role 
than is the case today, encompassing the mental elements expressed in the offence 
definition.  For example, the 1966 edition of Kenny’s Outlines explained the 
meaning of actus reus in this way, it:  
 
  may be defined as 'such result of human conduct as the law seeks to prevent'.   
  This may include legally essential facts and included amongst them there  
  may be one or more which are personal to the accused himself, including  
  even his own thoughts.  Thus, in burglary the prosecution must prove that the  
  prisoner (1) broke and entered, (2) the dwelling house of another, (3) in the  
  night, (4) with intent to commit a felony therein.  Elements (2) and (3) are  
  objective facts so the subjective mental attitude of the prisoner is irrelevant;  
  that is to say, whether or not the prisoner believed it to be a dwelling house,  
  or belonging to another, or that it was in the night can make no difference to  
  his liability to conviction if the other facts are established.  But (4) is  
  subjective and the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt that  
  he had the specified intention, however, although this is a subjective matter it  
  has nothing to do with the mens rea of the crime of burglary but is simply  
  one of the facts which together constitute the actus reus, since a man's  




                                                             
602 JW Cecil Turner, Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law (19th edn, Cambridge Uni Press 1966) 17 and 
referring to JWC Turner, Russell on Crime (12th edn, Stevens & Sons 1964) 23. 
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It is clear that the orthodox actus reus / mens rea notions did not denote a strict 
separation of the physical and mental elements in crime, albeit that is current 
interpretation.   That the modern interpretation makes for an uncomfortable fit in the 
overall conceptual scheme is demonstrated by some obvious theoretical difficulties 
which arise through the attempt of such an exercise.  For example, some actus reus 
elements inevitably inhere a particular mental aspect of their own, for example, the 
fact of possession.
603
  This is of no surprise when considered more generally in the 
light of science-led philosophy.  To accord with the scientific advances made in this 
field, the criminal law will need to abandon the distinction and accept that the 
blameworthy state of mind does not accompany the act, it is an elemental aspect of 
it.  Similarly, it is submitted that the orthodox distinction between the mental states, 
voluntariness and foresight of consequences,
604
 is equally difficult.
605
  Whilst 
acknowledging Turner’s commitment to the distinction, it is arguably at this juncture 
that the modern approaches to fault attribution can be seen at their most problematic 
in conceptual terms.  This can be discerned by reference to the doctrine of 
voluntariness and the earlier discussion in chapter 2.  It is widely accepted that the 
development of the concepts of fault, sufficient to attract criminal disapprobation, 
has been a gradual one.  In this respect, there is evidence that the doctrine of 
voluntariness began in the narrow sense to temper the harshness of a criminal law 
where fault had previously been attributable on the basis of simple causation.  An 
early refinement added the requirement that the actor was the author of his act in the 
sense that literal involuntariness would negate liability.  Subsequently, the doctrine 
was extended to encompass metaphorical involuntariness as is now expressed in the 
concepts such as duress and mistake.  Whilst voluntariness was the mental fault 
element required in every offence, the common law developed further such that an 
accused would not attract criminal culpability if he had not foreseen some specified 
consequence of his act.  Whilst this came to be described specifically as ‘mens rea’, 
it is submitted that this later requirement may have constituted a further refinement 
of the full doctrine of voluntariness rather than the identification of another distinct 
                                                             
603 See above ch 2 and Warner v MPC [1969] 2 AC 256 (HL).   
604 Mens rea in its original sense. 
605 That such fine mental distinctions cannot be made is hinted at by the points of tension identified 
in ch 2.  For example, the curious co-existing phenomena of insane and non-insane automatism, and 
the ‘defence’ of mistake, which can go either to deny the actus reus or mens rea, depending on their 
nature in the context of the modern construct. 
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mental state.  The only context in which voluntariness needed to be considered 
separately was in that of the statutory offences which did not necessarily import the 
common law presumption of mens rea.  
 
That the notions of voluntariness and mens rea are not capapble of segregation is 
demonstrable.  Capacity-based responsibility, underpinned by the notion of the 
‘rational calculator’, must encompass the notion that the choice expressed is not only 
freely made (and autonomous) but that it is also an informed choice.  Implicit in the 
very language of ‘rational calculation’ is the inference that the accused has 
calculated, weighed up the circumstances, at least as far as he himself knows or 
perceives them.  Put another way, it is simply the gradual refinement to the doctrine 
as it recognised metaphorical involuntariness.
606
  Indeed, that the presumption of 
voluntariness encompasses a presumption of knowledge of circumstances was 
established above.
607
  If the actor is possessed of this knowledge, and not acting 
under a mistake, there must remain only the finest of distinctions between this state 
of mind and that of mens rea, meaning foresight of particular consequences.  It is 
submitted that if the rational actor is making choices in the context of the 
surrounding circumstances, he is almost certainly doing so with some insight or 
allusion to the possible outcome of his choice.  It is only on the basis of his 
‘knowledge’ or belief of the circumstances that consequences can be foreseen; like 
the rational calculator making his choices as regards the action itself, consequences 
cannot be predicted in a vacuum.  Inevitably, such mental states cannot be artificially 
separated when they are all part and parcel of one process.
608
 
   
Accordingly, it is submitted that mens rea, or foreseeability of consequences, and 
voluntariness, encompassing the notion of free action in knowledge of the 
circumstances, are better considered as points across a spectrum of awareness rather 
than distinct mental states.  Knowledge, or perception of the circumstances in which 
                                                             
606 That the fault doctrines evolved gradually is consistent with the gradual transition from objective 
to subjective fault assessment and also the emergence of various defences which did not originate 
at the same time. 
607 See the discussion in ch 2. 
608 Ashworth identifies the relationship between voluntariness and the capacity of the individual for 
rational choice and says that since choice can only be exercised in the context of awareness of 
surrounding circumstances, belief as to what one is doing at the time of the act is central to the 
attribution of moral responsibility, this is what he calls the ‘belief principle’, Andrew Ashworth and 
Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (7th edn, OUP 2013) 156. 
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the act is done, must bear directly on the issue of foresight of consequence.  Thus, it 
is submitted that, in addition to the ambivalent use of the term mens rea, it is entirely 
possible that the enlargement of the concept may be symptomatic of the fact that the 





On the strength of scientific developments in the understanding of action, it is 
submitted that the traditional presumptions of fault, which were deemed to provide 
the essential link to the subjective mental state, beg comment in 2 respects.  First, it 
is clear that the mental and physical realms are not separate or severable and defy 
identification as distinct notions.  Accordingly, the perception of the presumptions as 
bridges providing access to the internal mental state was misconceived.  However, it 
is also the case that the manifest approach, implicitly adopted by the presumptions, 
more readily accords with today’s more sophisticated understanding of action.  Since 
the mental and physical are not severable, it is submitted that the observance of the 
conduct might point to a direct, holistic knowledge of the conduct in its totality.  
Indeed, further advances in neuroscience, discussed below, support such a 
proposition. 
 
4.4   Mirror neurons and the manifest approach to fault attribution 
 
The presumptions of fault implicitly recognised that the ‘mental state’, perhaps better 
described now as ‘blameworthiness’, was discernable only by reference to outward, 
physical behaviour.  This approach is not inconsistent with the modern, scientific 
understanding of action which fundamentally challenges the traditional actus reus / 
mens rea construct of crime.  However, whilst this research is not intended to 
advance the cutting-edge neuro-scientific account, yet more discoveries have been 
                                                             
609 Scientific theories provide an explanatory device that can account for the existence of mind 
without reducing or eliminating it, effectively making mind compatible with the physical. In 
accordance with emergentism, the mental is explained as a feature, at the system level, of the 
physical structure of the brain, and, causally speaking, there are not 2 independent phenomena 
comprising conscious effort and unconscious neuron firings.  Rather, there is just the ‘brain system’ 
which has one level of description when neuron firings are occurring and another level of 
description, the level of the system, where the system is conscious and indeed consciously trying to 
effect physical movement, Introduction to Giuseppe Vicari, ‘Beyond Conceptual Dualism: Ontology 
of Consciousness, Mental Causation, and Holism’ in John R Searle (ed), Philosophy of Mind (Value 
Enquiry 2008) 71. 
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made which bring exciting implications for the criminal law.  In essence, 
advancements have been made in the context of mirror neurons which have 
considerable potential to redefine the way in which an individual’s action is 
understood by others.  The startling science now emerging suggests that the manifest 
observance of another’s act does provide the observer with direct knowledge of it.   
 
Whilst the dualist challenge has always been to access the internal theatre of the 
actor’s mind, neuroscience now shows that sophisticated human cognitive abilities 
have their roots in a pre-linguistic, pre-conceptual and pragmatic understanding of 
the intentions and actions of other people.
610
  It is precisely this human ability to 
infer other people's mental states, such as intentions, emotions or desires, that 
provides an essential basis for successful social interaction by enabling the 
prediction of others most probable future acts.
611
  This primitive ability is embodied 
in particular areas of the prefrontal motor cortex where the same neurons that fire 
when a subject performs an intentional action also fire when the subject observes the 
same action performed by another.
612
  It is now established that the mirror neuron 
system is the mechanism by which people re-use their own mental states, or 
processes represented in bodily format, to functionally attribute it, the mental state, 
to others.  In this way it enables a direct appreciation of purpose without relying on 
                                                             
610
 G Rizzolatti et al, ‘Neurophysiological Mechanisms Underlying the Understanding and Imitation of 
Action’ (2001) 2 Nature Reviews Neuroscience 661 – 670; Giacoma Rizzolatti and Corrado Sinigaglia, 
Mirrors in the Brain (OUP 2008); G Rizzolatti and C Sinigaglia, ‘The Functional Role of the Parieto-
frontal Mirror Circuit: Interpretations and Misinterpretations’ (2010) 11Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience (2010) 264 – 274. 
611 Maren E Bodden et al, ‘Comparing the Neural Correlates of Affective and Cognitive Theory of 
Mind using fMRI: Involvement of the Basal Ganglia in Effective Theory of Mind’ (2013) 9, 1, Advances 
in Cognitive Psychology 32 – 43. 
612 Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia discovered the involvement of the parietal cortex during theory of mind 
processing, who specified the fronto-parietal mirror circuit. Initially observed in the monkey 
premotor cortex, research into the human mirror neuron system is now providing results.  The 
identification of mirror neurons not only enforces the thesis that action is not the result of pure 
perception and cognition, they have also been interpreted as the expression of a direct form of 
action understanding via embodied simulation, providing a unitary account of basic aspects of 
intersubjectivity Giuseppe Vicari, ‘Beyond Conceptual Dualism: Ontology of Consciousness, Mental 
Causation, and Holism’ in John R Searle (ed), Philosophy of Mind (Value Enquiry 2008), referring to 
Vittorio Gallese, ‘Mirror Neurons, Embodied Simulation and a Second-Person Approach to Mind 
Reading', (2013) 49(10) Cortex 2954 - 56.  The existence of the mirror mechanism is now firmly 
established in the human brain, see Kilner and others ‘Evidence of Mirror Neurons in Human Inferior 
Frontal Gyrus’ (2009) 29 (32), 10 Journal of Neuroscience153 – 59; Mukamel and others, ‘Single 
Neuron Responses in Humans During Execution and Observation of Actions’, (2010) 20 (8) Current 







 the internal simulation of others’ experiences by 
observation
614
 transforms visual information into knowledge.
615
   
 
Although the systematic investigation of affective and cognitive theory of mind has 
only recently started,
616
 it is suggested that there is a distinction of the level of 
processing which differentiates between a mirror and a mentalising system.
617
  This 
means that the ability can be further subdivided into affective and cognitive 
subcomponents, each of which can be affected individually or in combination.  The 
affective component recognises the feelings of another person
618
 and the cognitive 
infers the other’s mental states, for example his desires, beliefs, or intentions.  The 
mirror system
619
 engages when perceiving biological motion to ascertain the 
underlying intentions of the observed movement whilst the mentalising system
620
 
provides a more abstract inference of goals.  This system operates when there is no 
observable action of body parts and when intentions need to be inferred from 
abstract cues such as eye gaze, semantic information, facial expression, or 
knowledge about the situation.  Mentalizing and mirroring are thus the two processes 
                                                             
613 V Gallese, ‘The Manifold Nature of Interpersonal Relations: the Quest for a Common Mechanism’ 
(2003) 358 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B, 517 – 28; V Gallese and C 
Sinigaglia, ‘What is So Special with Embodied Simulation’, (2011) 15 Trends in Cognitive Sciences 512 
– 19. 
614  G Rizzolatti and others, ‘Neurophysiological Mechanisms Underlying the Understanding and 
Imitation of Action’ (2001) 2 Nature Reviews Neuroscience 661.  
615 G Rizzolatti and C Sinigaglia, ‘The Functional Role of the Parieto-frontal Mirror Circuit: 
Interpretations and Misinterpretations’ (2010) 11 Nature Reviews Neuroscience 264 – 274, 269.  
Neuroscientists suggest that the affective and cognitive theory of mind abilities recruit a network of 
brain structures, irrespective of the differentiation between its affective and cognitive 
subcomponents.   
616 Only a few functional imaging studies have compared both components to date, Maren E Bodden 
et al, ‘Comparing the Neural Correlates of Affective and Cognitive Theory of Mind using fMRI: 
Involvement of the Basal Ganglia in Effective Theory of Mind’, (2013) 9, 1 Advances in Cognitive 
Psychology 32 – 43. 
617 Van Overwalle F and Baetens K, ‘Understanding Others’ Actions and Goals by Mirror and 
Mentalizing Systems: A Meta-analysis’, (2009) 48 Neuralimage 564-584. 
618 M Schaefer et al, 'Mirror like Brain Responses to Observed Touch and Personality Dimensions', 
29th May 2013 Front Hum Neurosci 7:227.doi10.3389/fnhum.2013.00227 citing Bufalari and others, 
‘Empathy for Pain and Touch in the Human Somatosensory Cortex’ (2007) 17 Cereb Cortex 2553 – 
2561 who reported that somatosensory evoked potentials were modulated by the observation of 
attached hand with increased P 45 amplitudes during pain observation and decreased P 45 
amplitudes during touch observation.  Studies employing fMRI, magnetoencephalography, or TMS, 
transcranialmagnetic stimulation support the results of vicarious somatosensory activation when 
observing touch.   
619 This consists of the anterior intraparietal sulcus and the premotor cortex. 
620 This comprises the temporoparietal junction, the medial prefrontal cortex, and the precuneus. 
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used to access the mental states of others
621
 and, since multiple actions may be 
effected to achieve a specific result, it is suggested that the process is not a one-to-
one map between action and goal but a sophisticated process of many-to-many 
mapping.  Furthermore, it is recognised that goals are also context dependent such 




4.5   Mirror neurons and the assessment of collective action 
 
It is clear that the neuroscientific advances support the reliability of an observer’s 
assessment of action and the manifest approach to fault determination.  It is also the 
case that the actions to which the corresponding knowledge can relate are not 
confined to direct observance of the act in question but would clearly extend to the 
reconstruction of the act at trial, in addition to the act of the giving of evidence 
generally.  Whilst this is supportive of the manifest approach to criminality as 
expressed through the use of the fault presumptions, the discovery of mirror neurons 
also has some particularly interesting implications for a theory of intentionality in the 
specific context of collective action.
623
  It is suggested that they confirm that 
collective intentionality is the biologically primitive and prelinguistic condition of 
the possibility of collective and cooperative behaviour which cannot be reduced or 
eliminated in favour of something else.
624
  We are, it seems, innately ‘programmed’ 
to have direct knowledge of not just individual behaviour, but of collective 
behaviour too.  This particular discovery has led to the new discipline called ‘social 
neuroscience’ in which the mirror neuron system provides an explanation of the 
                                                             
621 It is recognised that there is a continuum from concrete to highly abstract goals and intentions 
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622 S Uithol, ‘What Do Mirror Neurons Mirror?’ (2011) Oct 24, 5 Philosophical Psychology 607 – 623 
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Whilst mirroring provides the means by which collective action is understood, it 
goes further still by explaining how collective power,
626
 encompassing collective 
intention,
627
 emerges.  Accordingly, neuroscience now provides direct scientific 
support for the proposition that a distinct organisational personality can emerge from 
the collective members.  To obtain such emergence of collective power, the 
individual momenta simply converge to a similar direction so that a collective 
momentum results.
628
  More specifically, to obtain collective action within groups of 
actors a mutual ‘tuning process’ occurs via the mirroring process. Thus, mirror 
neurons play an important role in both producing joint action and understanding it.
629
   
 
Neuro-scientific findings thus put beyond doubt the fact that organisational fault can 
be both manifestly attributed, by observing the behaviour of the collective, and also 
directly imposed.  It is submitted that this not only supports the proposition that 
corporations are responsibility-bearing actors in their own right, but it also obviates 
the need for a mechanism of fault attribution such as the identification principle.  
Since knowledge of the corporate behaviour is accessible to the observer, the 
manifest approach to the assessment of blameworthiness is equally as appropriate in 
the context of organisational behaviour as it is for that of individuals. 
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Computational Perspectives on the Emergence of Social Phenomena: Shared Understanding and 
Collective Power’ (2012) 8 Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence 168 – 191. 
629 Elisabeth Pacherie and Jerome Dokic, ‘From mirror neurons to joint actions’ (2006) 7 (2-3) June 
Cognitive Systems Research 101-112. 
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4.6   The paradox of the manifest 
 
It is evident that philosophy and science have found common ground through 
advancements in neuroscience and the discovery of the mirror neuron system in the 
brain.  Where philosophy had struggled to answer the dualist dilemma, the question 
of the mind / body divide, scientific endeavour provided potential answers.  
However, the criminal law’s continued commitment to the mental and physical 
distinction, articulated in the concepts of actus reus and mens rea (as they are now 
understood), is indicative of an institution which has thusfar refused to contemplate a 
more sophisticated theory of mind and action.  It is now accepted that action is not a 
thing capable of sub-division into mental and physical elements and it is therefore 
submitted that the criminal law’s continued attempt to do so is misguided.  A holistic 
approach to the assessment of conduct is more conducive to the modern 
understanding in which the body, brain and mental processes are intinsically 
interwoven and ontologically complete.  It is submitted that this analysis of action is 
more conceptually accommodating of the orthodox presumptions of fault which 
explicitly link the overt appearance of behaviour with the internal state.  Whilst the 
hint of a manifest assessment of fault might cause some initial discomfort in the 
subjectivist camp, the veracity of this approach is effectively shored-up by recent 
developments in neuro-science.  Paradoxically, the manifest approach is not manifest 
at all; the operation of the mirror neuron system providing direct knowledge of 
another’s behaviour. 
 
In view of this discovery, the orthodox presumptions of fault appear simply to 
express the fact that, in considering the totality of the behaviour, ‘common sense’ 
inferences might be drawn.  This has exciting implications for a theory of corporate 
criminality in which the presumptions provide a process for fault attribution which 
does not involve enquiry and emphasis on a metaphysical mental state which is, in 
any event, a non-severable.  Exciting as that may be, the newer social neuroscience 
discipline goes further still.  Not only does it go some way to explain how mirror 
neurons are involved in the production of collective action, it also demonstrates that 
they provide the observer knowledge of it.  The appropriateness of the manifest 
approach to the attribution of individual and corporate criminal liability is thus 




It is submitted that any remaining theoretical bars to either the manifest assessment 
of fault generally, or the realist approach to corporations specifically, must now be 
relinquished.  Given the scientific advancements that have taken place over the last 
couple of centuries, it is time the criminal law rejected its dualist model of 
criminality in favour of a more sophisticated appreciation of action.  As far as the 
assessment of individual wrongdoing is concerned, arguably what is required is little 
more than the return to a fully articulated presumptive approach to the assessment of 
conduct.  Conceptually, the explicit expression of the evidential link between the 
appearance of the behaviour and its blameworthiness would sufficiently 
acknowledge a more sophisticated understanding of action.  
 
More problematic, it would seem, is the introduction of a realist notion of 
organisations.  Although the concept is a familiar one, judicial commitment to the 
doctrine of precedent must be acknowledged together with the weight of authority in 
support of the fiction approach to corporate fault attribution.  It is therefore this 
aspect that the following chapter addresses in the form of a contextual and black 
letter law analysis of the development of the ‘identification principle’.  It is 
submitted that a reconsideration of authority in this area of law identifies that the 
earlier cases can be distinguished or shown to be ill-judged such that the obstacles to 














5.   Realism: back to the future 
 
It is at this point that, arguably, one of the most interesting findings to come from 
this research emerges.  Whilst modern neuroscience supports the recognition of a 
distinct collective entity in certain circumstances, a conceptual commitment to the 
realist theory of organisations is not new.  What neuroscience would ultimately 
demonstrate, other disciplines had long envisaged.  Indeed, it is a matter of some 
irony that what is now considered the landmark legal authority for the emergence of 
the fiction theory was actually a case decided in the midst of prevailing realist 
ideology.  The first articulation of the fictionist ‘identification principle’ of corporate 
liability is attributed to Viscount Haldane in the 1915 case of Lennards’ Carrying 
Company.
630
  What makes this authority particularly surprising is that Viscount 
Haldane was seemingly not bound by any earlier authority and, with a keen 
philosophical interest, he was very much attuned to realist theory.
631
    
 
Accordingly, this chapter sets out the philosophical and legal context in which the 
Lennard’s case
632
 was decided.  The first narrative deals with the broad general 
thinking of the time which, in essence, had moved from individualist theory to 
consider the significance and ontology of collective groups.  In this respect, a strong 
realist view of group activity is revealed.  The second narrative addresses 
specifically the common law, demonstrating a readiness to attribute corporate 
liability on the existing principles as they derived from master and servant law and 
agency doctrines. 
 
5.1   Realist theory 
 
Whilst individualism has remained the edifice of the criminal law, elsewhere holism 
                                                             
630 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd [1915] AC 705 (HL). 
631 In 1883, he published Essays in Philosophical Criticism, and in the same year, his translation of 
Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Idea. Other philosophical works include Pathway to 
Reality (1903), Reign of Relativity (1921), The Philosophy of Humanism (1922) and Selected 
Addresses and Essays (1928), see David Kahan’s introduction to Richard Burdon Haldane’s 1902-
1904 Gifford Lectures: The Pathway to Reality at 
<http://www.giffordlectures.org/Browse.asp?PubID=TPTPTR&Volume=O&Issue=O&ArticleID=6> 
accessed 15 May 2014.  Richard Burdon Haldane, The Pathway to Reality: Being the Gifford Lectures 
Delivered in the University of St Andrews in the Session 1902 – 1904 (Ulan Press 2012). 
632 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd [1915] AC 705 (HL). 
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is recognised as its conceptual pair.  For individualism to exist, individuals had to 
accept a supreme state that would protect individual property and thus transcend the 
rights and powers of the individual.
 633
  The 20
th
 century rise in holism emphasised 
notions of wholeness or collectiveness
634
 and the idea that the state, comprising the 
individuals who are its subjects, is more than the sum of its parts.
635
  However, in 
recognising that the analysis of social groups and structures needed to begin at the 
level of society or culture as a whole, the metaphor of the machine as a model for 
knowledge of life, mind and society was increasingly used.  This metaphor provoked 
a particularly strong reaction from those
636
 who considered society a sui generis 
reality, unique to itself and irreducible to its composing parts.
637





 for example, asserted that society was created when 
individual consciences interacted and fused together to create a synthetic reality that 
is completely new and greater than the sum of its parts.
639
  With what is called the 
‘collective consciousness’, he opined that collective groups ‘can be considered to 
possess agential capabilities: to think, judge, decide, act, reform; to conceptualise 
self and others as well as self’s actions and interactions; and to reflect’.
640
  
                                                             
633 It is said that here were 2 important moments in Western political and scientific thought, the first 
being the 17th century birth of individualism and then the 20th century rise of holism in the life and 
human sciences, Tom Otto and Nils Bubandt, Experiments in Holism, Theory and Practice in 
Contemporary Anthropology (Wiley-Blackwell 2010). 
634 The term ‘holism’ is attributable to the South African statesman Jan Christiaan Smuts.  Jan 
Christiaan Smuts, Holism and Evolution (Originally published 1926, Greenwood Press 1973). 
635
 Tom Otto and Nils Bubandt, Experiments in Holism: Theory and Practice in Contemporary 
Anthropology (Wiley-Blackwell 2010). 
636 Particularly in German-speaking countries, Tom Otto and Nils Bubandt, Experiments in Holism, 
Theory and Practice in Contemporary Anthropology (Wiley-Blackwell 2010). 
637 Emile Durkheim, De La Division Du Travail Social (1893), The Division Of Labour in Society (trans 
WD Halls, The Free Press 1984). 
638 E Durkheim (1858 – 1917). 
639 <https://www.iep.utm.edu/durkheim/internet> accessed 15 May 2014, encyclopaedia of 
philosophy.  Further, society, conceived as a collection of ideas, beliefs and sentiments of all sorts 
that are realised to individuals indicates a reality that is produced through the interaction of 
individuals, resulting in the fusion of consciences. 
640 Tom R Burns and Erik Engdahl, ‘The Social Construction of Consciousness, Part 1: Collective 
Consciousness and its Socio-Cultural Foundations’ (1998) 5(1) Journal of Consciousness Studies 72. 
The authors further their argument by reference to national behaviours during the Second World 
War in which different nations behaved differently towards their Jewish populations, according the 
the different collective consciousness, 77.  Of note, writing in 1912, Durkheim was not blind to the 
forces driving social disintegration which had been brought about by modernity. The institutions of 
the past, which had previously brought unity and cohesiveness, were now lost and this made way for 
what he called the new cult of the individual, the abstract conception of the autonomous actor 
endowed with rationality and born free and equal to all other individuals. In 1912 Durkheim wrote 
the old gods are raging or are already dead, and others are not yet born, Emile Durkheim, The 





 ‘holist’ analysis, published in 1907, 14 years after Durkheim’s 
sociological work, focused on the tendency in nature to form wholes that are greater 
than the sum of the parts through created evolution.
642
  According to his theory, the 
whole is in charge and all development and activity can only be properly understood 
when being viewed as a holistic character rather than as separate activities of special 
organs, or the separate products of special mental functions.
643
  Although framed in 
language strongly resonant of that of emergentism,
644
 his theory was not confined to 
the biological domain, and applied equally to human associations such as the 
State.
645
  As regards group wholes, Smuts observed that:  
 
  while the wholes may be mutually exclusive, their fields overlap and  
  penetrate and reinforce each other, and thus create an entirely new situation.   
  Thus we speak of the atmosphere of ideas, the spirit of a class, or the soul of  
  a people.  The social individuals as such remain unaltered, but the social  
  environment or field undergoes a complete change.  There is a multiplication  
  of force in the society or group owing to this mutual penetration of the  
  conjoint fields, which creates the appearance and much of the reality of a new  
                                                                                                                                                                            
analysis of the social disintegration of European society brought about by modernity. European 
society became profoundly deep structure to and the institutions animating mediaeval life 
disappeared. Society as a whole lost its former unity and cohesiveness and this rendered former 
beliefs and practices irrelevant. The big things of the past, the political, economic, social, and 
especially religious institutions, no longer inspired the enthusiasm they once did. Belief in God 
weakened and this brought a rejection of other elements of Christian doctrine, such as Christian 
morality and metaphysics which were being replaced by modern notions of justice and modern 
science. But no new gods were created to replace the old ones. Durkheim saw Europe as a society in 
a state of disaggregation with no bonds between individuals. Out of the chaos he saw the 
emergence of a new religion to guide the West, he called this the cult of the individual. The 
Durkheimian view of organisational culture was that “all consciousness of necessity resides in 
individual minds” but  that ‘it converges and coalesces to a dynamic process of interaction and so 
becomes exterior and constraining in the incontrovertible sense that individuals find themselves 
enmeshed in thick and unyielding webs of social pressure that leave little recourse but to join the 
crowd’, J Lincoln and D Guillot, ‘A Durkheimian View of Organisational Cultures’ in M Korczynski and 
others (eds), Social Theory at Work (OUP 2006). 
641 J Smuts (1870 – 1950). 
642 He observed that small units inevitably developed into bigger wholes, and they, in their turn, 
inevitably grew into ever larger structures without cessation.   Jan Christiaan Smuts, Holism and 
Evolution (Originally published 1926, Greenwood Press 1973). 
643 Jan Christiaan Smuts, Holism and Evolution (Greenwood Press 1973) 284. 
644 Ursula Goodenough and Terrence W Deacon, ‘The Sacred Emergence of Nature’  in Philip Clayton 
(ed), The Oxford Handbook of Religions and Science (OUP 2006) ch 50. 








5.2   Legal theory: the really fictitious fiction 
 
The juristic thinking of the same period was largely influenced by Otto von 
Gierke’s
647
 Das Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht
648
 in which he asserted that legal 
personality developed as recognition of real social fact as opposed to legal fiction.
649
   




 translated von Gierke’s work under the 
title Political Theories of the Middle Age.
652
  Similarly, a collection of essays 
published in a 1911 edition of the Law Quarterly Review agreed that the corporation 
was a creature of social fact, which preceded the creation of legal recognition and 





 observed that, ‘when a body of 20, or 2000, or 200,000 
men bind themselves together to act in a particular way for some common purpose, 
they create a body, which by no fiction of law, but by the very nature of things, 
differs from the individuals of whom it is constituted’.
655
   
 
Indeed, in 1905, just a decade before the landmark Lennards judgment,
656
 CT Carr 
had produced an encyclopaedic work on the topic of the law of corporations.  This 
was the result of Maitland’s request for a detailed exposition of English Group-life
657
 
                                                             
646 Jan Christiaan Smuts, Holism and Evolution (Originally published 1926, Greenwood Press 1973) 
339, ch 12. 
647 Otto Von Gierke (1841 – 1921). 
648 Berlin 1868-81.  This is translated as the German law of associations. 
649 David Foxton, ‘Corporate Personality in the Great War’ (2002) 118 LQR (July) 428-457. 
650 Frederic William Maitland, ‘Moral Personality and Legal Personality’ and ‘Trust and Corporation’ 
in HAL Fisher (ed), The Collected Papers of Frederick William Maitland (Cambridge University Press 
1911) vol III at 210 – 319, 321 - 440; William Martin Geldart, ‘Legal Personality’ (1911) 27 LQR 90; 
Frederick Pollock, ‘Theories of Corporations in Common Law’ (1911) LQR 219. 
651 FW Maitland (1850 – 1906). 
652 Otto Friedrich von Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age (trans Frederic William Maitland, 
Cambridge University Press 1913). 
653 David Foxton, ‘Corporate Personality in the Great War’ LQR (2002) 118 LQR (July) 428-457. 
654 AV Dicey (1835 – 1922). 
655 Quoted by Frederic William Maitland in, ‘Moral Personality and Legal Personality’ in HAL Fisher 
(ed), The Collected Papers of Frederick William Maitland (Cambridge University Press 1911) vol III,  
304 referring to the Sidgwick lecture 1910.  
656
 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd [1915] AC 705 (HL). 
657 Cecil Thomas Carr, The General Principles of the Law of Corporations (Yorke prize essay 1902, 
Cambridge University Press 1905). 
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to match the German equivalent written by Dr von Gierke.
658
  This comprehensive 
work on the law of corporations drew together much of Maitland’s earlier material to 
demonstrate the nature and attributes of the corporation and the steps by which it had 
reached the then present legal form.
659
  Whilst identifying that the origin of corporate 
liability was vicarious in nature, grounded as it was in the law of master and servant 
and principal and agent,
660
 Carr endorsed the prevailing realist philosophy, 
remarking that, ‘it may be worthwhile to reflect that the morality of all is not always 
identical with the morality of its constituent members: collectiveness has its effect 
upon conduct’.
661
  Of realism he pronounced that it: 
 
  reminds us that, in dealing with the Corporation, we are, after all, dealing   
  with a body of men of flesh and blood, and a body which has a recognised  
  personality, capacity, and will of its own.  The will is hardly less real because  
  it is the group will; the person hardly less real because it is a group person  
  (...) there comes a time when the fictions fail to satisfy.
662
   
 
He also quoted with approval Maitland’s prediction that, ‘Someday the historian 
may have to tell you that the really fictitious fiction of English law was, not that its 
Corporation was a person, but that its unincorporated body was no person’.
663
   
 
Carr evidenced the wide field that had been long occupied by various forms of 
corporations
664
 which included different: 
 
  churches, universities, village communities, the manor, the township, the  
  counties and hundreds, the chartered boroughs, the gild, the inns of court, the  
                                                             
658 Otto Friedrich Von Gierke, Das Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht (1866). 
659
 Cecil Thomas Carr, The General Principles of the Law of Corporations (Cambridge University Press 
1905). 
660 Derived from a time when the servant was a slave with no persona, the relationship between 
master and servant was therefore not distinguished from that of principal and agent. 
661 Cecil Thomas Carr, The General Principles of the Law of Corporations (Cambridge University Press 
1905) 105. 
662 Cecil Thomas Carr, The General Principles of the Law of Corporations (Cambridge University Press 
1905) 180. 
663 Frederic William Maitland, ‘Political Theories of the Midde Age, Introduction’ xxxiv in Cecil 
Thomas Carr, The General Principles of the Law of Corporations (Cambridge University Press 1905). 
194.  Indeed, it should be noted that the landmark judicial decision in Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 
22 (HL) was itself the product of the realist influence. 
664 Described as the English ‘Fellowship’ and association. 
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  merchant adventurers, the militant 'companies' of English condottieri, the  
  trading companies, the companies that become colonies, the companies that  
  make war, the friendly societies, the trade unions, the clubs, the group that  
  meets at Lloyd's coffeehouse, the group that becomes the stock exchange,  
  and so on even to the one-man company, the Standard Oil Trust and the  
  South Australian statutes for communistic villages.
665
   
The corporate form had been an intrinsic and long-standing part of the architecture 
of society since the Middle Ages
666
 and it was recognised in 2 forms, the corporation 
sole and the corporation aggregate.
667
  Carr included a detailed analysis of the 
development of both the civil and criminal liability of corporations.  Of note, it was 
within the civil law context that the issue of attributing liability to a corporation, and 
whether malice could be imputed, had been argued.
668
  The submissions made in a 
                                                             
665 Otto Friedrich von Gierke, Political Theories in the Middle Age, (trans Maitland FW, Cambridge 
University Press 1913) translator’s Introduction, xxvii. 
666 HAL Fisher (ed), The Collected Papers of Frederick William Maitland (Cambridge University Press 
1911) vol 3. This was the result of the influence of Roman law towards the end of the Middle Ages. 
667 The corporation thus constituted the offical character of the holder for the time being of the 
same office or the common interest of the persons who for the time being were adventures in the 
same undertaking, into an artificial person or ideal subject of legal capacities and duties, HAL Fisher 
(ed), The Collected Papers of Frederick William Maitland (Cambridge University Press 1911) vol 3, 
referring to Sir F Pollock’s explanation in his book on Contract. 
668 As regards the potential for civil liability, the earliest view had been articulated in the religious 
context and Pope Innocent III’s declaration of 1245 in which he forbade the excommunication of 
corporations on the basis that “they have neither minds nor souls: they cannot sin”, by a decree at 
the first Council of Lyons (1245) Pope Innocent III made this declaration, see Cecil Thomas Carr, The 
General Principles of the Law of Corporations (Yorke prize essay 1902, Cambridge University Press, 
1905) 73.  It was from this ecclesiastical context that lawyers were later to set out the 
generalproposition that corporations were incapable of malice or intention.  Later, in the 15th 
century, a year-book of Henry VI stated that a dean and chapter ‘cannot have predecessor nor 
successor, they cannot commit treason, be outlawed or excommunicated, for they have no soul', X 
Rep 32b.  A further expression of the sinlessness and soullessness of corporations can be found in 
the classic passage in Coke’s Report of the case of Sutton's Hospital in 1612, [1558-1774] All ER Rep 
11 at 13, see Cecil Thomas Carr, The General Principles of the Law of Corporations (Yorke prize essay 
1902, Cambridge University Press 1905) 76.  This case involved the validity of a bequest to this 
charitable corporation, in which Coke said, ‘The Corporation is only in abstracto, and rests only in 
intendment and consideration of the law.  It is invisible and immortal.’  However, this view was not 
settled and, in dissent, Lord Blackburn responded, ‘I quite agree that a corporation cannot, in one 
sense, commit a crime – a corporation cannot be imprisoned, if imprisonment be the sentence for 
the crime; a corporation cannot be hanged or put to death, if that be punishment for the crime; and 
so, in those senses a corporation cannot commit a crime. But a corporation may be fined; and a 
corporation may pay damages’, Pharmaceutical Society v The London and Provincial Supply 
Association [1874-80] 5 App Cas 857 (HL), 869.  Thereafter, it took a series of cases between 1880 
and 1904 to finally develop the principle of corporate liability in civil actions, Eastern Counties Rly Co 
v Broom (1851) 6 Ex 314; Whitfield v SE Rly Co (1858) 27 LT QB 229; Green v London General 
Omnibus Company (1859) 7 CBNS 290; Barwick v English Joint-Stock Bank (1867)LR 2 Exch 259; 
Henderson v M Rly Co (1871) 24 LTNS 881; Bank of New South Wales v Owston (1879) (JC) 4 App Cas 
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line of cases culminated in the court’s acceptance that malice could be imputed
669
 to 
a corporation with reasoning such as that of Chief Baron Kelly in 1871, ‘If they 
[corporations] are not to be liable for the abuse of this power, they are given a power 
to commit acts of oppression to an extension of the nature really fearful to 
contemplate’.
670
  Similarly, in 1886, Lord Fitzgerald had expressed his opinion in 
this way, ‘I shall only say of corporations, and of these trading corporations 
especially, that I have often heard it observed that they certainly are very frequently 
without conscience and sometimes very malicious’.
671
   Darling J. in the 1899 case of 
Cornford v Carlton Bank held that: 
  If malice in law were synonymous with malice in French – a sort of esprit  
  tinged with ill nature – I should entirely agree [with L Bramwell].  In such a  
  sense a Corporation would be as incapable of malice as wit.  But of malice –  
  actual malice – in a legal sense, I think a corporation is capable.
672
   
Indeed, according to Carr, the 1901 Taff Vale Railway case provided evidence that, 
in accordance with realist theory, the law also recognised the unincorporated 




 The now infamous case involved an action by the Railway Company against the 
unincorporated trade union in relation to the activities of its members.
674
  Finding in 
favour of the Railway Company, the House of Lords gave clear endorsement to the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
270; Edwards v Midland Rly (1880) 6 QBD 287, (1880) 50 LJ (QB) 281; Abrath v NE Rly Co (1886) 11 
App Cas 250; Kent v Courage and Co Ltd (1890) JP 55, 264; Cornford v Carlton Bank (1899) 1 QB 392-
5. 
669 The following civil cases are discussed, Pharmaceutical Society v The London and Provincial Supply 
Association [1874-80] 5 App Cas 857; Eastern Counties Rly Co v Broom (1851) 6 Ex 314; Whitfield v SE 
Rly Co (1858) 27 LT QB 229; Green v London Gen Omnibus Company (1859)7 CBNS 290; Barwick v 
English Joint-Stock Bank,LR 2 Exch 259; Henderson v M Rly Co (1871) 24 LTNS 88; Bank of New South 
Wales v Owston (1879) (JC) 4 App Cas 270; Edwards v Midland Rly (1880) 50 LJ (QB) 28; Abrath v NE 
Rly Co (1886) 11 App Cas 250; Kent v Courage and Co Ltd (1890) JP 55, 264; Cornford v Carlton Bank 
[1899] 1 QB 392; Citizens Life Assurance Company v Brown [1904] AC 423. 
670 Henderson v M Rly Co (1871) 24 LTNS 881. Baron Bramwell also gave judgment in this case and 
others in which he strenuously denied that corporations could be malicious. 
671 Abrath v NE Rly Co (1886) 11 App Cas 250, 254. 
672 Cornford v Carlton Bank [1899] 1 QB 392. 
673
 Cecil Thomas Carr, The General Principles of the Law of Corporations (Yorke prize essay 1902, 
Cambridge University Press 1905) 192. 
674 Taff Vale Rly Co v Amalgamated Society of Rly Servants [1901] AC 426 (HL). 
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realist approach which was prevalent at the time:
675
   
 
  The principle on which corporations have been held liable in respect of  
  wrongs committed by servants or agents in the course of their service and for  
  the benefit of the employer – qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus -  
  (see Mersey docks and Gibbs (1866) LR 1 HL 93) is as applicable to the case  
  for trade union as to that of the Corporation.  If the contention of the  
  defendant society were well founded, the legislature has authorised the  
  creation of numerous bodies of men capable of owning great wealth and of  
  acting by agents with absolutely no responsibility for the wrongs that they  
  may do to other persons by the use of that wealth and the employment of  
  those agents (...) [See Mersey Docks case LR1 HL 120] It would require  
  very clear and express words of enactment to induce me to hold that the  
  legislature had in fact legalised the existence of such irresponsible bodies  




Lord Halsbury, then Lord Chancellor, issued an opinion, with which Lord 
MacNaghten concurred, stating that, ‘'if the legislature has created a thing which can 
own property, which can employ servants, and which can inflict injury, it must be 
taken, I think, to have implicitly given the power to make it suable in a court of law 
for injuries purposely done by its authority and procurement’.
677
 
                                                             
675 Taff Vale Rly Company v Amalgamated Society of Rly Servants [1901] AC 426 (HL).  Of note, 
Haldane, as King’s Counsel, acted for the trade union and his submissions in the Court of Appeal had 
centred on the proposition that a society could not be sued unless it was incorporated, or the 
legislature had said it could be sued as if it were incorporated.  The ability of a trade union to hold 
property was facilitated by vesting it in the trustees, Trade Unions Act 1871, s 8; Trade Unions Act 
1876, ss 3, 4 and it could not be inferred that the legislature intended to treat a trade union as if it 
were a corporate body.   Further, although the union had no legal entity and it may be practically 
impossible to sue the members, the plaintiffs could not shortcut suing them by suing the registered 
name of the trade union instead.  For their part, the plaintiffs contended that the status of trade 
union, created in the Trade Union Act 1871 contemplated an entity with perpetual succession, a 
body entitled to hold funds and therefore a legal entity irrespective of incorporation.  In the event, 
Haldane KC’s arguments prevailed; A L Smith, MR, stated that there must be some statute enabling 
an action to be maintained in the name of the society.  However, the House of Lords reversed the 
decision by analogy to the tortious liability of corporations. See the comments of David Foxton, 
‘Corporate Personality in the Great War’ (2002) 118 LQR (July) 428 - 457. 
676 Taff Vale Rly Company v Amalgamated Society of Rly Servants [1901] AC 426 (HL) 430 (J Farwell). 
677 Taff Vale Rly Company v Amalgamated Society of Rly Servants [1901] AC 426 (HL) 436.  In 
retrospect, however, the House of Lords decision in Taff Vale, recognising the collectivity as a social 
fact, produced ramifactions that cannot be understated.  If it was, as suggested, a politically 




Maitland observed that when the House of Lords found that the trade union could be 
liable for the acts of it members, it involved a recognition that questions of identity 
could not be detached from questions of responsibility, if they are to have a life of 




In contrast to the civil law, however, Carr observed that corporate liability had been 
‘readily brought home by the criminal law’.
679
  He pointed to civic communities and 
cities, endowed with corporate status, which were subject to punishment for failing 
to repair roads and bridges, almshouses and grammar schools.
680
  The punishment of 
the body was effected by fine and if further forms of sanction were needed, the 
crown could take away some of its civic privileges or even curtail its civic 
existence.
681
  Further, referring Pollock,
682
 Carr stated that corporate liability could 
be vicarious,
683
 noting that the principle pervaded the whole of English law where 
                                                                                                                                                                            
government, it’s ironic consequence to shift massive public support to the Labour party and had this 
not been the case, history may have taken an altogether different course, KD Ewing, ‘The Politics of 
the British Constitution’ (2000) PL Autumn 405.  The Trade Disputes Act 1906 was enacted in an 
atttempt to shore up the political damaged effected through the Taff Vale decision and the judges, 
especially the Law Lords, were set to exit from areas of appelate process that appeared to involve 
policy-making, Robert Stevens, Law And Politics, The House of Lords As A Judicial Body, 1800 – 1976 
(Wydenfelt and Nicholson 1978) 69. 
678 Otto Friedrich von Gierke, Political Theories in the Middle Age, (trans Maitland FW, Cambridge 
University Press 1913) translator’s Introduction, xxii. 
679
 Carr explains that the punishment of the individual criminal was, in early times, effected by 
threatening punishment to a group of individuals. In the days when the modern system of police was 
as yet unknown, the group of men was made answerable for the doings of the man. He said that 
there was the 'view of frank pledge', 18 Edw II: Stephen, General View of Criminal Law, 10: Stubbs, 
Constitutional History I, 87: Maitland, Gloucester Pleas XXXI etc. In the maturity of the system all 
men were bound to combine themselves into associations of 10, each of whom were security for the 
good behaviour of the rest. Consequently lawyers were early familiarised with the notions of making 
a company of men liable to criminal proceedings. These companies were in no sense corporations, 
the procedure not aimed at an impersonal artificial entity, aimed rather at any members of the 
group who appeared sufficiently substantial to pay a fine, Cecil Thomas Carr, The General Principles 
of the Law of Corporations (Yorke prize essay 1902, Cambridge University Press 1905) 87. 
680 The punishment of the body was effected by amercement, a fine. 
681 What the crown had given, it could take away; charters could be forfeited, commercial 
advantages abolished, elected mayors and magistrates could be deposed and replaced by Royal 
lieutenants, Cecil Thomas Carr, The General Principles of the Law of Corporations (Yorke prize essay 
1902, Cambridge University Press 1905) 87 – 88. 
682 F Pollock (1845 – 1937). 
683 It is submitted that where liability is imposed vicariously, it is on a fiction basis rather than in 
accordance with the realist theory of organisations.  However, such an observation may as much 
reflect the fact that the master and servant relationship was the precurser to the corporate 
employer and that as the law of master and servant developed there was no reason to allude to 
theories of realism which only became relevant where there was collective action. 
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the wrong is committed in the course of service and for the master’s benefit.
684
   
 
Whilst the literature reveals some disagreement about the development of the 
criminal law in the specific context of the trading corporation,
685
 it is generally 
                                                             
684 Laugher v Pointer (1826) 5 B&C 554 cited by Cecil Thomas Carr, The General Principles of the Law 
of Corporations (Yorke prize essay for the year 1902, Cambridge University Press 1905) 97.  In 
support, he quoted Lord Justice Rigby in Dyer v Munday (1895) 1 QBD 748 who had said, ‘I can find 
no authority for distinguishing in the application of this rule between tortious and criminal acts of 
the servant’. 
685 Notwithstanding Carr’s encyclopaedic analysis, academic accounts have focused on the 
attribution of criminal liability to the corporate form exclusively in the context of the commercial 
trading entity.  On this narrow perspective, Brickey asserts that the general view in the early 16th 
and 17th centuries was that corporations simply could not be held criminally liable, see Kathleen F 
Brickey, ‘Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation’ 60 Wash ULQ 393, 
396 giving as an example 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries 476.  This seems to have the support 
of the infamous case of 1701 in which Lord Holt is reported to have said that a ‘corporation is not 
indictable, but the particular members of it are’, Anonymous Case (No 935) (1701) 88 Eng Rep 1518, 
1518 (KB 1701).  It should be noted that the case report comprises just this one sentence and Lord 
Holt’s reasoning cannot be ascertained.  Whilst the distinction between civil and criminal law cannot 
be understood in the same way it is today, it is said that this precedent was still authoritative in the 
mid-19th century, notwithstanding there were recognised exceptions, see Leigh LH, The Criminal 
Liability of Corporations in English Law 1-12 (LSC Research Monographs, Nowe and Brydone Ltd 
1969).  Kanna and Coffee, for example, submit that there were a number of  obstacles to the courts 
finding corporate liability in the 1700s which included the thinking that corporations could not be 
morally blameworthy, See Khanna VS, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?’ 
(1996) 109 Harv L Rev 1477 and John Collins Coffee Jr, ‘Corporate Criminal Responsibility’ in Sanford 
H Kadish (ed), Encyclopaedia of Crime and Justice (Aspen 1983) 253. An additional obstacle was the 
ultra vires doctrine which meant that the courts would not hold corporations accountable for acts 
not provided for in their charters, the fictional corporate entity had no mind and no body, and later 
it was said that, other than charter corporations, they were creatures endowed with the limited 
powers that were specified by the incorporating statute or the enabling provisions of the Companies 
Act by the objects set out in the memorandum of association.  Powers were never explicitly 
conferred enabling corporations to commit crimes, therefore, such acts were ultra vires, see LH 
Leigh, The Criminal Liability of Corporations in English Law 1-12 (LSC Research Monographs, Nowe 
and Brydone Ltd 1969) 8-9; John Collins Coffee Jr, ‘Corporate Criminal Responsibility’ in Sanford H 
Kadish (ed), Encyclopaedia of Crime and Justice (Aspen 1983).  Similarly, as a matter of procedure, 
the accused had to be physically brought before the court, LH Leigh, The Criminal Liability of 
Corporations in English Law 1-12 (LSC Research Monographs, Nowe and Brydone Ltd 1969) 9-12;  
Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part (2nd edn, Stevens & Sons 1961) 855 - 57.  Thus, 
prior to the 19th Century, commercial trading corporations lay outside the scope of the criminal law 
institution, as it then was, because prisoners were required to stand at the bar in person and they 
could not be represented by lawyers, JWC Turner, Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law (18th edn, 
Cambridge Uni Press 1962); Anonymous Case (No 935) (1701) 88 ER 1518, note, by Holt CJ. Finally, as 
corporations could act only through officers and not in propria persona, liability had to be vicarious 
and, according to Leigh, it was a fundamental principle of English common law that a person could 
not be held vicariously liable for the crimes of another, Leigh LH, The Criminal Liability of 
Corporations in English Law (LSC Research Monographs, Nowe and Brydone Ltd 1969) 3; R v Huggins 
(1730) 2 Ld Raym 1574.  That being said, Leigh did recognise exceptions to what he described as the 
general rule which were developed by analogy with the established master/servant doctrine in the 
context that a local authority could be held vicariously liable for the strict liability common law 
offence of public nuisance. Arguably, Leigh is mistaken in this respect given that the corporations 
themselves were under a duty. Others note the reluctance of the criminal law to adopt the doctrine. 
It was argued that such a move would be contrary to the criminal law’s aim of punishing only the 
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agreed that proceedings alleging public nuisance were some of the earliest to 
influence the criminal law’s development.  Of note, public nuisance was, in 
substance, a civil matter albeit technically framed as a criminal offence.
686
  The 
offence would be committed when the local authority failed in its duty to maintain 







  Although not based on vicarious liability, since the 
corporation itself was under the duty to perform the act in question,
688
 it was in this 
way that, by the mid-19
th
 Century, the courts began to accept that a trading company 
could be convicted of a criminal offence.
689
  Thus, in the Birmingham and 
Gloucester Railway case of 1842
690
 the company was indicted for a ‘non-feasance’ 
and in 1846 the Great North of England Railway Company (1846)
691
 was indicted 
for a positive act, misfeasance by public nuisance
692
.  It was in this case that Denman 
C.J. famously remarked: 
 
  there can be no effectual means for deterring from an oppressive exercise of  
  power for the purpose of gain, except the remedy by an indictment against  
  those who truly commit it – that is, the Corporation, acting by its majority:  
  and there is no principle which places them beyond the reach of the law for  
  such proceedings.
693
   
 
Although the observation was made in the context of a breach of a statutory duty, 
Carr identified that it had landmark importance in that it had ‘fixed the attitude of the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
morally culpable, where fault rested on vicarious, not personal, guilt. See Sanford H Kadish, 
‘Developments in the Law – Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behaviour Through Criminal 
Sanctions’ (1979) 92 Harv L Rev 1227, 1231 - 42 for a discussion of arguments relating to moral 
blameworthiness and James R Elkins, ‘Corporations and the Criminal Law: An Uneasy Alliance’ (1976) 
65 Ky L J 73, 97; Laski HJ, ‘The Basis of Vicarious Liability’ (1916) 26 Yale LJ 105, 130-134. 
686 See R v Stephens (1866) LR 1 QB 702 
687
 For example, Case of Langforth Bridge 79 ER 919, (1634) Cro Car 365; R v Inhabitants of Great 
Broughton, 98 ER 418, (1771) 5 Burr 2700. 
688 Elkins JR, ‘Corporations and the Criminal Law: An Uneasy Alliance’ (1976) 65 Ky LJ 73, 87 - 88; 
John Collins Coffee Jr, ‘Corporate Criminal Responsibility’ in Sanford H Kadish (ed), Encyclopaedia of 
Crime and Justice 253, 253 - 4 (Aspen 1983). 
689 R v Birmingham and Gloucester Rly Co 114 ER 492, (1842) 3 QB 223; R v Great North of England 
Rly Co, 115 ER 1294, (1846) 9 QB 315. 
690 R v Birmingham  and Gloucester Rly Co 114 ER 492, (1842) 3 QB 223 
691 R v Great North of England Rly Co 115 ER 1294, (1846) 9 QB 315. 
692 See Winn CRN, ‘The Criminal Responsibility of Corporations’ (1927-1929) 3 CLJ 398, 399 who says 
that the courts were compelled to recognise a like responsibility for acts done in breach of statutory 
duty as no satisfactory disctinction could be drawn between an act and an omission. 
693 R v Great North of England Rly Co 115 ER 1294, (1846) 9 QB 315, 327. 
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criminal law towards corporations’.
694
  The potential for corporate prosecution had 
been expressly provided earlier in that statutory reference to a ‘person’ would 
include a corporate personality, unless a contrary legislative intention appeared.
695
  
Thereafter, in 1880 the House of Lords reviewed the scope of the criminal law in 
relation to corporate entities and, by way of limitation, found that an artificial person 
still could not commit treason, felony or a misdemeanour involving personal 
violence.
696
  Writing in 1902, 2 decades later, Carr observed that if corporations ‘can 
have a mens rea their criminal liability is almost unbounded’.
697
   
 
However, whilst acceptance of the realist nature of organisations was seemingly not 
in doubt at the outset of the 20
th
 century, it must be acknowledged that the decided 
cases point to a corporate liability based on vicarious principles established in the 
context of master and servant law and agency.  It is to be conceded that, whilst at 
first blush these theories appear to make for incompatible bed-fellows, they are not 
mutually exclusive.  In this respect, it is submitted that the realist notion of groups is 
not to be doubted, but that the limited factual situations in which the law had been 
brought into play concerned examples of wrongful conduct readily attributable to 
identifiable individuals.  Accordingly, ‘corporate’ liability was found on the long-
standing principles of vicarious liability and it is simply the case that, during this 
period, instances of corporate conduct which might transgress the Harding ‘tipping 
point’
698
 were yet to have come about.   
 
                                                             
694 Cecil Thomas Carr, The General Principles of the Law of Corporations (Yorke prize essay 1902, 
Cambridge University Press 1905) 96. In particular, Carr foresaw the possibility of the courts 
extending a corporation’s criminal liability to manslaughter where negligence causes death.  
695
 Criminal Law Act 1827, s14.  The Interpretation Act of 1889 also reinforced judicial recognition 
that corporations could be held criminally culpable.  Having already noted the distinct categorisation 
of statutory and common law offences, whether the same attitude also extended to common law 
offences is not clear. 
696 Pharmaceutical Society v London & Provincial Supply Association [1874 – 1880] 5 App Cas 857 
(HL). 
697 Cecil Thomas Carr, The General Principles of the Law of Corporations (Yorke prize essay 1902, 
Cambridge University Press 1905) 98 and citing Stephens v Robert Reid and Co Ltd, 28 Victorian law 
reports 82; Lawler v P and H Egan Limited (1901) 2 Ir R 589; R v Panton 14 Victorian law reports 836.  
Presumably Carr is here referring to common law offences, since the presumption of mens rea 
applied only to them. 




Indeed, in 1904, in a case dealing with the common law offence of malicious libel,
699
 
the Privy Council strongly reaffirmed that principles of agency law applied as 
equally to corporations as they did to individuals, such that corporate liability would 
be vicarious: 
 
  If it is once granted that corporations are for civil purposes to be regarded as  
  persons, i.e., as principals acting by agents and servants, it is difficult to see  
  why the ordinary doctrines of agency and of master and servant are not to be  
  applied to corporations as well as to ordinary individuals.  These doctrines  
  have been so applied in a great variety of cases, in questions arising out of  
  contract, and in questions arising out of torts and frauds; and to apply them to  
  one class of libels and to deny their application to another class of libels on  
  the ground that malice cannot be imputed to a body corporate appears to their  
  Lordships to be contrary to sound legal principles. To talk about imputing  
  malice to corporations appears to their Lordships to introduce metaphysical  




Furthermore, the 1910 edition of Archbold’s practitioner text set out the general 
principles of corporate criminality as they were then understood.
701
  Affirming the 
limitations identified earlier,
702
 it listed the decided instances in which corporations 
had been indicted, namely non-feasance and misfeasance of public duties and the 
common law libel offences.  However, this exhaustive rehearsal can be read 
alongside Carr’s earlier analysis which indicated that the scope of corporate liability 
was effectively much broader, based as it was on the general principle of vicarious 
responsibility.  Of note, Carr observed that, ‘We have therefore arrived at the 
valuable idea that, if employers were not liable for the wrong done by their servants 
                                                             
699 A common law offence, the punishment was set out in Libel Act 1843, s 5 see William Feilden 
Craies and Henry Delacombe Roome, Archbold’s Criminal Pleading, Evidence & Practice (24th edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell 1910) 1236. 
700 Citizens Life Assurance Company Ltd v Brown [1904] AC 423 (PC) Aus (Lord Lindley). 
701 William Feilden Craies and Henry Delacombe Roome, Archbold’s Criminal Pleading, Evidence & 
Practice (24th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1910) 7. 
702
 An artificial person could not commit treason, felony or a misdemeanour involving personal 




it would be impossible to bring charges home to a corporation’.
703
  It is thus evident 
that the imposition of corporate liability was not limited by any supervening 
doctrine, the corporate employer being treated as individual masters and principals 
alike. 
 
5.3   Viscount Haldane L.C.’s realist philosophy 
 
The snapshot of both the philosophical and legal contexts in which the landmark 
Lennard’s judgment was delivered makes it a surprising decision, seemingly going 
against both the theoretical tide and the court’s willingness to inculpate corporations.  
Arguably, what makes it even more questionable is the fact that it was also decided 
in the absence of any binding precedent.  The fictionist approach to organisations 
that it is said to herald, therefore emerged in contradiction to both the prevailing 
theoretical landscape and the black letter law. 
 
Of note, Viscount Haldane L.C., who is reputed with first articulating the ‘directing 
mind fiction theory, was also something of a philosopher himself.
704
 Profoundly 
influenced by the German thinkers, it is a matter of some irony that he himself held 
strong ‘realist’ beliefs.
705
  Although he was called to the bar in 1879,
706
 Haldane 
nonetheless maintained his philosophical interest and in 1883 he published Essays in 
Philosophical Criticism in addition to his translation of Schopenhauer’s The World 
as Will and Idea.  Other philosophical works Haldane produced include Pathway to 
Reality (1903), Reign of Relativity (1921), The Philosophy of Humanism (1922) 
and Selected Addresses and Essays (1928).
707
  Illustrative of the influence of the 
                                                             
703 Cecil Thomas Carr, The General Principles of the Law of Corporations (Yorke prize essay 1902, 
Cambridge University Press 1905) 104. 
704
 As a teenager, Haldane had lost the faith shared by his deeply religious parents and had become 
interested in a mixture of philosophy, theology, natural science and the idealism of TH Green and 
Georg Hegel, see John T Saywell, The Lawmakers: Judicial Power and the Shaping of Canadian 
Federalism (Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, University of Toronto Press 2002).  
However, notwithstanding his publishing success, the New Statesman remarked that he was “a 
Hegelian who never understood Hegel, ‘The Haldane Paradox’, The New Statesman, 25 August 1928, 
30.  At 18 years of age he spent 6 months studying philosophy and geology in Gottingen, Germany 
and later won prizes and scholarships in philosophy at Edinburgh University. 
705 Richard Burdon Haldane, An Autobiography (Hodder and Stoughton 1929). 
706 Law and philosophy merged in his interest in jurisprudential cases and by 1882, he was appearing 
before the judicial committee of the Privy Council and before the House of Lords. 
707 David Kahan’s introduction to Richard Burdon Haldane’s 1902-1904 Gifford Lectures: The 
Pathway to Reality at 
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German realist theories of organisations, in book 1, lecture 2 of the Gifford series, 
for example, Viscount Haldane L. C. observed:  
 
  In life we have in the organism this remarkable feature, that the life of the  
  whole is present in each of the parts (...)  But this whole of life does not in its  
  work resemble a cause operating, ab extra, upon the organism, but is more  
  like, more really analogous to, the purpose which the soldiers in an army or  
  the citizens in a State are moved by when they act together.  The cells of the  
  body, the cells which make up the totality of the organism, act together  
  purposively, or quasi-purposively, which is a better expression—and I refer  
  to them in order to illustrate to you how really the analogy of the actual  
  purpose of living beings, acting together in a regiment or in a State, is a  





In his second book, Viscount Haldane L.C. again referred to the notion of a 
collective purpose or intention: 
  The great result which modern Biology has achieved, lies in the  
  demonstration that the living organism is an aggregate of the living units  
  which are often called cells.  But the aggregate is no mechanical aggregate.   
  The cells are less like marbles in a heap than like free citizens living in a  
  state.  They act for the fulfilment of a common end, which continues so long  
  as the life of the organism continues, and the fulfilment of which appears to 








                                                                                                                                                                            
<http://www.giffordlectures.org/Browse.asp?PubID=TPTPTR&Volume=O&Issue=O&ArticleID=6> 
accessed 15 May 2014. 
708 Viscount Richard Burdon Haldane, The Pathway to Reality: Being the Gifford Lectures delivered in 
the University of St Andrews in the Session 1902 -1904 (Ulan Press 2012) bk 1, lec 2. 
709 Viscount Richard Burdon Haldane, The Pathway to Reality: Being the Gifford Lectures delivered in 
the University of St Andrews in the Session 1902 -1904 (Ulan Press 2012) bk 2, lec 3. 
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5.4   Summary 
 
The ascription of vicarious liability
710
 may not necessarily be compatible with realist 
theory but neither is it fatal to it.  The fact that the liability incurred in the early cases 
was vicarious in nature does not weaken the realist theory.  That an organisation has 
the potential to act autonomously does not lead to the conclusion that it can never be 
held responsible for the acts of its members when they are acting on behalf of the 
organisation.  Rather, the issue goes to Professor Harding’s tipping point in the 
spectrum of behaviour and the location of the emergence of the distinct corporate 
personality.
711
  Whilst the contemporary theorists recognised the realist potential of 
organisations, the particular facts of the reported cases happened to engage rules of 
vicarious attribution, concerning, as they did, the relationship of the criminal conduct 
of individual employees with that of the employer.  The nature of the corporation 
and the mode by which it may attract criminal fault are thus separate issues.  
Accordingly, this research recognises both the realist nature of the collective group, 
                                                             
710 Indeed, the basis of vicarious liability itself remains contraversial and there is still disagreement as 
to whether it means that the master is responsible for the servant or whether the servant’s acts are 
those of the master himself, Celia Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (2nd ed, OUP 2001) 
referring to Glanville Williams, ‘Vicarious Liability: Tort of the Master or of the Servant?’ (1956) LQR 
72:522; Brent Fisse, ‘The Distinction Between Primary and Vicarious Corporate Criminal Liability’, 
(1967) ALJ 41,203.  Ormorod suggests if the physical act of the employee is construed in law to be 
the act of the employer, in legal theory it is not really a case of vicarious liability at all, David 
Ormorod’s, Smith and Hogan’s  Criminal Law: Cases and Materials (10th ed, OUP 2009). By way of 
illustration he says that in an offence of selling such as selling goods with a false trade description, in 
law the sale is the transfer of ownership of goods from A to B so although the goods are sold by the 
shop assistant, the seller is the owner of the goods ie the employer.  In law too the employer is the 
possessor of goods and there are numerous offences of possessing various articles and an employer 
has been held to keep and to use a vehicle when it is in the keeping or use by his employee in 
circumstances which the law forbids.  Whether the particular verb includes the inactive employer is 
a question of statutory interpretation but it should be noted that the law often has it both ways so 
the statute can be construed that the shop assistant has also sold the goods belonging to her 
employer and be guilty like the principle of the same offence.  In the case of selling intoxicating 
liquor the owner of the liquor, the licensee and the barmaid may be all guilty as principals of the 
same offence as each has in law sold, Allied Domecq Leisure Ltd v Cooper [1999] Crim L R 230 and 
Nottingham City Council v Wolverhampton & Dudley Breweries [2004] 2 WLR 820.  Alternatively, 
vicarious liability is said to be established by the identification of the conduct of the agent which is 
then ascribed to the employer, based on the legal relationship existing between them.  On this view, 
vicarious liability is conceived as a structure of legal fiction which states that whatever a person does 
through an agent, he is deemed to have done himself and the knowledge of the agent is the 
knowledge of the employer, see Eli Lederman, ‘Models for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability: 
From Adaptation and Imitation toward Aggregation and the Search for Self-Identity’ [2001] Buff Crim 
LR 642.  Blackstone explained the principle in terms of the fiction of an implied command, 
Blackstone, Commentaries 1, 417. 




the potential for it to incur liability vicariously and, in addition, the potential for an 
organisation to incur direct liability, for example when the criminal conduct is 
considered so pervasive and systemic that it is integral to the corporate behaviour. 
 
At the dawn of the 20
th
 century there was strong philosophical support for the realist 
view of collective groups with the notion that individuals coming together could lead 
to the emergence of an entity or consciousness that was more than the sum of its 
parts.  That this was the case was seemingly accepted with little demur.  For their 
part, the courts were as ready to attribute criminal liability to corporations as they 
were to human employers and principals, using the well established common law 
doctrines of master and servant and agency law.  Viscount Haldane L.C. was no 
stranger to either the realist philosophy or the courts approach to corporations but is 
nonetheless taken to have established the fiction theory in the Lennard’s judgment of 
1915.
712
  Since it marked a considerable departure from the prevailing orthodoxy, the 
following chapter seeks to explain the criminal law’s adoption of the fiction theory, 
via the mechanism of the identification principle, with a black letter law analysis of 















                                                             
712 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd [1915] AC 705 (HL).   
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6.   The common law development of the identification principle 
 
The decision emanating from the House of Lords in Lennard’s
713
 was a surprising 
one given the prevailing realist ideology, to which Viscount Haldane L. C. was no 
stranger, and the absence of any binding precedent.  The identification doctrine 
associated with this judgment was described in a recent report by the Law 
Commission as one that ‘treats the acts and states of mind of those individuals who 
are the directing mind and will of the corporation as the acts or state of mind of the 
corporation itself’.
714
  Accordingly, the imposition of corporate liability requires a 
‘two step analysis [that] first identifies the perpetrator of the crime, and then asks 
whether he or she is a person who can be said to embody the company’s mind and 
will’.
715
  Thus, it has been suggested that the common law developed two main 
techniques for the attribution of criminal fault, first by vicarious liability arising from 
the employment or agency relationship and, subsequently, via the identification 
doctrine.
716
   However, considered in the light of the findings in chapter 5, it is more 
accurate to say that the common law first developed one mechanism for the 
attribution of criminal fault and, thereafter, another by which to limit the operation of 
the first.  Put another way, the identification principle constituted a refinement that 
serves to limit the broad application of vicarious liability.   
 
In contrast to typical accounts of this area of law,
717
 this chapter will demonstrate 
Lennard’s
718
 was not taken to decide anything remarkable at the time or to develop 
the law in relation to any general principle of liability, either in the civil or criminal 
law jurisdiction.  Indeed, a wider examination reveals that the retrospective 
interpretation of Lennard’s
719
 places it in stark contrast to the prevailing criminal law 
which continued to apply the traditional principles of vicarious liability.  That this is 
the case is demonstrated by reference to the leading substantive and practitioner texts 
of the period, taken together with a string of well-known authoritative cases that 
                                                             
713 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd [1915] AC 705 (HL).   
714 Law Commission, Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts (Law Com No 195, 2010) pt 5, para 5.9. 
715 James Gobert, ‘Corporate Criminality: four models of fault’ (1994) 14(3) LS 393, 395. 
716 Described as the concept of corporate alter ego, see Sullivan GT, ‘The Attribution of Culpability to 
Limited Companies’ (1996) 55(3) CLJ 515,515. 
717
 David Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (13
th
 edn, OUP 2011) 260. 
718 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd [1915] AC 705 (HL).   
719 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd [1915] AC 705 (HL). 
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were heard after Lennard’s.
720
  The analysis reveals that the landmark status now 
afforded to Lennard’s
721
 was due entirely to its subsequent elevation in Tesco v 
Nattrass over 5 decades later in 1972.
722
   
 




 had established this general principle of corporate fault 
attribution in 1915, the implications would have been of far less significance than 
they became over half a century later.  In particular, the 2 evidential presumptions of 
fault were fully operational in the criminal law during this period.  Accordingly, the 
primary focus of enquiry would have been the manifest appearance of fault, the 
presumption of intention of natural consequences applying as much to the corporate 
actor as to the human individual.
724
  However, by the time of the Tesco prosecution 
in 1971
725
, the enlarged mens rea doctrine had done much to displace the traditional 
canons of fault together with the evidential presumptions that accompanied them.  
Specifically, it will be recalled that Sweet v Parsley,
726
 decided in 1969, 2 years 
before Tesco,
727
 had already effected something of sea-change as regards the 
presumption of voluntariness,
728
 whilst the presumption of intention had been 
causing considerable concern for the best part of the decade.
729
  Thus, with the 
upgrading of the doctrine of mens rea and the displacement of the evidential fault 
presumptions, a combination of factors was to influence the development of the 
principles of corporate fault attribution.  The increasing reluctance to convict in the 
absence of proof of a blameworthy state of mind was certainly evidenced by the 
judicial approach to the so-called ‘strict liability’ offences at the time of the Tesco 
decision
730
 and it is plausible that the doctrine of vicarious liability suffered for much 
the same reason.  Similarly, in the absence of the evidential presumption of intention, 
                                                             
720 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd [1915] AC 705 (HL). 
721 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd [1915] AC 705 (HL). 
722 Tesco Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153 (HL). 
723 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd [1915] AC 705 (HL). 
724 National Coal Board v Gamble [1958] 1 QB 11. 
725 Tesco Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153 (HL). 
726 Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 (HL). 
727 Tesco Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153 (HL). 
728
 Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 (HL). 
729 See the discussion above in chapter 3. 
730 Tesco Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153 (HL). 
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the means by which a guilty corporate mind might be proved would now have been 
becoming problematic.  It is submitted that in both these respects the recognition of 
the ‘identification principle’ provided a ready solution.  Not only did the notion of 
the ‘directing mind and will’ resonate with the modern primacy of the metaphysical 
enquiry, its attribution to an earlier authority accorded with the orthodoxy of the 
black letter law methodology. 
 
6.2   From Lennards to Tesco: the black letter law 
 
In Lennard’s the House of Lords was called to consider whether a corporate ship-
owner could be liable for loss of the cargo due to the unseaworthy state of one of its 
ships.
731
  Under the relevant merchant shipping provisions, the ship-owner could be 
liable if it could be shown that he, in this case the company, was at ‘actual fault’.
732
  
The case turned on the meaning of 'actual fault' as it applied to a company and their 
Lordships felt that, properly interpreted, the term precluded the application of 
vicarious liability on the part of the employer for the negligent acts of his servant.  
Echoing the expression of Coke in the Sutton’s Hospital Case,
733
 which was 
influenced by the ecclesiastical notion that a corporation was incapable of sin,
734
 the 
doctrine was first articulated by Viscount Haldane in broad terms:  
 
  A corporation is an abstraction.  It has no mind of its own any more than it  
  has a body of its own; its active and directing will must consequently be  
  sought in the person of somebody who for some purposes may be called an  
  agent, but who is really the directing mind and will of the corporation, the  




Lord Dunedin gave the only other speech in Lennard’s and he did not comment on 
the ‘directing mind’ test at all, although he did refer to the ‘alter ego’ of the company 
and the fact that the board of directors had entrusted its business to the managing 
                                                             
731 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd [1915] AC 705 (HL).   
732 Merchant Shipping Act 1894, s 502. 
733 Sutton’s Hospital Case (1612) [1558 – 1774] All ER Rep 11, 15 Co Rep 32b. 
734
 Cecil Thomas Carr, The General Principles of the Law of Corporations (Cambridge University Press 
1905) referring to Dr Otto von Gierke, Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht III, 279. 
735 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd [1915] AC 705, 713. 
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 by just 2 years and in which Scrutton J. had stated that 
in relation to the same provision, ‘The only exceptions to the protection given by the 
statute are (a) if the fire happened with the actual fault or privity of the owner, 
which, in the case of a limited company, means the person having management; i.e. 
Mr Lindley (...) ’,
738
 the director in the instant case.  Unlike Viscount Haldane L.C.’s 
dicta, there was no elaboration or metaphysical subtlety added.   Indeed, Scrutton J.’s 
comment was obiter and did not go as far as to provide any reasoning or any 
authority for the proposition he made, it was simply taken as read.   
The facts of Lennard’s were that faulty ship boilers had caused the fire which 
destroyed the claimant’s cargo.  The managing ship-owner sought to rely on the said 
statutory provision since its purpose was to protect ship-owners from the acts of their 
servants and to limit liability for loss and damage.  In determining the construction 
of the particular section, it was held that the owner himself needed to prove that he 
was not at actual fault.  Applied to the corporate owner, it was said that this 
necessitated the person acting as the alter ego of the company showing that he was 
not personally at fault.  Since the board of directors had placed responsibility for the 
management of the ship in the managing director, it was therefore the managing 
director who needed to show that he, acting for the company, was not at fault.  In the 
circumstances, he, as the alter ego, had not done so and accordingly the company 
was liable for the loss of the cargo. 
 
As regards any theoretical discussion about the liability of organisations, the 
Lennard’s judgment was sadly wanting.
739
  The authorities referred to were few in 
number and all concerned civil matters, none of which were exactly on point.
740
  
Similarly, neither Viscount Haldane L.C. nor Lord Dunedin purported to set out any 
general principle of corporate criminal liability in what was essentially a 
consideration of the issue of causation and the interpretation of one particular 
                                                             
736 Ingram & Royle Ltd v Services Martimes du Treport Ltd (No 1) [1913] 1 KB 538. 
737 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd [1915] AC 705 (HL). 
738 Ingram & Royle Ltd v Services Maritimes du Treport Ltd (No 1) [1913] 1 KB 538, 544. 
739 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd [1915] AC 705 (HL). 
740 Cases referred to are Wilson v Dickson (1818) 2 B & Ald 2 which considered the position of 
individual part owners; The Warkworth (1884) LR 9 PD 20; Norfolk & North America Steam Shipping 
Co Ltd v Virginia Carolina Chemical Co [1912] 1 KB 229 (CA); Ingram & Royle Ltd v Services Martimes 
du Treport Ltd (No 1) [1913] 1 KB 538.   
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statutory provision.  This is unsurprising in that the criminal liability of corporations 
was still evolving by analogy with the law of master and servant and that of principal 
and agent.  For example, the 1910 edition of Archbold’s Criminal Pleading quoted s. 
2(1) Interpretation Act 1889, ‘in the construction of every enactment (...) the 
expression “person” shall, unless a contrary intention appears, include a body 
corporate’; a contrary intention being inferred in cases of treason, felony, personal 
violence and where the penalty is imprisonment or corporal punishment.
741
  The text 
then set out various authoritative examples of corporate liability.  These included 
Whitfield v South East Railway Co (1858),
742
 a case concerning an allegation of 
malicious libel, in which Lord Campbell C.J. had held that since actions in tort or 
trespass could lie against a corporation, there must be circumstances in which 
express malice could also be imputed to a corporation.
743
  Similarly, in Mackay v The 
Commercial Bank of New Brunswick [1874]
744
 the Privy Council had decided that an 
incorporated bank could be liable in deceit for the false statements of its cashier, who 
was acting as a general manager of the bank.  It did not doubt that a corporation 
could be liable for the fraudulent actions of an agent done in the course of his 
service.  The Privy Council expressly approved the statement of Lord Cranworth in 
Ranger v Great Western Railway [1854]
745
 in which his Lordship had applied simple 
agency principles where the employer was a corporation rather than an individual.   
 
Two years after Lennard’s,
746
 the case of Mousell Brothers [1917]
747
 decided that a 
railway company was criminally liable for the acts of its branch manager who had 
issued false consignment notes to avoid railway tolls.  The decision was said to be 
based on the Parliamentary intention to make masters criminally liable for the acts of 
their servants, akin to the social welfare legislation relating to the sale of goods and 
drugs, where, as a matter of construction, statutes imposed an absolute liability on 
                                                             
741 William Feiden Craies and Henry Delacombe Roome, Archbold’s Criminal Pleading, Evidence and 
Practice (24th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1910) 7, 8. 
742 Whitfield v South East Rly Company (1858) E, B & E 115; 120 ER 451. 
743 Express malice was distinguished from malice in law. 
744 Mackay v The Commercial Bank of New Brunswick [1874] LT vol 30, NS 180. 
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 Ranger v Great Western Rly [1854] 5 HLC 71. 
746 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd [1915] AC 705 (HL). 





  Giving judgment in Mousell Bros, Viscount Reading said: 
 
  I think, looking at the language and the purpose of this Act, that the 
 Legislature intended to fix responsibility for this quasi-criminal act upon the  
  principal if the forbidden acts were done by his servant within the scope of  
  his employment.  If that is the true view, there is nothing to distinguish a  
  limited company from any other principal, and the Defendants are properly  




Considering the corpus of reported judgments of the time, there is nothing to suggest 
that the courts were seeking to construct some general principle of corporate 
liability.
750
  Similarly, whilst it has been suggested elsewhere that the ‘directing 
mind’ theory resurfaced in the civil law in the early 1930s,
751
 the 1938 edition of 
Archbold’s
752
 was drafted in the same terms as the 1910 version, notably absent of 
any reference to Lennard’s
753
 or indeed to any such theory.  In contrast, it set out the 
provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1925 which deal with procedural matters in 
instances where a corporation is charged ‘alone or with some other person, with an 
indictable offence’.
754
  It was not until the Second World War that cases dealing with 
the question of the basis of criminal responsibility of companies came to the fore 
                                                             
748 See for example the discussion contained in  the Law Commission, Criminal Liability in Regulatory 
Contexts (Law Com No 195, 2010) pt 5, para 5.4 and citing Mousell Bros Ltd v London & North 
Western Rly Co [1917] 2 KB 836, 845 (Atkin J). 
749 Mousell Bros Ltd v London & North Western Rly Co [1917] 2 KB 836, 845. 
750 According to Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part (2nd edn, Stevens & Sons 1961) 
274, Mousell was the solitary exception to the principle that attributed acts do not apply to offences 
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to an intermediate stage in the development of corporate criminal responsibility, David Ormorod, 
Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, Cases and Materials (10th edn, OUP 2009).  Later Williams observed 
that the speech of Lord Evershed in Vane v Yiannopolous [1965] AC 486 (HL) suggested that Mousell 
Bros Ltd v London & North Western Rly Co [1917] 2 KB 836 was to be restrictively interpreted and it 
was no authority for saying that every employer is vicariously liable for his employee’s offences 
involving mens rea, rather Mousell was an obscure decision and not clear authority for anything, 
Glanville Williams, Text Book of Criminal Law (2nd edn, Stevens & Sons 1961).  
751 See RJ Wickins and CA Ong, ‘Confusion worse confounded: the end of the directing mind theory?' 
[1997] JBL Nov, 524 - 56; Ong points to several cases dealing with the liability of companies in 
negligence where employees had suffered injuries within a factory workplace but regrettably the 
author does not identify them by name.  It should be noted in any event that negligence is not based 
on subjective mental states but objective assessment. 
752 Robert Ernest Ross and Maxwell Turner, Archbold’s Criminal Pleading: Evidence and Practice (30th 
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1938) 10. 
753
 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd [1915] AC 705 (HL). 
754 Robert Ernest Ross and Maxwell Turner, Archbold’s Criminal Pleading: Evidence and Practice (30th 
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1938) 97. 
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 Kent and Sussex 
Contractors
757
 and Moore v Bresler.
758
  Of note, none of these cases made any 
reference to Lennard’s [1915]
759
 and continued to employ traditional agency 
principles. 
In Triplex Safety Glass [1939],
760
 the Court of Appeal applied agency reasoning in 
relation to criminal libel and in Moore v Bresler Ltd
761
 it was held that the corporate 
employer could be criminally liable if its employees performed an authorised job in 
an unauthorised, fraudulent way.   That same year, in Kent & Sussex Contractors,
762
 
the company was prosecuted for issuing a record, knowing it to be false in a material 
particular.
763
  The facts were that the transport manager had submitted the record in 
order to obtain petrol coupons with intent to deceive.  At first instance it was held 
that the knowledge of the manager could not be imputed to the company but this was 
reversed on appeal to the Divisional Court.  Notably, Viscount Caldecote C.J. 
rehearsed the judgment of Lord Cranworth in Ranger v Great Western Railway 
Company [1854], which stated: 
 
  Strictly speaking a corporation cannot itself be guilty of fraud.  But where a  
  corporation is formed for the purpose of carrying on a trade or other  
  speculation not-for-profit, such as forming the railway, these objects can only  
  be accomplished by the agency of individuals; there can be no doubt that if  
  the agents employed conduct themselves fraudulently, so that if they had  
  been acting for private employers the persons for whom they were acting  
  would have been affected by their fraud, the same principles must prevail  
  whether the principal under whom the agent acts is a corporation.
764
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 Triplex Safety Glass Co Ltd v Lancegaye Safety Glass (1934) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 395 (CA). 
756 R v ICR Haulage Ltd [1944] KB 551. 
757 DPP v Kent & Sussex Contractors [1944] KB 146. 
758 Moore v Bresler Ltd [1944] 2 All ER 515. 
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762 DPP v Kent & Sussex Contractors [1944] KB 146. 
763 Informations were preferred against the respondent company under regulations 82(1)(c) and 
82(2) of the Defence (General) Regulations 1939, charging them that for the purposes of the Motor 
Fuel (No 3) Rationing Order, 1941, that it with intent to deceive, made use of a document which was 
false in a material particular which was signed by the transport manager of the company. 
764  Ranger v Great Western Rly (1854) 10 ER 824 [86]. 
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He noted that it was well settled that a corporation could be liable in actions such as 
fraud, libel or malicious prosecution and he also considered Pearks, Gunston and 
Tee Limited v Ward
765
 and Channel J.’s recognition of quasi-criminal offences which 
imposed absolute liability.  With regard to the present case, Viscount Caldecote C.J. 
stated that where: 
 
  the company was charged with doing something with intent to deceive, [and]  
  the second charge was of making a statement which the company knew to be  
  false in a material particular (…) (t)he question of mens rea seems to be quite  
  irrelevant (…).  There was ample evidence, on the facts as stated in the  
  special case, that the company, by the only people who could act or speak or  
  think for it had done both these things, and I can see nothing in any of the  
  authorities which requires us to say that a company is incapable of being  




Also giving judgment framed in agency terms, Macnaghten J. agreed that a 
corporation could only have knowledge and form an intention through its human 
agents but added that circumstances may be such that the knowledge and intention of 
the agent must be imputed to the body corporate.
767
  In the same case, Hallett J. 
referred to the Interpretation Act 1889 and the Criminal Justice Act 1925 noting that, 
‘There has been a development in the attitude of the Court arising from the large part 
played in modern times by limited liability companies (...) the theoretical difficulty 
of imputing criminal intention is no longer felt to the same extent’.
768
  Hallett J. also 
commented that: 
 
  if every person desiring to obtain petrol coupons has a duty imposed by  
  statutory authority to furnish honest information, it seems strange and  
  undesirable that a body corporate desiring to obtain petrol coupons and  
  furnishing dishonest information for that purpose should be able to escape the  
                                                             
765  Pearks, Gunston & Tee Ltd v Ward [1902] 2 KB 1 concerned section 6 of the Food and Drugs Act 
1875, providing that 'no person shall sell to the prejudice of the purchaser any article of food or any 
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 DPP v Kent & Sussex Contractors [1944] KB 146, 155 - 56. 
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  liability which would be incurred in like case by private person.
769
   
 
As regards criminal intent, he quoted from Atkin J.’s judgment in Mousell, ‘I see no 
difficulty in the fact that an intent to avoid payment is necessary to constitute the 
offence.  That is an intent which the servant might well have, inasmuch as he is the 
person who has to deal with the particular matter’.
770
   Hallett J. also referred to 
Triplex Safety Glass in which du Parcq L.J. had taken the view that a body corporate 
may by its servants or agents be guilty of malice so as to render it liable to 
conviction for criminal libel.
771
   
 
The subsequent Court of Appeal case, ICR Haulage [1944],
772
 involved a charge of 
common law conspiracy to defraud against the company, its managing director and 
other employees.  Approving the earlier authorities, the company itself was included 
on the indictment.   The Court of Appeal made use of the statement of Macnaghten J. 
in DPP v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd [1944] to the effect that the criminal 
intention of an agent, acting within the scope of his authority, could be imputed to 
the company.
773
  In that same year Moore v Bresler Ltd
774
  concerned the conviction 
of the company secretary and sales manager for making use of a document which 
was false in a material particular with intent to deceive.
775
   The Divisional Court 
found the company itself criminally liable, notwithstanding the company had been 
the victim of the fraud and the individuals concerned had not been acting in the 
company’s interests. 
 
Whilst the early cases appear to be context- sensitive
776
 they do not purport to 
establish a general principle of corporate criminal liability, indeed in ICR Haulage 
[1944], Mr Justice Stable was explicit on that point.
777
  Furthermore, according with 
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the agency analysis of liability at this time, the 1949 edition of Archbold’s
778
 made 
no mention of either Lennard’s
779
  and it was still absent from the 1958 and 1966 
editions of Kenny’s Outlines.
780
  However, it was during this period that Lord 
Goddard C.J., in Gardner v Akeroyd [1952], suggested that founding the criminal 
liability of employers on the basis of vicarious liability might be ‘odious’ and lead to 
potentially unjust results.
781
  Of note, it was in the same year that the next reported 
reference to the ‘directing mind and will’ was made, and, like its predecessor 
Lennard’s, the case was a civil matter.
782
  It was not until 1957 that there was a 
veritable sea change.  Brought about in the civil law case of Bolton (Engineering) Co 
Ltd,
783
 Denning L.J. claimed that the earlier cases had created a unifying theory 
which set out an overarching principle for both the civil and the criminal liability of 
companies.  He said,  ‘So also in the criminal law, in cases where the law requires a 
guilty mind as a condition of a criminal offence, the guilty mind of the directors or 
the managers will render the company themselves guilty.  This is shown by R v ICR 
Haulage Ltd’.
784
   
 
Of course, Denning L.J.’s comment on criminal liability was strictly obiter, Bolton 
Engineering itself concerning with a civil matter of landlord and tenant law.
785
  ICR 
Haulage
786
 had contained no mention of the directing mind theory either explicitly or 
implicitly and as for Lennard’s, Denning L.J. observed simply that, ‘in cases where 
the law requires personal fault as a condition of liability in tort, the fault of the 
manager will be the personal fault of the company’.
787
  However, it was in Bolton 
Engineering that Denning L.J. breathed life into the now infamous anthropomorphic 
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account that has become the touchstone of the doctrine:
788
 
    
  A company in many ways may be likened to a human body.  It has a brain  
  and a nerve centre which controls what it does.  It also has hands which hold  
  the tools and act in accordance with directions from the centre.  Some of the  
  people in the company are mere servants and agents who are nothing more  
  than the hands to do the work and cannot be said to represent the mind or  
  will.  Others are directors and managers who represent the directing mind and  
  will of the company, and control what it does.  The state of mind of these  
  managers is the state of mind of the company and is treated by the law as  
  such.
789
   
 
Leaving aside the fact that this was a fundamentally problematic analysis for the 
criminal law, since the actus reus and mens rea seemed to reside in different 
individuals, the statement must be considered by reference to the principles of 
criminality as they existed at that time.  Thus, as regards the reference to a state of 
mind, it must be remembered that in the 1950’s the presumption of voluntariness and 
the presumption of intention were still in full sway.  Whatever Denning L.J. said, the 
practice at that time was to assess fault primarily by reference to the overt conduct 
and its outcome.  Accordingly, the full implication of Denning L.J.’s creative 
analysis of corporate liability would not be felt until much later with the 
displacement of the evidential presumptions in favour of the expanded notion of 
mens rea.  It must also be noted that Denning L.J.’s innovative interpretation in 
Bolton Engineering
790
 did not assert anything like a firm influence on the criminal 
law until much later, with opinion divided as to any certain development of the legal 
principle.  For example, the 1961 edition of Williams’ seminal Criminal Law text 
mentioned a ‘new concept’ in the law of tort where the ‘acts of the “organs” of the 
corporation (...) were attributed to the corporation and treated (...) as though they 
were the acts of the corporation itself’.
791
  In support of this tortious liability 
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Williams quoted at length the dicta of Viscount Haldane L.C. in Lennards,
792
 
identified that the term ‘organs’ derived from the 1916 Daimler v Contintental Tyre 
case
793
 and observed that the alter ego doctrine enabled the state of mind of the organ 
to be regarded as the company’s own.  As to the imputation of mens rea under this 
principle, Williams cited ICR Haulage Ltd [1944] in support.
794
  That being said, the 
1966 edition of Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law was a little more reticent about 
recognising a new principle, stating that, ‘the courts have moved in the direction of 
making the corporation directly responsible, by the fiction that the elements of 
criminal liability present in the responsible agent of the corporation can be imputed 
to the corporation itself’
795
 and concluding that the ‘formulation of clear principles of 
criminal liability for corporations is urgently needed’.
796
  Given that Stable J. in ICR 
Haulage had articulated the judgment of the court in the language of the law of 
agency, there is arguably some weight to be afforded to Kenny’s reservations.
797
  
Furthermore, whilst Glanville Williams explicitly linked the tortious development in 
Lennard’s
798
 to the development of the criminal law of corporations
799
, not one of 









 had resurfaced after 5 decades to provide the authority for the 
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180 
 
identification principle in tort law and the agency case of ICR Haulage.
803
  Indeed, in 
its 1985 report, the Law Commission confessed to having been taken aback by the 
range of situations in which there was (to their knowledge) no direct authority prior 




As to the landmark case of Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1971],
805
 the 
company was prosecuted under section 11(2) Trade Descriptions Act 1968 for 
selling goods at a price higher than that advertised.
806
  The supermarket sought to 
rely on the defence set out at s. 24(1), namely that the offence was committed by 
another, the store manager, and that the company had taken all reasonable 
precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid it’s commission.
807
  In seeking 
to blame the store manager, Tesco argued that he was another person within the 
meaning of that provision and could not be viewed as the embodiment of the 
company itself.  With the court finding in favour of the company, it has been 
suggested that the case emerged in an atmosphere of liberal reform.  Lord Reid was 
certainly highly critical of the creation of absolute offences and the fact that 
individuals could be convicted of offences for which they were entirely blameless;
808
 
an injustice, he said, which brought the law into disrepute.  It was, of course, Lord 
Reid who, just 2 years earlier, had been instrumental in the Sweet v Parsley ruling 
which had expanded the very concept of mens rea.
809
   
 
Of note, Lord Reid relied particularly upon the dictum of Viscount Haldane L.C. in 
Lennard’s [1915]
810
 and then on that of Denning L.J. in Bolton Engineering 
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  In addition, he cited the 1950 case of Dumfries and Maxwelltown Co-
operative Society v Williamson
812
 which had concerned the similar provisions of the 
Sale of Food (Weights and Measures) Act.
813
  Agreeing with Lord Justice-General 
Cooper’s interpretation, he held that vicarious liability should not be imposed for an 
infringement committed without the consent or connivance of the employer.  Having 




 and then Dumfries,
816
  which 
had considered the issue of vicarious liability, Lord Reid then considered criminal 
cases which he classified as examples of companies being held liable for the fault of 
‘a superior officer’, referring to DPP v Kent
817
 and R v ICR Haulage.
818
  Arguably, 
the reference to the officers being ‘superior’ was superfluous since both cases had 
been decided by reference to simple agency theory in which the superiority of the 
officer involved was of no legal relevance.  However, omitting explicit reference to 
the law of agency, Lord Reid then quoted a passage from the latter case, stating that: 
 
  where in any particular case there is evidence to go to a jury that the criminal  
  act of an agent, including his state of mind, intention, knowledge or belief is  
  the act of the company [it] (…) must depend on the nature of the charge, the  
  relative position of the officer or agent, and other relevant facts and  
  circumstances of the case.
819
   
 
As far as this quote is concerned, it is contained in the final paragraph of Stable J.’s 
judgment in ICR in which he appeared to be talking generally about the need to 
consider a principal’s liability for the acts of his agent on a case-by-case basis.
820
  
However, Lord Reid used the quote to support the recognition of the ‘directing mind 
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and will theory’ which was said to require the culpability of a sufficiently senior 
officer.  Lord Reid went on to cite a further two cases in which companies had not 
been held responsible for the acts of their servants
821
 and, of these, the one reported 
case relied solely on the civil case of Bolton Engineering [1957].
822
  Lord Reid 
concluded that criminal liability only arose in 2 circumstances; the first, in the case 
of a company where the acts are those of responsible officers who form the ‘brain’ of 
the company and the second where the acts are those of a person to whom delegation 
of management has been passed.  Delegation by an individual was he said, quite 
correctly, another principle which has been recognised in licensing cases but which 
was anomalous.
823
  Bypassing any discussion of the longstanding agency principles 
and master and servant law, upon which the earlier criminal cases were based,
824
 
Lord Reid then focused on this anomalous line of authority.   
 
The basis of delegated liability had only ever been applied in limited, fact-specific 
situations such as licensee’s breaches where the licensee was absent from the 
licensed premises.
825
  The principle comes into effect when an individual office-
holder is under a duty and the performance of the duty is delegated to another
826
 and, 
accordingly, there are obvious overlaps between it and the attribution of liability on 
the basis of both master and servant and agency law.  Whilst this may explain the 
difficulties encountered by those who have sought to provide a coherent account of 
the development of a general principle in the attribution of corporate criminal fault, 
Lord Reid failed to consider the agency type cases.  Appearing to intermingle, and 
thus confuse, the directing mind theory with that of delegation, Lord Reid asserted 
that a board of directors could delegate part of their functions of management so as 
to make their delegate an embodiment of the company.  In the instant case, Tesco v 
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 he held that the Tesco board had never delegated any part of its 
functions, but had set up a chain of command through regional and district 
supervisors whilst remaining in control.  Accordingly, the acts or omissions of the 
shop manager were not the acts of the company itself.   
 
On Lord Reid’s analysis in Tesco v Nattrass, the identification principle restricted 
corporate liability to instances of culpability at a very high level within the 
organisation, namely ‘the board of directors, the managing director and perhaps 
other superior officers of a company who carry out functions of management and 
speak and act as the company’.
828
  It is this narrowing of liability to a very high level 
of management that has resulted in the widespread criticism that it is ‘at odds with 
the realities of the diffusion of managerial power in large companies and, more 
troubling still, could provide companies with perverse incentives to decentralise 
responsibilities so as to make it impossible to identify a senior individual (...) in 
charge of any matter’.
829
  This deficiency was addressed to some extent in a line of 
cases
830
 culminating in the Privy Council case of Meridian Global Funds 
Management (1995)
831
 in which Lord Hoffman framed the question in a purposive 
way.
832
  Whilst the flexibility of this approach was applauded by many who 
recognised that it could resolve the problem of corporate liability in a doctrinally 
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 the approach was short-lived.  Argued by the Crown in the 
corporate manslaughter case AGs Ref (No 2 of 1999) [2000],
834







 could have been distinguished in future cases on the basis that it 
provided nothing more than clarity as to the interpretation of the specific piece of 
legislation with which it was concerned, the Trade Descriptions Act.
837
  It has also 
been suggested that as the sole House of Lords’ decision in this area and involving a 
‘public welfare’ offence, not requiring proof of mens rea, the ‘directing mind’ 
argument could have been side-stepped altogether.
838
  In this respect, it has been 
argued that the fact that their Lordships did not do so illustrates as much about the 
contemporary judicial aversion to strict liability offences as it does about corporate 
liability for non-regulatory offences.
839
  Whilst there certainly appears to be evidence 
of a judicial agenda of this nature, with the broad expansion of the mens rea doctrine, 
it is also clear that the full extent of the potential legal implications of Tesco
840
 
would not have been obvious at the time.  Much as both of the evidential 
presumptions were fully operative at the time of the Lennard’s judgment,
841
 the 
presumption of intention, by reference to the natural and probable consequences of 
the act, was just beginning to attract attention on a prolific scale in the Tesco era.  
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Although DPP v Smith [1961] had attracted much criticism,
842
 upgrading the 
rebuttable evidential presumption to the status of an irrebuttable presumption of law, 
and s. 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 had corrected its misapplication, the 
terminology of ‘natural and probable consequences’ was to be the subject of 
heightened judicial attention for some time to come.
843
  Although Tesco v Nattrass
844
 
served to link the criminal liability of the company to the blameworthiness of one of 
its senior officers, the assessment of fault was still focused on the manifest 
appearance of the conduct.  Accordingly, it is submitted that the metaphysical 
limitations of the identification principle were yet to become evident. 
 
6.3   Summary 
 
In summary, it is submitted that the 1915 Lennard’s judgment,
845
 addressing as it did 
the statutory interpretation of a shipping act provision, was in no way remarkable 
when it was delivered and its subsequent significance as a general principle of 
corporate liability was a matter of retrospective convenience.  Indeed, that the case 
was to achieve landmark status was not evident at the time of Viscount Haldane’s 
death in 1928 and, of the few cases mentioned by Viscount Haldane in his 
autobiography, Lennard’s is not one.
846
  Indeed, the retrospective interpretation of 
Lennard’s
847
 places it in stark contrast to the prevailing criminal law which 
continued to apply the traditional principles of vicarious liability.  The landmark 
status now afforded to Lennard’s
848
 was due entirely to its subsequent elevation in 
Tesco
849
 and a court keen to expand the boundaries of the mens rea doctrine yet 
further.  It would appear that the identification doctrine was more the result of a 
haphazard conjunction of judicial pronouncements, made over a long period of time, 
than a coherent development of legal principle.  
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Furthermore, it can be observed that the authorities involving the question of 
corporate misconduct have tended to involve the misconduct of one or two 
identifiable individuals, the issue being whether or not these individuals can be taken 
as the embodiment of the corporation itself for the purpose of liability attribution.  




 can be 
distinguished from cases involving widespread misconduct of a systemic nature.  
Instances of pervasive misconduct within an organisation are rare, with perhaps just 
the unsuccessful prosecution of P & O Ferries springing to mind.
852
  The court held, 
and Parliament recognised, that corporate conduct of such a pervasive nature could 
not be addressed by reference to the identification principle.  Accordingly, the 
bespoke corporate homicide offence was enacted, aligning to the recognition of 
aggregate fault, albeit confined to management level.
853
  Whilst the identification 
principle might be serviceable in the former cases, it singularly fails in the latter.  
Recently enacted statutes provide precedent for the departure from the identification 
principle in specified instances of corporate misconduct and also implicitly accept 
that a corporation is a responsibility-bearing actor for the purpose of the criminal 
law.
854
  While we remain bereft of a fully developed theory of corporations, it is 
submitted that cases involving criminogenic companies can, and should be, 
distinguished from those in which individual offenders can be located.    
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7.   Conclusion 
Having established that both the common law and current statutory approaches to the 
attribution of corporate criminality are ill-suited to addressing modern examples of 
systemic corporate fraud, this research has identified the means by which dishonesty 
and intention can be attributed directly to an organization.  Accordingly, the criminal 
law can now respond to instances of pervasive corporate fraud which go beyond the 
hitherto traditional cases involving the misconduct of individuals perpetrated in the 
corporate context.  Thus, whilst the identification principle is a suitable method of 
corporate fraud attribution where a senior ‘director’ uses the corporate mantle to 
achieve his fraudulent purpose, this research provides the means by which 
organisations which have developed a corporate culture or practice can themselves 
be prosecuted. 
 
The method has involved a combination of legal theoretical analysis, supported by 
the findings of mind/action philosophy and modern neuroscience.  Further, the 
rational reconstruction sought has been achieved through a black letter law and 
historical unpicking of the formation of criminal law doctrine.   
 
The development of the criminal law has been traced alongside the historical 
emergence of trading corporations and the new problems of crime that 
industrialisation brought.  The historical account of the evolution of the construct of 
criminality, and the changing notions of the determinants of fault, has demonstrated 
that current assumptions about the basis of criminal liability rest on both a linguistic 
and conceptual confusion of the orthodox common law principles. In particular, the 
notion of mens rea has assumed a dominant role in the criminal law and, with the 
problematic metaphysical connotations it imports, this has duly impacted on the way 
in which the law has responded to corporate wrongdoing.  However, a renewed 
recognition of the traditional doctrine of voluntariness, the original hallmark of 
criminal fault, is an important step towards facilitating a general model of corporate 
liability.  This recognition inevitably acknowledges the continued existence of the 
evidential presumption of voluntariness which is both appropriate and practical in 
the attribution of fault, particularly in the corporate context.  Without the need for the 
prosecution to prove specific mental states, it would be open for a representative of 
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the corporation to raise evidence of any denial that the corporate conduct was 
voluntary.  Such an approach does not exclude the possibility that new context-
specific defences may develop by analogy with the existing defences with which an 
individual can deny voluntariness.  Conceived in its wider sense, acting freely and in 
knowledge of the circumstances, voluntariness is indicative of the capacity of the 
actor and provides the means by which a corporation can be recognised as a 
responsibility-bearing entity.  
 
Whilst the presumption of voluntariness was erroneously interpreted to offend one 
basic tenet of criminal law, seemingly reversing the burden of proof, the presumption 
of intention came to be seen as an affront to the whole principle of subjective 
individualism.  Mistaken for a legal presumption, not an evidential one, and thus 
taken to import an objective assessment of fault, it also became discredited.  
Accordingly, the evidential presumption of intention, based on the presumed 
foresight of natural consequences, gradually disappeared from the dialogue and 
narrative of the criminal law.  Although the Criminal Justice Act 1967 had clarified 
the status of the presumption, the focus of debate shifted over the subsequent 
decades such that the judicial and academic attention exclusively concerned the 
notion of oblique intention and degree of foresight required before indirect intention 
could be found.  The language of natural consequences was displaced by that virtual 
certainty.  As a result, the fact that the presumption of intention continues to apply 
when direct intention can be inferred is now rarely articulated.  Whilst it is evident 
that the presumption remains, it has but a tacit existence and it is rarely 
acknowledged explicitly.  Of the 3 orthodox presumptions, the presumption of mens 
rea is the only one now explicitly acknowledged.  However, the modern 
understanding of the mens rea doctrine has altered considerably.  In its original form, 
the presumption applied only to common law offences such that fault was 
determined not only by virtue of the voluntariness of the act but also because the 
defendant had foreseen the specified harm that had resulted.  That mens rea needed 
to be proved was assisted by the sister presumption of intention, where a harm 
foreseen was deemed to be a harm intended.   Consequently, the demise of the latter, 
in conjunction with the extended definition of mens rea, means that the prosecution 
must prove, subjectively, that the defendant, at the time of the commission of the 
offence, was possessed of each of the mental states set out in the definition of the 
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offence in question.  Accordingly, the primary enquiry in the trial process is now that 
of the defendant’s mind where previously the presumptions had operated to focus 
first on the outward appearance of the act which, if suggestive of blameworthiness, 
could then be rebutted by the defendant’s evidence. 
 
This procedural and evidential shift has had obvious conceptual implications for the 
attribution of wrongdoing perpetrated by the corporate actor.  However, the 
recognition of the continued existence of these presumptions facilitates the 
inculpation of the corporate entity on the same basis and model of criminality that is 
employed in the instance of individual liability.  This discovery means that, as far as 
corporate action is concerned, the absence of a guilty metaphysical ‘mind’ is not 
fatal to the finding of fault.  It is simply a matter of determining the process by which 
fault should be identified and, by acknowledging the operation of the orthodox 
presumptions, the overt act can be considered in the first instance with any denial of 
blameworthiness considered thereafter.  Like the individual, the corporate defendant 
is capable of calling witnesses to refute either or both presumptions in its defence. 
 
In the context of the fraud offence the evidential presumptions facilitate the 
attribution of both capacity and intent to the corporate actor.  Whilst it is the element 
of ‘dishonesty’ that truly distinguishes the entrepreneurial from the fraudulent, it has 
been shown that the courts also take an inferential approach in this respect. In 
accordance with the traditional approach to fraudulent intent, the common law 
continues to consider the overt appearance of the conduct in question first, by 
reference to an objective standard, and, thereafter, makes the subjective enquiry.  
Accordingly, where the conduct in question appears blatantly dishonest the 
presumption of dishonesty can be refuted by the defendant organisation bringing 
evidence to the contrary.  The essential ‘bridge’ in the attribution of fault continues 
to be the application of the orthodox evidential presumptions, based on the manifest 
perception of behaviour.  Whilst this approach is determinative of individual 
liability, it is equally consistent with the attribution of corporate fault. 
 
In support of this finding, an examination of contemporary philosophy, underpinned 
by recent scientific advances, serves to militate against the way in which criminal 
liability is currently constructed.  It is shown to challenge both the strict bifurcation 
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of the physical and mental elements of the offence and also the way in which we 
comprehend the subjective mental state of the defendant. The Latin maxim, as taken 
as the basis for the separation of actus reus and mens rea, is shown to accord with the 
Cartesian view of the world but to fail in relation to a more sophisticated 
understanding of action in which the physical and mental are not ontologically 
separable.  Thus, this analysis reveals that whilst the problem of finding the 
metaphysical guilty ‘mind’ presented an almost insuperable obstacle to attributing 
corporate culpability, the attempt to separate attributes of mind and body is itself 
based on an artificial construct.  Dualism is no longer the prevailing theory of mind 
and action.  Furthermore, contemporary philosophy is informed by scientific 
advances into the mirror neuron system of the brain.  With evidence that direct 
knowledge of another’s action can be experienced via the observation of it, credence 
is given to the explicit acceptance of the ‘manifest’ approach to the attribution of 
fault, the observance of the overt behaviour central to that enquiry.  Since the 
forming of groups and the engaging in group action is an elemental characteristic of 
human behaviour, it is further demonstrated that if the experience of the individual 
observing the action of another individual provides direct knowledge of it, so too 
does the observance of ‘group behaviour’ exhibited, for example, through corporate 
action.    
 
In as much as the historiographical account reveals the way in which the criminal 
law has gradually departed from the common law canons of fault, black letter law 
analysis specifically reveals the questionable basis of the identification theory of 
corporate liability.  The landmark status afforded to Lennard’s [1915]
855
 was due to 
its retrospective elevation effected in the Tesco v Nattrass judgment of 1971, a case 
which seemingly turned on the prevailing judicial distaste for strict liability offences 
rather than the strict application of legal principle.
856
  Whilst the usefulness of the 
identification principle is not in doubt where the misconduct of identifiable 
individuals is involved, and the question is whether or not they can be viewed as the 
embodiment of the corporation itself, it ceases to be of use where the misconduct is 
so systemic and pervasive that it is impossible to locate fault with the exactness that 
individual liability requires. That organisations are recognised as possessing the 
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capacity for autonomous action is now far from controversial.  Accordingly, this 
research demonstrates that the criminal law already possesses the conceptual tools 
needed to attribute fault to the corporate actor and to address the unique nature of 
fraud when it is committed in this context.  Given the lack of precedent in the 
context of systemic corporate fraud, there is an opportunity for the common law to 
make a coherent response which accords with orthodox doctrine, contemporary 
thinking and the scientific understanding of action.  Alternatively, Parliament may 
put the matter beyond doubt with the enactment of an express provision such that, 
for example, ‘in relation to a charge of fraud contrary to the Fraud Act 2006, a 
company may be found to be dishonest and have fraudulent intention, as described in 
act, where this is the obvious inference to be drawn from the corporate conduct and 
all the evidence’.   In this respect, the recently enacted Bribery Act 2010 provides a 
valuable precedent not only for a zero-tolerance approach to economic crime but also 
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